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Michael Mandelbaum
Strobe Talbott

REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND

The late summer and autumn of 1986 were a busy, confusing and dramatic period in Soviet-American relations. Within four months, the tone and substance of communications between Washington and Moscow oscillated sharply between conciliation and acrimony. At issue was whether there would be a second meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. If summitry futures had been traded like commodities, fortunes would have been made and lost. The two leaders themselves engaged in a kind of arbitrage, trying to make quick political profits from the swings of the market.

In July and August Reagan and Gorbachev exchanged letters, and each dispatched delegations of arms control experts to the other's capital. Momentum seemed to be building toward a summit in Washington at the end of the year. Then an American journalist was arrested in Moscow. Suddenly the mood soured, and the momentum slowed. But in the midst of what turned out to be a minor crisis, Reagan and Gorbachev made clear first to each other and then to the world that they were determined to proceed with the business between them. They agreed to hold a meeting, which quickly became one of the most extraordinary encounters in the history of relations between their countries, perhaps in the annals of high-level diplomacy.

The two-day meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12, 1986, broke with virtually all the precedents of U.S.-Soviet relations. There were scarcely any preparations. The meeting that took place was entirely different from the one the Americans had expected. They had anticipated not a full-fledged summit but, in President Reagan's words, "the last base camp"

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on the way to a Washington summit. Yet the agenda turned out to be much broader, and the issues discussed far more consequential, than even those the Americans had envisioned for the anticipated full summit itself.

In some obvious ways the Reykjavik meeting was a failure. At least in the short term, it derailed the summit process and dramatized the fragility of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Not since Khrushchev had refused to meet with President Eisenhower in Paris in 1960 and argued with President Kennedy in Vienna the following year had an encounter between the American and Soviet leaders ended so badly. In Iceland, when Reagan emerged from his final session with Gorbachev, his usual jaunty manner was missing; his mood was grim.

In reporting to the press immediately afterward, Secretary of State George Shultz appeared exhausted, dejected and defeated. He had to fight to control his emotions. He repeatedly used the word "disappointment" to describe the weekend. White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, at an impromptu press conference at Keflavik Airport, lashed out at the Soviets, saying that "they finally showed their hand; it showed them up for what they are." He said that "there will not be another summit in the near future as far as I can see."

Despite the spectacular collapse of the meeting and the ensuing acrimony, there was also significant, if tentative, progress on arms control. In his press conference, Shultz spoke of "potential agreements" that were "breathtaking." The two sides moved closer to accommodation on a number of issues than their top officials had considered possible beforehand.

In violation of all conventional wisdom about sound negotiating tactics and prudent diplomacy, Reagan and Gorbachev engaged each other on the biggest, most difficult issue dividing them—how to structure and limit their huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons—and then proceeded to improvise. Working groups of experts with no clear instructions toiled through the night to hammer out compromises on matters that years of negotiation had failed to resolve. The two leaders themselves spontaneously tabled variations on one of the oldest, most implausible and least productive themes of the nuclear age—general and complete nuclear disarmament. But they also spent considerable time adjusting their proposals for more practical measures that could become part of achievable, verifiable agreements.

They failed at the last minute to overcome the principal

obstacle to a treaty that might significantly reduce the levels of offensive weaponry on both sides. They could not resolve the question of how, if at all, to constrain President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI was then, as it had been for several years and promises to be for some time, the most contentious issue in Soviet-American relations. Gorbachev insisted that the program would give the United States military-technical superiority and a first-strike capability against the U.S.S.R. President Reagan insisted just as forcefully that SDI would produce a purely defensive shield against all offensive nuclear forces and was, therefore, the moral alternative to traditional deterrence based on mutual assured destruction. Neither leader would accept the other's reasoning.

But the meeting did offer a glimmer of hope of a world in which the United States and its allies would be less threatened by Soviet ballistic missiles. It also demonstrated that SDI gives the United States considerable leverage in the effort to achieve such a world through arms control.

II

The Reykjavik encounter was, in a sense, Gorbachev's revenge for the Geneva summit of the previous year. The earlier meeting, in November 1985, had taken place on Reagan's terms. The atmosphere had been civil, even cordial. It left a lingering image in the eyes of the world of the two men seated comfortably before a crackling fire in a pool house on the shore of the lake. They were photographed shaking hands, smiling, chatting earnestly but amiably. Before going home they made a joint public appearance at which they signed a communiqué. Perhaps inevitably, the press proclaimed a "new spirit of Geneva."

The most important feature of the Geneva meeting for Gorbachev was what had *not* happened: Reagan had come to the summit and gone home without yielding even the slightest concession on SDI, the American policy that most concerned the Soviet leaders. Because he had succeeded in "protecting" SDI at the summit, Reagan was hailed by the American right just as enthusiastically as he was praised by the center and the left for resuming high-level Soviet-American diplomacy.

The general secretary may have run into trouble when he arrived home in Moscow empty-handed. His comrades among the Kremlin old guard and the military could not have been pleased that the summit had failed to stop or even slow down

SDI. As a result of whatever displeasure he encountered in the Politburo, Gorbachev may have decided never again to let himself be lured to a summit at which SDI would be finessed.

Throughout much of 1986, the two leaders engaged in a slow-motion fencing match over whether they would hold a second meeting. In the atmosphere of good feeling that had enveloped them in Geneva, they had agreed to meet again the following year in the United States, and the year after that in the Soviet Union. The White House wanted the second meeting in June 1986 and in any case no later than September, before the November congressional elections. The Kremlin made clear that it was not interested in another meeting without concrete progress in arms control. Soviet spokesmen indicated that June was much too soon for the necessary preparations and suggested that their leader would renege altogether on his promise to attend a second summit rather than participate in what would be little more than another photo opportunity.

Even as they seemed to be stalling on a second summit, the Soviets stepped up their propaganda on behalf of a moratorium on all nuclear testing and a phased reduction of nuclear weapons that would lead to the elimination of both sides' arsenals by the end of the century. These proposals were designed for maximum appeal to international public opinion. Each was also a way of attacking SDI. A comprehensive test ban would prevent the development of the nuclear-driven X-ray laser, which some scientists think is the most promising technology for space-based defenses; the elimination of offensive nuclear weapons within 15 years would seem to make strategic defense all but superfluous. At the same time, the Soviets were making some concrete concessions at the ongoing arms control negotiations in Geneva. For example, they dropped their insistence on counting as "strategic" the American forward-based systems, most of them located in Europe, that could reach Soviet territory.

By appearing to insist on progress in arms control as a condition for holding the summit conference, the Soviets were trying to exert political and psychological pressure on Reagan, whose interest in another meeting and in an arms control accord was evident from his statements during the spring and summer. Time was running out for him. By 1987, even if his personal popularity remained high, the United States would be deep into the next presidential campaign. It would be more

difficult than usual to conduct foreign policy. Policy toward the Soviet Union would be especially vulnerable to the partisan and ideological passions of the election season. Moreover, growing public and congressional concerns over the federal budget deficit threatened a backlash against military spending, including on SDI.

For Ronald Reagan to leave the presidency in a blaze of superpower statesmanship, he might need a second summit in late 1986 and another before leaving office. Moscow was attempting to get American arms control concessions in exchange for keeping to the agreed schedule. In early September Gorbachev complained in an interview with the Czechoslovak Communist Party newspaper *Rudé Právo*, "We have not moved an inch closer to an arms reduction agreement, despite all the efforts made by the U.S.S.R."

Even as they set conditions for another Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, however, the Soviets were evidently looking for a way to justify one. For a while they seemed to abandon, or at least loosen, the connection that they had made earlier among the various arms control negotiations. In January 1985, in a meeting in Geneva with George Shultz, then Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had insisted that the three issues of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), strategic arms, and space and defensive systems had to be resolved "in their interrelationship." Yet starting with the Reagan-Gorbachev summit of November 1985, Soviet officials began saying they would be willing to settle for an interim INF agreement, progress toward a nuclear test ban or perhaps even so-called confidence-building measures such as strengthened procedures for avoiding the accidental start of a war in Europe.

In short, the Soviets seemed ambivalent about a summit. They did not want to allow Reagan's supporters to claim, as they had after the Geneva meeting, that standing tall and holding firm had paid off and that Gorbachev had knuckled under to the President. At the same time they were worried about the consequences of yet another breakdown in Soviet-American diplomacy. Despite their professed fidelity to a great revolutionary tradition, the men in the Kremlin are extremely conservative. They are deeply uncomfortable with discontinuity, uncertainty, unpredictability. The failure to hold a follow-up summit would represent all three. And they were genuinely worried about the future of the nuclear competition. A respite from—or perhaps a long-term arrangement for the regulation

of—that competition was important if Gorbachev were to have the *peredyshka*, or breathing space, that he seemed to need in order to carry out his domestic program.¹

The Soviets had to calculate the likely impact of American politics on their interests. As the end of his presidency approached, Reagan would become a lame duck. Some Soviet officials said that their leaders were tempted simply to wait out what they called “this impossible Administration” and hope for someone more “reasonable.” But given their penchant for worst-case analysis, Soviet officials had to consider at least the possibility that the next American president would be even more strident in criticizing their political system, more vigorous in attacking their empire on its flanks, perhaps even more committed to strategic defense. As they surveyed the American political landscape they could see a number of potential presidential candidates who seemed to fit that description. In discussions with Americans, Soviet specialists on the United States showed deep curiosity about the presidential prospects of Representative Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) and Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.).

Moreover, the difficulties that the Soviets had experienced with Reagan gave the President a certain political advantage in managing the domestic politics of an agreement if one were achieved. He would have little difficulty getting a treaty ratified by the Senate. Thus, both Reagan and Gorbachev had incentives to meet again.

III

The two leaders seemed to be moving in the direction of a second summit when they were jolted by one of the unforeseen events that have made the conduct of Soviet-American relations so accident-prone over the years. The episode started with a scene out of a grade-B film about the FBI, which was followed by one from an equally hackneyed thriller about the KGB. On August 23 Gennadi Zakharov, a Soviet physicist on the staff of the United Nations, was arrested while attempting to purchase intelligence secrets from an agent who had been working for the FBI. While he was the victim of entrapment, Zakharov was clearly engaged in espionage. The KGB retaliated

¹ See Arnold Horelick, “U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Return of Arms Control,” *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1984; and Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, “The Genesis of Gorbachev’s World,” *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1985.

by setting a superficially similar trap in Moscow for Nicholas Daniloff, the correspondent for *U.S. News & World Report*; one of his Soviet contacts arranged for a meeting on August 30, at which he gave Daniloff a sealed envelope. Secret policemen then suddenly appeared, arrested Daniloff and claimed that the envelope contained state secrets. Unlike Zakharov, Daniloff did not know what he was receiving and had no thought of buying the information. He was the victim of a primitive frame-up. The Soviets then tried to arrange a trade of Daniloff for their own man.

As some Soviets admitted privately, their government seriously underestimated the outrage that the Daniloff affair would provoke in the United States. The Reagan Administration's initial reaction was mild compared to that of the American media. This was not surprising, since one of their own was being held hostage. Congress, too, took a harder line than the White House, with some members insisting that all business with Moscow stop until Daniloff was set free.

In late September Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze came to the United States to take part in the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly and met with President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz. Both sides had hoped the meetings would lay the groundwork for a summit. But Daniloff's imprisonment poisoned the atmosphere and complicated the agenda of the meetings. The potential effects of the whole affair seemed absurdly out of proportion to the cause.

Because of the depth of hostility and mistrust between the superpowers, Soviet-American relations often appear to exemplify Murphy's Law: whatever can go wrong, does go wrong—and at the worst possible time. Over the years much has gone wrong, often scuttling the best-laid plans of statesmen on both sides. The U-2 incident of May 1960 led Khrushchev to storm out of the Paris summit; the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 delayed agreement to hold the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); the invasion of Afghanistan virtually guaranteed that the U.S. Senate would not ratify the SALT II treaty; and the downing of a Korean airliner in September 1983 impeded Shultz's effort to reengage the U.S.S.R. in quiet diplomacy on a variety of bilateral and regional issues.

For all the differences among them, these incidents had three important features in common, which they shared with the Daniloff affair. First, the Kremlin's concern with security

almost always takes precedence over propaganda and diplomacy. Moscow was determined to keep loyal Communists in power in Prague and Kabul no matter what the price in international opprobrium, just as it was determined to get its agent out of an American jail by any means necessary. Second, if what the Soviets do leads to a crisis in their relations with the United States they are quick to blame Washington. And third, the disruption in relations has always proved temporary. On September 29 Daniloff was released as part of a compromise whereby Zakharov, too, was to be returned home, but not in a direct exchange.

The Daniloff affair was all too characteristic of both the Soviet Union itself and the Soviet challenge to American policy. It illustrated anew the nature of the Soviet system: the institutionalization of paranoia and xenophobia that find expression in a deep animosity toward foreign journalists; the corruption of the law; the obsession with exposing enemies and, in the absence of real enemies, with finding and framing scapegoats instead. The Soviet system performs these tasks so well that it does other things badly. A state that defines internal security almost exclusively in terms of the power of the police finds it all too easy to give short shrift, not to mention inadequate resources, to other forms of security, such as economic well-being. The “competent organs” is the stock Soviet euphemism for the KGB. The unintended implication of the phrase is that all other organs are incompetent, an implication that is not altogether wrong.

Thus the Daniloff incident served to remind many Americans that the basis of their objections to the other superpower lies deeper than opposition to the U.S.S.R.’s expansionism and its threatening military programs. Soviet foreign policy is objectionable largely because the Soviet army and its baggage train of commissars, diplomats and propagandists have treated the people of Afghanistan, Poland and Czechoslovakia in much the same way that the KGB treated Nicholas Daniloff—and, for that matter, Andrei Sakharov, Yuri Orlov (the dissident who was released from a labor camp and allowed to emigrate as part of the resolution of the Daniloff affair), and so many others.

During the episode Reagan received considerable criticism from the right for allowing the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting to proceed, for trying to keep plans for a summit on track, and generally for continuing “business as usual” with a regime that

was holding captive an innocent American. But business as usual with the Soviet Union was, by definition, limited business, driven by the superpowers' mutual interest in the avoidance of war and by very little else. It was the kind of business that had historically proceeded, albeit with delays and distractions, even in the face of episodes far bloodier than the Daniloff affair. If the United States refused to do business with the Soviet Union until Moscow began to treat its people decently, to say nothing of foreign journalists and the citizens of neighboring countries, no superpower business would ever get done. In truth, episodes like the Daniloff affair are not simply bumps in the road to summits, they are the pavement itself.

IV

The Daniloff affair seemed to redouble the two leaders' determination to meet face to face. Each was confident of his own ability to project an appealing but also commanding and persuasive personality. The two shared the belief that, as individuals, they could and should exert direct control over the relationship between their countries, rather than leave it to the giant bureaucracies over which they presided. The incident served as a reminder to both men of how relatively minor events can spin out of their control.

In a series of communications with the White House before Daniloff was allowed to leave the U.S.S.R., Gorbachev expressed irritation over the uproar in the United States that the journalist's detention had provoked, but also frustration and impatience that the U.S.-Soviet relationship should so often seem to defy deliberate, coherent management from the top. In a letter that Shevardnadze delivered to Reagan on September 19, Gorbachev wrote of the need for the two leaders to involve themselves personally, so as to impart an "impulse" to the stalled diplomatic process. He proposed the Reykjavik meeting as a way of accelerating preparations for a Washington summit.

Reagan, according to his aides, was immediately inclined to accept. He was attracted to the symbolism of meeting the other leader in a city halfway between their two capitals. He was encouraged by Donald Regan, who felt that the President had proved in Geneva the year before that he could deftly handle his Soviet counterpart. Some of Regan's associates said that the chief of staff also had his eye on the calendar: a mid-October meeting in Reykjavik would come a few weeks before the

congressional elections of November 4, in which the President's party would be fighting—in vain, as it turned out—to keep control of the Senate. The meeting would remind the electorate that the Republican flag was still firmly planted on diplomatic high ground.

Gorbachev's proposal was kept secret until September 30, when Daniloff was safely out of the Soviet Union. Then the President stunned the world by announcing that he would go to Iceland ten days later.

The Soviets had led American officials to expect that INF would be the focal point of the meeting. Since the Geneva summit the year before, the Soviets had been hinting, and occasionally flatly stating, that Gorbachev was prepared to sign a separate INF agreement unlinked from other arms control issues. Of the three sets of talks in Geneva—Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), space and defense, and INF—the third had always been the most political. The weapons under the rubric of INF were destructive enough in their own right, although they were all but incidental in terms of military firepower when compared to the numbers and capabilities in the strategic category. But INF was vitally important in the politics of NATO; the so-called Euromissiles symbolized America's commitment to use its own nuclear weapons to protect Western Europe. Conversely, the Soviet campaign to block the American deployments was part of a broader effort to encourage the “decoupling” of the United States from Europe.

When it came time to make a deal that would be the centerpiece of a summit, Shultz and Shevardnadze were drawn toward INF. That negotiation lent itself to the immediate diplomatic need to achieve concrete agreement far more easily than did START and the space and defense talks, where there were thorny and vitally important military questions at stake, such as whether the United States should spend billions on developing exotic antiballistic missile systems and whether the Soviet Union would have to spend comparable sums on countermeasures.

But when Reagan arrived for the first session in Reykjavik, he found that INF was neither the main item on the agenda nor was it detached from the other, more difficult, strategic issues. Gorbachev had brought with him a briefcase full of papers outlining nothing less than a comprehensive arms control agreement dealing with INF, START and SDI, as well as other issues such as nuclear weapons testing. In the words of one of

the President's aides, the Soviet leader was "going for the big casino."

From the beginning it was clear to Reagan that while Gorbachev had come prepared to make some unexpectedly forthcoming concessions, they might all be contingent on some sort of reciprocal American flexibility on SDI, although exactly what that flexibility would have to involve was not at first apparent. Emerging from his first session with Gorbachev to meet with his advisers, President Reagan said, "He's brought a whole lot of proposals, but I'm afraid he's going after SDI."

Gorbachev was proposing a version of what many arms control specialists inside and outside the Administration had long anticipated—and what some had advocated. For many months they had speculated about the possibility of a "grand compromise" in which the United States would accept significant constraints on SDI in exchange for equally significant reductions in Soviet offensive forces. The Soviet incentive for such a compromise was plain. An American defensive system, even if it were not particularly effective, would force the Kremlin into an expensive and potentially disruptive round of the arms race. Moreover, SDI represented a new kind of competition in exotic technology, where the advantage, at least initially, would be with the United States. Those who pondered the possibilities for such a compromise had never been certain about how far the Soviets would go in offering to reduce their most threatening offensive weapons in order to obtain restraints on American defenses.

In Reykjavik Gorbachev and his colleagues moved toward answering that question, although the response that emerged was not conclusive, precise or binding. The exact terms of the tentative accord reached during the weekend were the subject of considerable confusion. There were subsequent disagreements about exactly what had been decided, what conditions had been attached and what timetable had been stipulated. Some reductions were slated to take place over five years, others over the course of ten. Some of the provisions for the second phase seemed more like utopian reveries or pure propaganda than real arms control. In the week after the summit, senior Administration officials launched an intense public relations campaign to reverse the impression that Reykjavik had ended in failure. They engaged in a surreal debate with the Soviets, and sometimes with each other, over whether by 1996 the world was to be free of all nuclear weapons, as the Soviets

contended, or only of all ballistic missiles. Neither the President nor Donald Regan was at first quite clear on that point.

During a climactic Sunday session in Reykjavik, President Reagan proposed the elimination of ballistic missiles within ten years. This would have deprived the Soviet Union of its most formidable weapons while leaving the United States with an advantage in nuclear-armed bombers and cruise missiles. Gorbachev countered with a variation of a proposal he had been making since January for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, which would have left the Soviet Union with numerical advantages in conventional forces. Reagan replied, "That suits me fine."

The President subsequently maintained that he had not intended to endorse Gorbachev's call for total nuclear disarmament within ten years; rather, Reagan explained, he had merely meant to reiterate his long-standing hope that a nuclear-free world would be achieved some day.

In the week after Reykjavik, the Administration adopted a unified public stance; it was committed to the goal of eliminating all ballistic missiles within ten years. However, even that objective proved controversial. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were upset that they had not been given a chance to study the military implications of what would be a drastic change in the basis for deterrence. Military and congressional leaders argued that a ten-year timetable for the abolition of ballistic missiles would undercut support for the new generation of American ballistic missiles—the MX, the Midgetman and the Trident II or D-5 submarine-launched missile. By promoting the elimination of ballistic missiles within ten years, the Administration was unintentionally undermining its own much-vaunted "strategic modernization" program.

Experts on both sides of the Atlantic reminded the Administration that ballistic missiles were crucial to the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella over Western Europe; the doctrine of extended deterrence depended on the American capacity to retaliate quickly and effectively with a nuclear strike if the Soviet Union ever attacked NATO; ballistic missiles were the principal means of carrying out that retaliation.²

² Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), an authority on defense issues, contended that without nuclear weapons the West would find itself at a disadvantage in facing the superior non-nuclear forces of the Eastern bloc and said that he was "relieved that the superpowers did not reach an agreement along these lines." Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger made the same point in an essay in *Time* magazine on Oct. 27, 1986, entitled "The Dangers of a

During their long and tiring sessions in Iceland, Reagan and Gorbachev had apparently been caught up in a make-or-break atmosphere. At the end they had engaged in a bout of feverish one-upmanship, with each trying to outdo the other in demonstrating his devotion to the dream of a nuclear-free world. Each had reverted to his grandiose disarmament appeals of earlier in the year. That part of the documentary record of the weekend appeared destined to recede into the footnotes of history. However, the terms that had been envisioned for the first five-year period were more specific, more modest, and more in line with agreements that the two sides had signed and observed in the past. They were therefore likely to have more staying power.

Detailed negotiations would be necessary to turn the terms to which the two leaders had agreed into a treaty. In the process of conducting such negotiations, the stated goal of a 50-percent across-the-board reduction in strategic weapons might have to be compromised. But an accord along the lines of the Reykjavik agreement would almost certainly compel the Soviets to retire a significant portion of their large, multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, including some of their notorious "heavy" SS-18s, which worry the United States because their accuracy, speed and destructive capability make them the potential instruments of a surprise attack. These missiles have been the principal cause of American concerns about a "window of vulnerability," the driving obsession of the American strategic debate for nearly two decades. At Reykjavik, Gorbachev also agreed to consider provisions that would induce both sides to rely more on bombers, cruise missiles and small, single-warhead mobile ICBMs—weapons that are better suited to retaliation and therefore less likely to pose the threat of a first strike.

While the Americans wanted reductions of offensive forces, the chief Soviet goal was restraints on defensive systems—specifically the American SDI. Gorbachev had proposed different kinds of restrictions at different times.

When he assumed power in early 1985, Gorbachev wanted a complete ban on "space-strike arms," including all research. Then, in an interview published in *Time* magazine in September 1985, he said that "fundamental" research might be allowed. Over the following months, he proposed an extension of the

Nuclear-Free World," in which he also asserted that abolishing nuclear weapons forever was simply not possible because the knowledge of how to make them would always remain.

1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for 15–20 years, then for “up to 15 years.”

Meanwhile, in a letter to Gorbachev in July 1986, Reagan had proposed continuing the ABM treaty for seven and a half years. Neither side would be able to withdraw during that period. The question of duration was obviously amenable to compromise: the two could split the difference and arrive at a figure of ten years. So they did at Reykjavik. But that did not resolve the difficult question of what the ABM treaty actually permitted in the way of research, development and testing of high-technology space-based defensive systems. It was over this issue that the Reykjavik meeting collapsed.

Early in the weekend Gorbachev indicated that he was interested in “strengthening” the treaty. However, not until the final unscheduled session on Sunday afternoon did he make clear that by this he meant that research during the ten-year period would have to be confined to the “laboratory.” Reagan balked at that formulation. As he told Gorbachev and said repeatedly afterward, he considered this definition of permissible research an attempt to “kill” SDI. When Gorbachev would not budge, the President gathered up his papers and the meeting ended on a note of failure and recrimination.

It was perhaps the most bizarre moment in what was already a peculiar event; the President had not been prepared to deal conclusively or in detail with the vital and immensely complicated question of the future relationship between SDI and the ABM treaty; he had little opportunity to take counsel from his own advisers, not to mention from technical experts and European and congressional leaders, on a subject that had implications spanning both oceans and stretching far into the future. Yet he not only made a critical decision on the spot, he publicized it in a way that froze the two leaders into incompatible positions. Why did he not simply say to Gorbachev, in effect, “This is very interesting, a lot is on the table; we’ll have to study it carefully, and we’ll get back to you”?

That question was not answered in the immediate post-Reykjavik flurry of official explanation and justification. One conjecture was that Reagan felt under some pressure from the right. If he had appeared even to entertain Gorbachev’s proposal, he would have been vulnerable to charges of doing at Reykjavik what he had avoided doing at Geneva the year before: compromising on SDI. Conservative congressmen and columnists had warned him before the meeting not to make

any such compromise; they congratulated him afterward for not doing so. Even more important to the President was his deep commitment to the dream of a space shield that would protect the American people from nuclear attack. He sensed that the Soviet leader was trying to get him to give up that dream; he responded by walking away.

From the Soviet point of view, Reagan's position meant that the United States was not willing to pay any appreciable price in defensive restraints to get offensive reductions—at least not yet. Reagan's agreement to delay SDI deployment for ten years and adhere to the ABM treaty depended on the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles within that same ten-year period, something that virtually nobody outside the room in Hofdi House, where the two leaders met, considered even remotely feasible. In any event, the delay hardly represented a concession because SDI would not be ready for full deployment for at least ten years anyway. Moreover, Reagan's understanding of the ABM treaty differed sharply not only from that of the Soviets but from the interpretation of a number of key members of Congress and even of the Americans who negotiated the treaty in the early 1970s.³

After the meeting, Administration spokesmen maintained that the treaty gave the United States the right not only to conduct research but also to develop and test an SDI system and its components. So when the ten-year moratorium ended, the United States might have some sort of defensive system ready to put in place. Faced with that prospect, the Soviets would have no incentive to reduce their offensive forces. Quite the contrary, they would have every reason to *increase* their arsenal of offensive weapons; for in order to deter the United States, the Soviets believe, they must be able to penetrate and overwhelm whatever defenses the United States eventually deploys. Thus Reagan's position on the defensive half of the grand compromise at Reykjavik came down to a refusal to accept any of the restraints on SDI that the Soviets sought.

In his attempt to confine the program to "laboratory" re-

³ The ABM treaty had long been understood to permit research but not development or testing of space-based defensive systems utilizing "exotic" technologies. In 1985 some members of the Reagan Administration challenged this traditional, "restrictive" interpretation of the treaty. They advanced a "permissive" interpretation, according to which everything short of actual deployment of SDI could proceed. On this subject see Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "Testing and Development of 'Exotic' Systems under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper"; and Abraham D. Sofaer, "The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative," both in *Harvard Law Review*, June 1986.

search, Gorbachev seemed to be insisting on a new, more restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty, just as Reagan was advancing a more permissive one. Each side had room to maneuver. Reagan's principal concern seemed to be protecting SDI from Soviet efforts to "kill" it. Even many who were skeptical of his vision of the program as a way to defend American cities from nuclear attack believed that the United States needed to conduct a research program as a hedge against the possibility that the Soviets, who also had a strategic defense research effort under way, would make a breakthrough of their own in that area.

The research program that even many skeptics supported, however, might well go forward under the traditional interpretation of the treaty. According to Gerard Smith, its chief American negotiator, who spoke in an interview published in *Time* shortly after the summit:

There could be testing, outside the laboratory, of some new technologies and devices, as long as they were not components of a deployable system. Defining components may be a key element in the ongoing negotiation, but in the gray area between the Soviets' current laboratory definition of permissible research and the Administration's claim that anything goes, there should be a way of accommodating Gorbachev's fear and Reagan's dream.

If Smith is right, the compromise that the two leaders had failed to reach at Reykjavik may yet be struck. Both leaders promised to persist in seeking an agreement. At his press conference immediately after the meeting, Gorbachev said, "The road we have traveled toward these major agreements—major accords on the reduction of nuclear arms—gives us substantial experience, gives us substantial gains here in Reykjavik." In a televised address from Moscow two days later he said, "The American leadership will obviously need some time. We are realists and we clearly understand that the questions, which had remained unresolved for many years and even decades can hardly be resolved at a single sitting." A week after that speech he delivered another one in which he complained that the American side was giving a distorted version of the events in Iceland. But he reaffirmed that "we are not removing these proposals; they still stand. Everything that has been said by way of their substantiation and development remains as before." "The Reykjavik meeting," he added,

“greatly facilitated, probably for the first time in many decades, our search for disarmament.”

Reagan, too, looked to further negotiation. “I’m still optimistic that a way will be found,” he said in a televised speech of his own after Reykjavik. “The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach. . . . Our ideas are out there on the table. They won’t go away. We’re ready to pick up where we left off. Our negotiators are heading back to Geneva, and we’re prepared to go forward whenever and wherever the Soviets are ready.” Within three weeks Shultz and Shevardnadze met again, this time in Vienna, to try to pick up the pieces. That meeting failed to break the impasse over SDI and, in Shevardnadze’s words, “left a bitter taste.” American officials in Vienna had the impression that the Soviets might be stalling for time to reassess the American political situation in the wake of the Democratic Party’s regaining control of the Senate just two days before the meeting. Nonetheless, both Shultz and Shevardnadze called for patience and reiterated their determination to press forward on future negotiations.

Almost immediately after they ended in disappointment, therefore, the Reykjavik and Vienna meetings were already beginning to appear as another stage, a difficult and discouraging stage perhaps but far from the last one, in the ongoing effort to regulate the military competition between the superpowers.

V

With the Reykjavik meeting, Reagan and Gorbachev were two-thirds of the way to matching the trio of summits that Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev had held during the heyday of *détente*. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were not, however, returning to the conditions of the early 1970s. The political arrangements of that period have sunk into the past, weighted down with controversies and recriminations. The Reagan-Gorbachev relationship, however it turns out, will be different. Moreover, however the bargaining on arms control ends, the interaction of these two leaders, including the roller-coaster course of relations in 1986, demonstrates some enduring principles about the Soviet-American relationship itself. Those principles essentially concern limits—on what the superpowers can do both to each other and with each other.

One is the limit to how far Soviet-American relations can deteriorate. Particularly during his first term, Reagan had been the most anti-Soviet American president in 30 years, perhaps ever. He had aimed not at solidifying the status quo in East-West relations but at overturning it. His rhetoric toward Moscow had been harsh. The Soviet leaders had responded with even harsher language of their own. Each side had tried briefly to impose a diplomatic boycott on the other. Yet at no time, even when relations were at their worst—even after the Korean airliner episode and the Soviet walkout from the Geneva talks in 1983—had there been a serious danger of war. Moreover, none of the major agreements that had been reached in more cordial times came unstuck. The European settlement that the *détente* of the early 1970s had produced never even came under critical scrutiny. While the SALT agreements were the objects of a good deal of such scrutiny, they remained in force, at least until late 1986. And in 1985 the two leaders found themselves agreeing to meet regularly. The business they had with each other was too compelling to ignore.

The first half of the 1980s, and the policies that both sides pursued in that period, also showed that neither was likely to gain a decisive advantage over the other. By agreeing in principle to meet on a regular basis and to seek diplomatic accommodation on some of the issues that divided them, the two leaders were implicitly acknowledging the limits of their ability to get their way unilaterally. For both men, this was a lesson that took some time to learn.

In his June 1982 address to the British Parliament, Reagan had called the Soviet Union “inherently unstable” and said that it was facing a “great revolutionary crisis.” He had implied that the United States should exploit that instability and aggravate that crisis. By the time he first met with Gorbachev in November 1985, he had ceased to make such claims. He had even signed a presidential directive that concluded that the United States had at best only a very modest ability to influence internal Soviet policy and should focus instead on influencing its external policy.

One way to influence the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was to discourage Soviet expansionism by supporting anti-Soviet insurgencies in the Third World. The Reagan Doctrine, which committed the United States to such support, was still very much in force at the time of Reykjavik. But that hallmark policy of the Administration was encountering difficulties at

home. On the issue of Nicaragua, the White House was under public and congressional pressure to couple the military and humanitarian aid for the anti-Sandinista rebels with genuine support for the diplomatic effort to achieve a negotiated settlement, known as the Contadora process.

Meanwhile, there were signs that the Soviets, too, had begun to understand the limits of unilateralism in the nuclear competition. Nikolai Ogarkov, the former chief of the Soviet General Staff, spoke of the fruitlessness of the arms race and said that nuclear superiority was a mirage. Soviet specialists on strategic affairs not only called for a “new way of thinking” about the problems of stability—some of them sometimes also tentatively attempted to think and write in new ways.

Some of the most interesting statements that Gorbachev made during his first 18 months in power concerned what he and other Soviet spokesmen referred to as “common security.” At the end of the Geneva summit he expressed his “profound conviction that less security for the United States of America compared to the Soviet Union would not be in our interests, since it could lead to mistrust and produce instability.” He elaborated on this theme in his address to the 27th Party Congress three months later:

The character of present-day weapons leaves a country no hope of safeguarding itself solely with military and technical means. The task of ensuring security is increasingly seen as a political problem, and can be resolved only by political means. . . . Security can only be mutual. . . . It is vital that all should feel equally secure, for the fears and anxieties of the nuclear age generate unpredictability in politics and concrete actions.

Gorbachev’s reassuring words may simply have been part of another Soviet campaign to lull and divide the West. But they may also have reflected the beginning of a welcome, if belated, Soviet recognition that the Leninist principle that politics is always a matter of *kto-kogo*—who will prevail over whom—was simply not operative, or for that matter even acceptable, in the strategic nuclear relationship. Gorbachev’s words may have bespoken a Soviet conclusion similar to the one strategists in the West had long since reached; however fiercely they may compete elsewhere, in conducting the nuclear arms race the superpowers best serve their own interests by maintaining an equilibrium and jointly fostering the goal of strategic stability. Even though many details remained to be clarified and nego-

tiated, the terms to which the Soviets agreed in Reykjavik suggested that they might be prepared eventually to accommodate some American concerns and cooperate to achieve a more stable nuclear balance.

SDI had undoubtedly played an important part in inducing the Soviet leadership to rethink what common security meant in the strategic nuclear competition. It had forced them to face up to some of the more dangerous consequences of their excessive accumulation of land-based ballistic missile warheads. If they pressed for advantages in the familiar area of offensive weapons, they might find themselves plunging into the unfamiliar and treacherous terrain of high-technology strategic defense. To make matters worse, the Americans would have arrived there first, and would feel much more at home.

Reagan, too, came up against obstacles to altering the nuclear relationship between the superpowers. As he made clearer than ever at Reykjavik, SDI was his bid to change the rules, indeed to change the game itself. But by then, for all his own devotion to SDI and for all the disagreements about how the ABM treaty should be interpreted, he found himself having to offer repeated assurances that the program would proceed under the terms of the treaty. SDI therefore seemed likely to flourish only to the extent that it was compatible with deterrence and arms control. Reykjavik was bound to increase the pressure on him to use it as a "bargaining chip" to get reductions in offensive weapons. That rationale was a far cry from the President's original vision, proclaimed in March 1983, of an impregnable astrodome over the United States that would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete."

Indeed, while Reagan's conduct at Reykjavik demonstrated his continuing belief in that vision, few officials outside the Oval Office of the White House shared his hope. Virtually his entire government either had abandoned the idea of a comprehensive defense that would make traditional deterrence unnecessary or had never subscribed to the idea in the first place.⁴

If the Reagan-Gorbachev relationship demonstrated the limits to both what the superpowers could do to thwart each other and how far their relations could deteriorate, it also illustrated the upper limits on improvement in their relations. The poten-

⁴ See Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1987, chapter 4.

tial accord that was glimpsed in Reykjavik would certainly go beyond the limitations on offensive weapons established by the SALT II treaty of 1979. But the grand compromise, if it ever came about, would scarcely represent a whole new approach to strategic arms control. Quite the contrary, it would reaffirm not only SALT II but SALT I by linking limits on strategic defense with restrictions on strategic offense.

Thus, even as they broke with some of the procedures that their predecessors had followed, Reagan and Gorbachev were moving in the direction of restoring a measure of continuity with the past. Moreover, just as Reagan had learned to live and work with Gorbachev, he was learning to live with the old, familiar problems of asymmetries in force structures, theoretical vulnerabilities and the moral as well as practical dilemmas of deterrence.

If the worst that was likely to happen between the superpowers was not all that bad, the best was not all that good. The fundamental conditions of Soviet-American relations were likely to persist. This, in turn, meant that the ritual of Soviet-American summitry was likely to have a long run, and for all the reasons that had led Reagan and Gorbachev to engage in that ritual themselves, both in the fairly traditional summit at Geneva in November 1985 and in the strange interlude at Reykjavik a year later.

Robert G. Kaiser

THE SOVIET PRETENSE

Since the Bolshevik Revolution the ideology of Russian communism has had a haunting power outside Russia's borders, even at times when the country was desperately poor and backward. The central proposition of Marxism-Leninism—that a struggle between “socialism” and “imperialism” is inevitable and will inevitably result in the triumph of socialism—has long baffled and alarmed the West.

Inside the Soviet Union the same oft-repeated faith in the inherent superiority of socialism has been a fundamental aspect of Soviet life. By its repetition, the country's leaders have sought to assure their people that hardships and sacrifices were worthwhile, even noble, because they all marched toward such a glorious end.

Official confidence in the superiority of the Soviet system and in the certain victory of socialism over capitalism might be called the Soviet Pretense. It has been a crucial ingredient of the Soviet Union's national character, and an important tool for all of its leaders, from Lenin through Chernenko. But in the era of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Pretense is collapsing. This is a momentous change.

Kremlinologists rightly debate the ultimate significance of Gorbachev's efforts to “accelerate” and “restructure” the Soviet economy. His first 18 months in office produced no dramatic results, as he himself has acknowledged. We will have to wait many years to fully assess a reform effort that is just taking shape.

But it is not too soon to acknowledge the substantial qualitative change that Gorbachev has brought to Soviet political discourse and, by implication, to the Soviet self-image. Mr. Gorbachev has abandoned the rhetorical style on which he himself and all his countrymen were reared. The traditional Soviet approach was to minimize bad news while repeating again and again how great is Soviet power, how glorious its

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many victories, how brilliant its future. Instead, Gorbachev emphasizes the bad news—the country's stagnation—and dwells on the radical changes in individual citizens' attitudes necessary to put things right.

Initially, this change was refreshing. It won Gorbachev considerable sympathy among his countrymen. But in a deeply ideological society whose ideology has long been formulated in slogans, this new kind of rhetoric may eventually have serious political consequences. In effect Gorbachev has repealed the happy-ever-after promised by all his predecessors. He still holds out hope for a marvelous tomorrow, but only if his demands for sweeping changes in the status quo are met.

Yet he refuses to define or explain those changes, so even the most earnest and dedicated Soviet citizen must wonder exactly what Gorbachev expects him to do. Just how does a good comrade learn an entirely new approach to his work, as Gorbachev repeatedly tells him he must?

Gorbachev will change his country; he hopes the change will be for the better, but we have solid grounds for doubt. Ultimately his new candor may only dispirit the Soviet public, reinforcing the cynicism that is already so strong in Soviet life.

By altering Soviet self-perception and acknowledging how far from its ideal Soviet society has drifted, Gorbachev may be doing the Western world an inadvertent but considerable favor. He may give the West a new opportunity to make a more realistic assessment of the Soviet Union, and to achieve a new, more sensible consensus on the Soviet problem and how best to deal with it.

II

Perhaps the quintessential Soviet document of the old school was the Third Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted under Nikita Khrushchev at the 21st Party Congress in 1961. "Socialism will inevitably succeed capitalism everywhere," it declared. "Such is the objective law of social development. Imperialism is powerless to check the irresistible process of emancipation."

This much was conventional Soviet rhetoric, but in the 1961 document the party took a fateful step further, offering concrete predictions about the subsequent 20 years' achievements:

Within the current 10 years [industrial output will increase] by approximately 250 percent, exceeding the level of U.S. industrial output; within

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20 years, [the increase will be] not less than 500 percent, leaving the present overall volume of U.S. industrial output far behind. . . . In the first decade, the Soviet Union will outstrip the United States in output of the key agricultural products per head of population. . . . By the end of the second decade, every family, including newlyweds, will have a comfortable flat.

These predictions all proved wildly overoptimistic, and the promises of the third party program were soon forgotten. Gorbachev and his colleagues rewrote it, with much more modest goals, at the 27th Party Congress last March.

As an expression of the aspirations of the Soviet elite, the third party program is still an important document. Members of the party elite in 1961—survivors of the Stalin era who had seen their country win the Second World War, then recover dramatically and become the first country to explore outer space—no doubt felt the ambitions that the program enumerated. They had no good reason then to question that their system could produce a competitive world power. Of course there were serious deficiencies in Soviet society, but these, the elite believed, would be put right; the general trend was clear, and exhilarating.

For nearly a quarter of a century, the style of the 1961 program survived. From Brezhnev to Chernenko, Khrushchev's successors echoed his essentially optimistic propaganda, even as they tempered his wildest promises. Then Gorbachev tried something new.

Compared to the soothing, if drearily repetitive, rhetoric of his predecessors, Gorbachev's public statements often have a compelling—even alarming—quality. "Everybody must change," he said in 1985, in a characteristic comment, "from the worker to the minister to the secretary of the Central Committee. . . . Those who do not intend to change will have to be moved from the road." Why is change required? "The historical fate of the country and the position of socialism in the world" depend on it, Gorbachev told the Central Committee early in 1985. And how is the country doing? Poorly, by the leader's remarkable accounts, even after 18 months under his leadership: "So far there have been no profound qualitative changes that would consolidate the trend toward accelerated growth. . . . To speak frankly, the main thing still lies ahead."¹

If they take his words seriously, Gorbachev's audiences must

¹ Speech to the Khabarovsk party *actif* of July 31, 1986, reported in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Soviet Union*, Aug. 4, 1986.

be troubled by what he says, both because of its implicit pessimism about the recent past and the present and because of the scale of the changes he repeatedly demands. For example, here are excerpts from his speech last summer to the party leadership in Khabarovsk, in the Soviet Far East:

The current restructuring embraces not only the economy but all other facets of public life: social relations, the political system, the spiritual and ideological sphere, and the style and the methods of the work of the party and all of our cadres. "Restructuring" is a capacious word. I would equate the word "restructuring" with the word "revolution". . . .

The tremendous scale and volume of the work ahead is coming to light more fully, and it is becoming clearer to what extent many conceptions of the economy and management, of social issues, of the state system and democracy, of upbringing and education, and of ethical demands, still lag behind the tasks of further development. . . . We shall continue to [work] until we have ensured a radical shift above all in the thinking of our management cadres, and in the thinking and psychology of all workers and the entire society. . . .

There will be no move forward if we seek the answers to new questions in the economy and in technology by looking to the experience of the thirties, forties, fifties or even sixties and seventies. This is a different time, with different demands and different requirements.²

Mr. Gorbachev's candor has been mimicked by others in the leadership. Perhaps the boldest of his colleagues is Boris N. Yeltsin, now a candidate member of the Politburo, whom Gorbachev brought to Moscow as the new first secretary of the capital's party organization.

"It is necessary to stop the lies," Yeltsin said at his most famous public appearance, a speech to the Moscow party in January of 1986. On that occasion he gave a grim account of the failures of the party organization to guide the city properly.

At a closed meeting of the city's party leaders last April, Yeltsin went further, which suggests that the new candor may be even stronger behind closed doors. A partial transcript of that meeting reached the West last summer, and was published in *Le Monde*.³ It has all the hallmarks of a genuine document, and has been accepted as such by U.S. government analysts. A few excerpts demonstrate how far Yeltsin wandered from the conventional, Panglossian approach of the traditional Soviet official:

² *Ibid.*

³ July 16, 1986, pp. 2-3.

The city's [previous] officials were doing everything just for show. "Look how beautiful our city is, how smoothly everything runs here; we are the best in the world; we must not expose Moscow's problems." Those who continue to think that way must move aside and leave. . . .

We must combat abuse of power. The wives of many [Moscow] leadership officials drive around in black Volgas (i.e., a car used as a limousine by officials below the highest ranks). Generally a car of this type arrives in the morning to take the child to school, then takes the father to work, and finally returns for the wife. We must put an end to this. . . .

In the past few months, 800 trade officials (i.e., people working in wholesale and retail sales organizations) have been arrested in Moscow. We are digging deeper and deeper and still cannot see the bottom of this well of corruption.

Yeltsin revealed that the renowned Moscow subway was in deteriorating condition and, for the first time, losing money; that 15 scientific institutes in the city were being closed because they "have done nothing for years"; that 3,600 drug addicts had been "registered" in Moscow, adding, "How many drug addicts have we not yet detected?"; that life expectancy among Muscovites had fallen from 70 years to 68 in just two years, from 1983 to 1985.

This sort of frank talk defies traditional Soviet taboos. Perhaps, theoretically, it was predictable that at this stage of its evolution, the Soviet Union should produce leaders who speak honestly about their country's immense problems. Gorbachev, Yeltsin and others are beginning to bring Soviet propaganda into line with Soviet reality. But as a matter of practical politics, this shift to candor about a worsening Soviet situation cannot have been easy. It marks the collapse of a wave of optimism which, just a dozen years ago, had exhilarated the Soviet elite, giving its members new hopes for the status of their country.

In the early 1970s President Nixon visited Moscow and Soviet propagandists celebrated a historic shift in "the correlation of forces" to the advantage of "world socialism." It must have seemed to many Soviet officials that the early promises of Lenin and Stalin were finally being fulfilled. The trend of events did seem to be moving their way: the Americans had lost their war in Vietnam and were in turmoil at home; Washington had to acknowledge the Soviet Union's arrival as a genuine superpower, ratifying that status in the many agreements signed in the 1972-74 period; subsequent Soviet-Cuban adventures in Angola and Ethiopia demonstrated that this superpower could use its strength creatively and effectively.

Indeed, from the time of Sputnik in 1957 through the apogee

of détente, a member of the Soviet elite could easily have believed that his country was on an ascendant path, competing effectively with the United States, moving inexorably toward the preeminent international status it deserved. Of course the road was not smooth or easy, but Marxist-Leninists understand the dialectic of history, and know that it works in fits and starts. That same member of the elite would have acknowledged that much remained to be done, particularly in improving the standard of living, but until the mid-1970s he certainly had ground for optimism.

During the last decade that rosy picture darkened dramatically. It has turned out that 1970s-style détente did *not* signify any profound alteration in the correlation of forces. The United States appeared to recover from its Vietnam fiasco, and took an antagonistic new course clearly threatening to Soviet interests. Left-wing political parties were eclipsed all over Western Europe, and the NATO alliance demonstrated unexpected resolve in its deployment of new intermediate-range missiles in 1983–84. Even Japan, with the selection of Yasuhiro Nakasone as prime minister, chose a relatively hard-line government.

The Soviet decision to abandon economic autarky—an important aspect of détente, never fully appreciated in the West—has not worked out well. Western technology did not bring the Soviet Union the benefits Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin hoped for, while the Soviet Union and its East European dependencies have amassed large debts to the capitalists. The continuing Polish crisis, so surprising when it erupted in 1980, undermined all optimism about the future of the East European empire. The shape of the world's technological future has become clearer in the last ten years, and for the Soviet Union it is an ominous outlook, based on the widespread adoption of computers, devices that have proven stubbornly foreign to most sectors of Soviet society.

Perhaps most important, it is now clear that the Soviet domestic economy—industry, agriculture and the service sector—is in grave difficulty. The health of Soviet society is also deteriorating. The striking statistics on declining life expectancy, referred to fleetingly by Yeltsin, are the most compelling evidence, but there is much more, from climbing crime and divorce rates to an obviously worsening food situation.

This sudden change in the country's fortunes cannot have escaped the notice of many thoughtful Soviet Communists. A profound malaise was evident to me during a month's visit to

Moscow in late 1984, when the elite could barely disguise its humiliation as party leaders struggled to sustain the pretense that the faltering Konstantin Chernenko was a functioning national leader. Mr. Gorbachev's ascension the following year broke that mood and has restored a sense of possibility. But the elite itself, judging by reasonably good evidence from participants in the debate, is still sharply divided about whether Gorbachev can really improve the situation, or simply prevent it from getting much worse. Gorbachev does not make it any easier for the optimists in this dispute by repeating his warning that only the most sweeping changes in the attitudes and performance of everyone in the country can lead to genuine improvements.

III

The collapse of the Soviet Pretense is the latest stage of a long process—begun with the death of Stalin—by which the Soviet Union has slowly shed Stalinist ideology. Once that process had begun, it was going to be very hard to stop it, which is why it seems fair to consider the Gorbachev candor a natural evolution, though still a dramatic change from the immediate past.

Outsiders should not underestimate the grip that ideology had on the country, or its significance. The Stalinist world view shaped every Soviet leader of this century, no doubt including Gorbachev. The mythic image of "Soviet power" as the force that would transform backward Russia into a global super-power stuck in the minds of young Communists, generation after generation. Seweryn Bialer has noted that when Khrushchev so alarmed the West by promising, "We will bury you," he was not making a threat, but offering an ideological truism. The view that history would vindicate communism and bury America's anachronistic capitalist system "was so natural to him that he must have been surprised by the effect of his simple ideological statement," Bialer writes.⁴

Westerners cannot easily appreciate the influence Stalin's vision has had on his country. The memoirs of intelligent Soviet citizens who survived that era, now appearing in their new homelands in the West (the books of Lev Kopelev and Raisa

⁴ Seweryn Bialer, *The Soviet Paradox*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986, p. 264.

Orlova, husband and wife, are good examples) remind us how blindly even the brightest Soviet citizens unquestioningly adopted Stalin's view of reality in the 1930s and 1940s.

Adam Ulam has described Stalin's approach to ideology: "A society cannot be controlled fully by merely political and economic chains, [Stalin] recognized; a nation's energies cannot be mobilized for mighty endeavors, for enduring frightful sacrifices, if its spiritual and intellectual nourishment is neglected."⁵ So Stalin provided his version of Marxism-Leninism, and enforced it with ruthless violence that took millions of victims. "They died so that life should prove the truth of dogma," Ulam writes. "Life must be seen as a constant struggle between the forces of light and darkness [Stalin believed]. To deny this struggle would have been to strip communism of all its uplifting meaning, to make it a dry business of charts and administration, a philosophy that called for bureaucrats and experts, not leaders and heroes."⁶

Today Soviet communism *has* become a dry business that calls for bureaucrats and experts, not heroes. During three decades after Stalin died, the system devolved; corruption and drunkenness, shirking and stealing became—by official admission—commonplace. Nostalgia for Stalin's firm hand blossomed in the 1970s among many ordinary Russians, a revealing indication of the continuing appeal of his kind of visionary leadership. But without leaders who could resort to violence as Stalin did, his approach to power could not be sustained. And none of his successors has shown any stomach for reviving the violence, which in any event party leaders would never again sanction, since the party was one of Stalin's principal victims.

Khrushchev exposed Stalin's crimes, but was nevertheless the last true believer in Stalin's ideological vision. Through the long Brezhnev era, cynicism prospered. Brezhnev himself did not abandon Stalin's optimistic slogans, but he repeated them with his characteristic vacuity. As he clung to power and national morale began to unravel, Brezhnev involuntarily created the conditions Gorbachev is now trying to exploit. The Brezhnev era is increasingly Gorbachev's principal scapegoat in his public statements.

⁵ Adam Ulam, *Stalin*, New York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 338.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 740.

IV

Gorbachev and his colleagues are now battling against drunkenness, cynicism and sloth, no doubt hoping that if they can put things right, they can once again revive the pretense of Soviet superiority. This generation of Soviet leaders will not be willing to accept a permanently inferior status for their country, even if, temporarily, they must abandon slogans and promises that sound more and more preposterous, even to relatively credulous Soviet ears. The new policy of *glasnost* (openness) and the call for *perestroika* (restructuring) are tactics intended to revive the system, not admissions of failure.

But because they sound ominously like such admissions, they are politically risky. By tinkering with the promises of communism, Gorbachev is calling into question an important traditional source of the system's legitimacy. The simple formula that has served so long—the end justifies the means—became a fundamental explanation for the way things were. Now, when the leadership of the country seems increasingly convinced that the desired end may require *different* means, the old formulas no longer provide meaningful reassurance.

It cannot be easy for an ideological society to prosper in the absence of persuasive doctrinal explanations for either current conditions or future prospects. There has been abundant evidence of strain caused by the new approach. One example came at the 1986 party congress where, although Gorbachev spoke eloquently about the need to change the economic mechanism, the man directly in charge of the economy, Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov, ignored the subject entirely in his report.

More than once Gorbachev himself has been censored in the party press. One intriguing case occurred last summer. In his speech to the party elite in Khabarovsk on July 31, Gorbachev made these remarks about party cadres or workers:

A combination of experienced cadres with young ones must be guaranteed. There must be a process of cadre promotion and growth, but a deserved one, without, so to speak, favoritism and chummy relations, but for the job done. There must be a constant inflow of fresh forces (i.e., new people).⁷

When *Pravda* printed the “text” of the speech on August 3, the same passage read like this:

⁷ *FBIS*, Aug. 4, 1986.

We must ensure a combination of experienced and young cadres on the basis of a continuous process of growth and cadre promotion with due consideration for their political and professional qualities.

In *Pravda*, there was no longer any need for “a constant inflow of fresh forces,” nor any criticism of “favoritism and chummy relations.” On this most sensitive of subjects the Soviet leader is not allowed to speak his mind in the principal party organ—or he decided to censor himself.

Yeltsin’s meeting with the Moscow party elite last April, cited earlier, provided another example. According to the unofficial transcript of that affair, 300 written questions from the floor were passed forward to Yeltsin, a number of them hostile. One question, which Yeltsin reportedly read aloud, said, “You have very grand plans; what are you meddling with? Gorbachev just needed a loyal man. Go back to Sverdlovsk before it is too late” (Sverdlovsk is the Ural Mountains city where Yeltsin was previously first secretary of the party organization).

According to the transcript, shouts of “shame!” could be heard in the hall. Yeltsin commented: “Calm down, comrades. I do not think this question comes from the floor. It must have been received earlier and have slipped into the bundle. The author is obviously sick.”

That sort of bravado no doubt has an impact, but the fact remains that party morale is at risk, and ideology no longer offers much comfort. Revealingly, the entire subject of ideology has lost the importance once accorded it. At last winter’s party congress, only the Central Committee secretary in charge of ideological matters, Yegor K. Ligachev, considered the subject in any detail in a speech from the podium, and his was hardly innovative or even interesting. Gorbachev, in his long report to the congress, revived many old formulas about the inherent failings of capitalism, but did so, it seemed, primarily to introduce—and take the edge off—his own critical commentary on the state of Soviet socialism. Ritualistic genuflections to Lenin and his works seem more perfunctory now in politicians’ speeches and printed propaganda.

The party itself has, for all practical purposes, ceased to be an ideological force. Wolfgang Leonhard writes in his new book that party members are no longer assigned any substantial ideological role, but instead are exhorted to become model

citizens who set a productive example.⁸ The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonhard suggests, could now be renamed “The Union of Patriots” or “The Fatherland Party.”

V

In the five-year economic plan that began this year, Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues are tinkering with the system they inherited, hoping to tap its squandered reserves of productive capacity to reverse the slowdown of recent years. Gorbachev describes the current effort as “the most difficult thing—to get this powerful flywheel (the Soviet economy) spinning.” Then, “in the subsequent five-year plan period, things will go more quickly and will grow.” More cynically, one could argue that after five years of limited experiments that won’t work, Gorbachev will be compelled to try more sweeping changes that may or may not work.

It is much easier to be pessimistic than hopeful about Gorbachev’s—and his country’s—prospects. The Soviet Union’s survival is not in question here; even if Gorbachev fails as a reformer, his country will survive, and will almost certainly remain strong and powerful for as long as he rules it. But unless he is a fabulously successful reformer, Gorbachev will not be able to revive the Soviet Union as a genuine competitor for world leadership with the United States and its allies. Instead he will preside over a continuing process of muddling downward that could leave the Soviet Union, by the turn of the century, far behind many more dynamic societies in the world, still offering its citizens a second- or third-class standard of living while, no doubt, still bristling with first-class military power.

What is in prospect now is the loss of the Soviet national ideal—the logical extension of the collapse of the pretense of Soviet superiority. The whole point of the Bolshevik Revolution was to put Russia on the curl of the wave of history, so its communism would triumph when the internal contradictions of capitalism brought down the traditional great powers in the West. That was the Leninist rosy scenario. Without it, new generations of Soviet leaders will have to reformulate both their private and the party’s public visions of their country and its place in the world.

⁸ Wolfgang Leonhard, *The Kremlin and the West*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1986, p. 11.

There are already indications that some Soviet citizens have begun to react to Gorbachev with a skepticism that ill serves the general secretary's effort to revive the economy through exhortation. For a while Gorbachev can continue to criticize and cajole, but this must be a short-term tactic. If it produces no positive results, it will soon sound like hollow hectoring. In a few years, Gorbachev could face an unhappy choice between resorting to the old Big Lie, bragging how well things are going in the face of blatantly contradictory evidence, or acknowledging that the system itself is to blame (as surely it is) for the country's persistent shortcomings.

Predictions about shifts in national mood are risky, but it does seem fair to speculate on the fatalism that will set in if the Gorbachev "restructuring" fails. Brezhnev enjoyed a considerable political advantage during the first dozen years of his reign; he led a people whose standard of living had been improving steadily for 30 years. By the mid-1990s, if present downward trends have not been dramatically reversed, Gorbachev or his successor could easily face a cynical population whose standard of living has been frozen or even declining for 20 years. And the Soviet population of the mid-1990s will be much more aware of conditions outside the country than were the citizens of the 1960s and 1970s, and will understand vividly their own relative inferiority.

A stagnant or declining Soviet Union in a world of dynamic technological change and rapid growth in once-backward nations will surely suffer from further erosion of ideological confidence. It is not difficult to imagine the effective demise of Marxism-Leninism as anything but a legitimizing doctrine justifying the continued rule of the party elite.

It has long been clear that communist ideology by itself is an insufficient source of legitimacy. Nationalism—really Russian nationalism, barely disguised to accommodate the multinational Soviet state—has been the most effective substitute for Marxist-Leninist zeal since Stalin put it at the center of the war effort against Germany. Today Gorbachev usually tells his countrymen that their past efforts were worthwhile because they made the Soviet Union a great world power, and rarely because they advanced communism or world revolution.

But certain elements of Soviet ideology that have always troubled the West will survive as long as the system does. One is the mythology of the party and its leading role, which justifies the elite's status. Another is the presumption that the struggle

between socialism and “imperialism”—the West—will continue indefinitely, a formula for permanent struggle that gives the elite a useful tool to dominate the society. The idea of a permanently hostile outside world is so resonant with the deepest insecurities of the Russian national character that it is doomed to survive.

VI

If we have entered a period of Soviet decline, accompanied by a momentous change in Soviet self-perception, what does that signify for the rest of the world? How could the United States and its allies take advantage of these changes?

The traditional “what is to be done?” sections of contemporary analyses of the Soviet Union are generally unsatisfying. The standard prescriptions are reminiscent of Gorbachev’s exhortations for economic reform. They would require abrupt and radical changes in style and substance—in this case, of Western politics and diplomacy. Of course it would be desirable to concentrate on those areas where East and West have common interests, to be firm, patient and persistent, to use a sensible combination of carrots and sticks, and so on; desirable, but on past form, wholly unlikely.

The treatises of professional diplomats and scholars will never alter the basic facts of Western, and particularly American, life. The United States will rarely conduct an artful, sophisticated foreign policy as long as it remains a rough-and-tumble democracy that permits countless factions to influence policy, sometimes to seize control of it. American presidents are virtually never elected on the basis of foreign policy issues; when those issues are significant, their importance is usually symbolic and psychological. The checks and balances of the American system affect foreign policy only in extreme situations, rarely in month-to-month diplomacy. Efforts by Congress in the Reagan years to turn the Administration toward arms control have been instructive; on certain specific points (for example, the testing of antisatellite weapons and the development of a mobile Midgetman missile), Congress has changed the Administration’s course, but without altering its overall policy.

America’s Soviet policy has long been complicated by the absence of a political consensus about the nature of the Soviet threat, and about what the United States should be trying to accomplish in its dealings with the Russians. Americans argue

about whether the Soviets are determined to conquer the world at all costs, or might somehow be pacified; about whether it is ever possible "to trust the Russians." They debate whether American policy should seek to unravel Soviet power, contain it, cajole it or coexist with it while pursuing common interests.

To some extent these debates reflect the different psychologies of those who participate in them. But to a large degree they have grown out of earlier perceptions of the Soviet Union that have now been largely—but not totally—discredited by events, and by our relatively new ability to see Soviet society for what it is. By speaking with some candor about the facts of Soviet society, Gorbachev may help all of us see how we ought to revise our image of his country.

That revision must not be too sweeping. The Soviet Union is still, and will remain, a huge, powerful country. Its leaders remain less interested in international stability than in expanding Soviet influence. They remain cautious, even conservative, but also hostile to a world order dominated by the United States and the international capitalist economy. They will seize opportunities to increase their influence, and to diminish ours.

Though they face grim domestic problems, the society over which the Soviet leaders preside will neither collapse nor be transformed in the foreseeable future. It will instead muddle through, and probably muddle downward. The Soviet empire will continue to weaken, perhaps eventually will unravel, but again the pace of change will likely be slow.

But if these important factors will remain, or change only gradually, one central ingredient of the image of Soviet power that energized the cold war era has already been dispelled, with much less fanfare than it deserves. Mr. Gorbachev implies it when he tells his comrades how badly they are doing, how counterproductive are their work habits and excuse-making. President Reagan implies it too with his many public references to the Soviets' dire economic condition, and hence their need for arms control agreements. Both are referring to the cardinal fact that the Soviet Union is not competitive with the advanced Western economies, and shows no signs of becoming competitive in this century, or beyond.

One could argue that the Soviet economy has never been competitive in any conventional sense. Its only consequential accomplishment has been the creation of awesome military might. But the truth about the Soviet system has always been less important in the West than the threat the system implied—

the threat of a better way to organize human societies, one that would prove more productive, more efficient, and ultimately more appealing to the great mass of humanity than the Western model. That was the initial threat of Bolshevism; it was the threat of Sputnik, which mobilized the West, especially America, to race to the moon and to the era of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Fear of possible Soviet *victory* in the global competition is what gave us the rhetoric and spirit of John F. Kennedy's New Frontier, then—arguably—the war in Vietnam and the high-technology arms race.

Khrushchev's promise to bury us was no idle threat; we believed that he meant it, and feared that he might be able to do it. A generation later the Soviet Union has lost its appeal, not only in Western Europe where, after World War II, we feared it most, but even in the Third World countries where Khrushchev himself was so sure it would prevail.

During that same generation, the wall of mystery that surrounded the Soviet Union has crumbled; the facts have become clear. Stalin found a way to modernize a backward land and reorganize it around a new political movement, but his creation was so top-heavy and overbearing that it offered no hope of fully exploiting the talents of the Soviet people. In the current period of accelerating technological change, the Soviet Union is actually falling further behind its rivals.

The opportunity to see the Soviet Union clearly gives us a chance to redefine the threat it poses. If the stakes of our competition are not as high as once feared—if the battle is not for world domination, but for incremental changes in the influence of East and West—coping with the contest ought to be simpler than it once seemed.

But it will not suddenly become easy. The persistence of the Soviet problem is one of its most fundamental characteristics. We are stuck with it. There is no reason to expect Gorbachev, or his successor, or *his* successor to become reasonable, or to be satisfied with the international status quo. The Soviet Union will continue to insist on playing an active role in the world—will insist on its status as a superpower. The Soviets will pursue their own "security," a troublesome concept that seems always to involve our insecurity as well. Seweryn Bialer has noted that the Soviets have expanded their definition, so that "security increasingly includes the preservation of Soviet status."⁹

⁹ Bialer, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

Gorbachev brings a new verve and style to Soviet foreign policy. Many years after they might have, the Soviets have finally learned the tricks of public relations. This combination, over time, could considerably improve the Soviets' international image, creating new difficulties for American strategists. The Reykjavik meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev may or may not have been a breakthrough for arms control, but it was surely a precursor of a bolder Soviet diplomacy that we should now expect to see more often.

But no foreseeable change in the style or substance of Soviet policies, at home or abroad, will transform our Soviet problem. It will remain difficult, but it will also remain manageable.

Even if Gorbachev's domestic initiatives succeed far beyond any present expectations, the Soviet Union will remain relatively poor and backward. It will not suddenly become competitive with the advanced societies of Asia and the West. Nor will it quickly be transformed into the threat we once feared, a modern version of the Third Reich bent on world conquest.

If—as now seems more likely—Gorbachev's "reconstruction" fails, he (or a successor) could revert to a deliberate policy of artificial cold war as a cover for the country's shortcomings. Future Soviet leaders may decide they need to promote a heightened sense of siege to maintain firm control at home. Such a change would be most unwelcome, yet it would create as many problems for the Soviets as it would for us. Gorbachev's "charm offensive" would collapse in a renewed cold war, but all his country's weaknesses would remain.

The idea that the Soviet Union is hostile, ambitious, yet incapable of fulfilling either its own hopes or our own darkest fears will meet considerable resistance in the West. We have made a heavy psychological investment in the image of the cold war as the ultimate showdown between two irreconcilable giants. American politics have been dominated by that image since the time of Joseph McCarthy, if not before.

Mikhail Gorbachev has given us a new opportunity to redraw our image of the East-West confrontation. As he implicitly acknowledges, we are not really dealing with two equivalent giants. Not that we needed his new candor to realize how grave are Soviet weaknesses, or how unfavorable are the trends in that country.

Robert B. Cullen

SOVIET JEWRY

As he had pledged he would, Ronald Reagan made human rights in the Soviet Union a priority item on the agenda for his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik. At their first session in Hofdi House, the President told the Soviet leader that repressive Soviet practices, including the refusal to allow Jews from the U.S.S.R. to emigrate, had a direct and negative effect on the Soviet-American relationship, fomenting mistrust and tension. Later that day, Mr. Reagan handed Mr. Gorbachev a packet of written materials on human rights; it included graphs and charts on the number of Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union and the number who would like to leave. And in the experts' all-night negotiations that followed, the question of Soviet Jews arose again. The message to Moscow, one American official recounted later, was that "if you want a productive relationship, you have to deal with certain inescapable realities." And one of those realities is the American demand to let Soviet Jews go.

But in the end, Reykjavik produced only a few changes in Soviet style. Soviet officials agreed to a continuing dialogue on "humanitarian issues and human rights"; for the most part, they listened politely when their press conferences were interrupted by people pressing for Jewish emigration. In the corridors Soviet journalists and academics passed the word that the Kremlin wanted to limit the public relations damage its human rights policies were causing. But at Reykjavik, as at Helsinki, Madrid, Geneva and other previous forums, there were no Soviet promises, no concessions. American officials afterward described themselves as frustrated by the fact that the key to releasing Soviet Jews remained elusive.

The irony is that since the beginning of the Reagan Administration, a potential lever for winning the release of Soviet Jews has lain useless. That lever is trade. It cannot be used because in 1974 Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments to two bills, with the avowed goal of

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pressing the Soviet Union to allow more emigration. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 stated that countries with nonmarket economies could not receive most-favored-nation status, nor government-backed credits, unless they allowed free emigration. The Stevenson addition to the Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974 set a four-year ceiling of \$300 million on Export-Import Bank credits to the Soviets. In practice, since the decision to grant MFN status to the People's Republic of China in 1979, Jackson-Vanik has applied only to the Soviet Union and some of its Warsaw Pact allies.

Enough time has passed to judge both amendments by their results. And, unfortunately for the Jews and other refuseniks whom they were supposed to help, the record suggests that rather than promoting emigration, the amendments have given Soviet leaders one more reason, however perverse, to keep people in. Emigration rates for Soviet Jews today are far lower than they were before the amendments were adopted. It is, in fact, reasonable to infer from the history of the past 15 years that many thousands of Soviet Jews now languishing in the refusenik's limbo might have been released had the amendments not been enacted. It is time to repeal the Stevenson Amendment and to change the Jackson-Vanik Amendment so that it might serve its proclaimed purpose.

II

Oppression of Russian Jews predates the era of communist government. So do American concern for their plight and U.S. government efforts to help. Long before the Russian Revolution, the tsars founded and maintained the Russian Orthodox Church as a state religion. Under Nicholas I, Christian "orthodoxy," along with autocracy and nationality, became one of the pillars of the official ideology. Partly as a result, the regime periodically oppressed all kinds of non-Russian, non-Orthodox minorities. Jews had become Russian subjects, for the most part, when the empire extended its dominion to eastern Poland. They suffered for not being Slavs and for not being Orthodox. During periods when the rules were strictly enforced, tsarist governments required the Jews to live in the "Pale of Settlement," an area in the southern and western portions of the Russian Empire first established by Catherine the Great. Quotas governed their admission to higher education. Periodically Jews in Russia faced violent repression, the

notorious pogroms; the word comes from the Russian verb *pogromit*, "to destroy." Perhaps the best that can be said for tsarist treatment of the Jews is that many were allowed to leave.

Then, as now, Americans worried about the mistreatment of Russian Jews and tried to effect change on their behalf. As early as 1870, the issue caused friction between Washington and St. Petersburg. In 1903 President Theodore Roosevelt received a delegation of American Jews concerned about the terrible pogrom at Kishinev. Roosevelt forwarded to Tsar Nicholas II a petition protesting the pogrom. The tsar's reply prefigured the statements of his communist successors 80 years later. He said he had no need of information from outside sources about what was going on within Russia. The response of the United States also prefigured future events. In 1911, under pressure from the Congress and the American Jewish community, the Taft Administration abrogated the 1832 Russo-American commercial treaty. Interestingly enough, this early withdrawal of trade did not help Russian Jews. The tsar's government saw it as interference in Russian internal affairs, and subjected the Jews to new reprisals.

What really helped Russian Jews was, ironically, the Russian Revolution. Many Jews participated in it; many others welcomed it. Although it is fundamentally hostile to all religions, Marxist theory at least condemned anti-Semitism, seeing it as yet another device used by the ruling class to divide and control the working classes. Lenin personally denounced it. Under the Bolsheviks, Jews became one of more than a hundred minority nationalities living within the borders of the Soviet Union. Theirs was not as advantageous a position as that enjoyed by the larger minority groups—Georgians, Uzbeks and others—who occupied distinct territories outside the boundaries of Russia. These groups were allowed to form constituent republics within the Soviet Union. Minority nationalities scattered within Russia were not, but they had, in theory at least, certain rights. In the early days of the Soviet Union, Jews had their own schools and a special department within the government, and their language was recognized. (That language was, and is, Yiddish, which the Soviets insist is the national language of the Jews. Hebrew, which is classified as a clerical language, is not recognized—a situation that creates problems for many Jewish activists in the Soviet Union today.) Several Jews—Leon Trotsky, Lev Kamenev and Grigori Zinoviev were the most prominent—occupied positions of political power. Life for the

Jews in the years after the revolution was by no means ideal, but it was better than it had been under the tsars. "Equality of the Jews," Maxim Gorki boasted, "is one of the more wonderful achievements of the Revolution."¹

Like so many other revolutionary ideals, equality for the Russian Jews perished under Josef Stalin. The older and more cruel Stalin became, the more the Jews suffered. His anti-Semitism first surfaced in the campaign against Trotsky. In the 1930s the Jewish schools and institutions, and many of the synagogues, were shut down. There was a respite during World War II, when Jews were enlisted in the fight against fascism. But after the war, Soviet Jews felt the brunt of Stalin's pathological tyranny. In 1948 Solomon M. Mikhoels, director of Moscow's Jewish State Theater and a leader of the wartime Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, was murdered, beginning a widespread purge that saw hundreds of Jewish intellectuals shipped to the Gulag. There were many trials for "economic crimes," in which a disproportionate number of the defendants were Jews. In 1952 some 23 Jewish intellectuals were executed after a secret trial on charges of treason and espionage. And in the last months of his life, Stalin planned yet another massive purge, the pretext for which was the "Doctor's Plot," a fiction in which nine physicians, six of them Jewish, were accused of having conspired to poison leading Soviet figures. Apparently, Stalin intended to conclude the Doctor's Plot by sending Soviet Jews en masse to Siberia.

Under Nikita Khrushchev things improved somewhat for Jews, as they did for all Soviet citizens. Formally, Khrushchev stated that he considered both anti-Semitism and Zionism to be reactionary. In practice, Khrushchev was given to crude remarks about "yids." He rejected Jewish emigration to Israel, and during the final years of his leadership, in the early 1960s, a new round of prosecutions for economic crimes again found Jews bearing a disproportionate share of the punishment. Scores of synagogues were closed.

At the beginning of the Brezhnev period, in 1965, an article in *Pravda* explicitly condemned anti-Semitism. This remained the stated Soviet policy throughout the Brezhnev years. In February 1981, speaking on ethnic tension to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev

¹ *Nesvoevremennye mysli: Zametki o revolyutsii i kulture* [Untimely Thoughts: Notes on Revolution and Culture], Petrograd: Kultura i Svoboda, 1917, p. 109.

reaffirmed the policy, although in terms calculated to offend Jews friendly to Israel. The party, he said, "has fought and will always fight resolutely against such phenomena, which are alien to the nature of socialism, as chauvinism and nationalism, against any nationalistic aberrations, such as, let us say, anti-Semitism or Zionism."

Under Mikhail Gorbachev, official policy remains much the same. So has the reality of life for Soviet Jews—a reality in which repression is combined with limited opportunity for those willing to assimilate. Mr. Gorbachev has noted correctly that Jews are disproportionately represented in the Soviet Union's educated professions. In fact, many Jews within the Soviet Union who have chosen not to be religious and not to support Israel publicly have managed to attain responsible positions within the system—up to a point. But Gorbachev has chosen to ignore, publicly at least, the repressive aspects of Soviet society. There are no Jews in the Politburo or in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Jewish dissidents have convincingly documented the existence of quotas which limit or exclude Jews from mathematical and scientific training.

Few Westerners who have lived in Soviet society have failed to note the prevalence of popular anti-Semitic stereotypes. Occasionally pamphlets and articles appear in the government press that purvey such stereotypes. Jews who dare to take the first steps toward organizing themselves—even by teaching Hebrew—are subject to arrest and imprisonment. There is an active "Anti-Zionist Committee," which is led by prominent Soviet Jews, among them retired Colonel General David Dragunsky. Although it is ostensibly an independent citizens' organization, it holds press conferences denouncing Israel in the auditorium of the Foreign Affairs Ministry's press department, suggesting that it works closely with the Soviet propaganda apparatus. Its activities are a potent and public reminder to Soviet Jews that their lot could be much worse if the government chose to make it so.

III

The question of emigration for Soviet Jews, as distinct from any other citizens who might have wanted to leave, did not arise seriously until after the creation of the state of Israel in 1947 (which the Soviet Union supported). Although the 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared the right to enter and leave one's own country, Soviet citizens had

no such right in practice. Nor did the Kremlin wish to make an exception for Jews. Khrushchev at one time told a foreign delegation that he opposed Jewish emigration to Israel because Israel was under the thumb of American reactionaries. Policy began to change after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. In 1966 Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin told Western reporters that if there were divided families that wanted to leave the Soviet Union, "the road is open to them." In 1967 the Six-Day War galvanized many Soviet Jews to consider doing just that.

But leaving was not a simple process. There has never been, in practice, a simple right to leave for any Soviet citizens, Jewish or otherwise. When Moscow has permitted emigration, it has usually been predicated on the reunification of divided families. When the authorities wish to permit more emigration, they loosen the definition of a divided family to include cousins or other distant relatives, and they allow invitations from Israel to reach Soviet citizens. When they wish to clamp down, they have many means. They can impose taxes or other financial requirements. They can permit only those with close relatives outside the country—immediate family—to leave. Or they can simply reject applications for vague reasons of state security.

What strikes any Westerner who spends enough time in Moscow to get to know the refuseniks is the terrible waste of human potential they represent. Many live quietly desperate lives; they wonder whether they will ever be able to develop their talent in the West, and fear that as years pass, their talent will erode. Some lose their jobs. Others may suffer no reprisals, and still others may go to jail for such activities as organizing and teaching Hebrew classes. But all experience fear and anguish. And all face the calamitous prospect of seeing their lives wasted simply because they wish to emigrate.

Why have the Soviet authorities chosen, in recent years, to cut down on the number of emigrés? Only they know for certain. The official reason, given by sources ranging from Gorbachev to the Anti-Zionist Committee, is that all, or nearly all, of the Jews who wanted to rejoin families in the West have done so. Those who remain, the line goes, cannot leave because in the course of their work they have been exposed to "secret" information that the state has the right to safeguard. Any American correspondent who works in Moscow knows that this is patently false. Every correspondent receives calls from Jews who want to leave, who have relatives in the West or in Israel, and who have never been exposed to anything remotely resem-

bling a state secret. Yet they are not permitted to go. The human rights material that Reagan handed to Gorbachev at Reykjavik estimated that there are about 11,000 people who have applied to go and have been refused. Israel says there are 400,000 Jews in the Soviet Union who have asked for invitations to Israel; presumably, many of them have not formally applied for fear of the consequences of being refused. The numbers are impossible to verify, but there is no doubt that many thousands of Jews have applied and been refused and that many more would apply if they thought there was a good chance their request would be granted.

There are other, more genuine, reasons for restricted emigration. To cite them is not to agree with them. It is simply to acknowledge that they exist, and that Soviet policymakers will need countervailing incentives to let Soviet Jews emigrate. First, the Soviet Union is attempting to operate a sophisticated, yet closed, economy. This means that it trains specialists who, in certain fields such as mathematics, are the equals of any in the world. Yet, it expects them to live and work for much less than their talents could earn them in the West. A Soviet computer programmer, who might command \$50,000 annually in the United States, is expected to get by on perhaps 400 rubles (\$560) per month in the U.S.S.R., to scrape for a decent apartment, a car, a dacha in the country. If Moscow were to open the doors, some of the country's most valuable specialists would have strong economic incentives to live in the West. This drain might be bearable if it could be confined to Jews. The Jewish population, by Soviet count, is less than two million. But if Jews were allowed to emigrate freely, the number might swell, since children of mixed marriages can choose their nationality. People who have been calling themselves Russian or Ukrainian might reclassify themselves as Jewish. Still, the emigration of talented Jews would be a manageable loss to a country with a population of roughly 280 million. But what if Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians or Muslims began to demand the same right? The Soviets might then face a choice between political unrest among minority groups or a serious drain of educated workers and valuable labor.

From a foreign policy standpoint, releasing large numbers of Jews would conflict with important Soviet interests in the Arab states. As early as 1959, King Imam Ahmad of Yemen wrote to Khrushchev, warning that if the Soviets gave in to pressure for Jewish emigration, this would constitute "an im-

mense danger” to the Arab nation. Khrushchev responded that there was no cause for concern because Soviet Jews did not want to leave. Today it is not hard to imagine Gorbachev receiving similar entreaties from the Arab world. One potential advantage the Arabs have in their struggle against Israel is their higher birthrate. The Soviet Union’s Jews are one of only two populations in the world with the potential to help Israel with that demographic problem.

From the standpoint of international and domestic prestige Soviet officials suspect that liberal emigration policies would only create problems for them. It would be bad enough if, after growing up with all the presumed advantages of life under mature socialism, large numbers of Jewish Soviet citizens chose to live in Israel. At least they have ethnic ties drawing them there. The fact that in the 1970s nearly half of the departing Jews, once out of the Soviet Union, chose to go to the United States must be especially irritating. It undercuts all Soviet efforts to portray the quality of life under socialism as superior to that under capitalism.

Finally, Soviet leaders frequently complain that the United States is hypocritical in its advocacy on behalf of Soviet Jews. Whatever indignities might be visited upon Soviet Jews, the Kremlin knows that the lot of Soviet Jews is better than, say, that of blacks in South Africa. Yet the United States chooses to follow a policy of constructive engagement with Pretoria and to wage a moral crusade against Moscow. Perhaps Soviet leaders are not entirely to blame if they find this policy inconsistent.

IV

In the context of these Soviet interests and of both Russian and Soviet history, what is remarkable is not that few Jews can presently emigrate. What is remarkable is that since 1969, the Soviet government has allowed some 265,000 Jews to leave. The figures are listed in Table 1. At first glance the statistics suggest a close correlation between the years of Soviet-American détente and the years of high Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, and a closer analysis confirms this. The Soviets have allowed high levels of Jewish emigration in periods when they felt they had a reasonable chance of getting either arms control, trade agreements or both with the United States. When those hopes evaporated, so did the flow of Jews out of the Soviet Union.

TABLE 1
JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION
1968-1985

<i>Year</i>	<i>Emigrés</i>
1968	229
1969	2,979
1970	1,027
1971	13,022
1972	31,681
1973	34,733
1974	20,628
1975	13,221
1976	14,261
1977	16,736
1978	28,864
1979	51,320
1980	21,471
1981	9,447
1982	2,688
1983	1,314
1984	896
1985	<u>1,140</u>
TOTAL	265,657

SOURCE: Figures for 1968-70 are from Robert O. Freedman, editor, *Soviet Jewry in the Decisive Decade, 1971-80*, Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1984, p. 22. The later figures are from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry.

The first period of significant Jewish emigration coincided with the first bloom of détente and peaked, along with détente, in 1973. The Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments, adopted in the fall of 1974 and enacted into law in January 1975, in retrospect look like a classic case of fixing something that was not broken. The Soviets responded not by increasing emigration, but by cutting it back, as the figures for 1975-77 show. The next emigration peak, in 1978-79, coincided with the concluding phases of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), and it is reasonable to speculate that the Soviets did not want to sour the chances for treaty ratification by continuing to restrict emigration to very low levels.

But the 1978-79 peak coincided as well with an unpublicized series of meetings and negotiations involving Soviet embassy diplomats in Washington, leaders of the American Jewish community, the late Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) and the Carter Administration. Put simply, the question in these discussions was, given the high rates of emigration in 1978-79, should the United States respond by waiving the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and granting the Soviets most-favored-nation status and renewed access to Export-Import Bank credits? The

reaction of the Carter Administration was tentatively favorable. But the Administration was not willing to use its power to waive the amendment unless Senator Jackson and the major Jewish organizations went along. Under the law, if the president wishes to waive the amendment, he must tell Congress that he has "received assurances" from the country in question that it will henceforth permit emigration.

The Soviets had indicated before the amendment was adopted that they would never give such formal assurances on a matter they regarded as a question of internal policy. Therefore, the United States had to decide whether the high rates of emigration in 1978–79 in themselves justified a waiver. Senator Jackson's position was that they did not. He insisted that President Carter get, if not written, at least verbal assurances from the Soviets that the high emigration rates would continue. The Jewish organizations went along with Jackson. Faced with that lack of support, the Carter Administration chose not to ask for a waiver.

It was, in retrospect, a questionable decision. Some Jewish groups believe to this day that it was the correct one. Jerry Goodman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry supports it on the grounds that the Soviets might well have cut off the flow of emigration once they had gotten what they wanted. He notes that the Soviets began to introduce new restrictions on emigration as early as May 1979, before the decision not to seek a waiver. But others, like Hyman Bookbinder of the American Jewish Committee, believe it was "a tragic mistake" not to have granted the waiver in 1979. In any case, by the end of that year, whatever hopes the Soviets might have had for MFN status, as well as a ratified SALT II treaty, were dead. The emigration figures soon declined to their present low.

V

Can the United States induce the Soviets to let the refuseniks go, and, if so, how? Fortunately, the situation of Soviet Jews is not as desperate as that which faced European Jewry in the 1930s. Then, European Jews faced a regime with an avowed doctrine of racial superiority and a pathological determination to exterminate them. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, pays lip service to the concept of ethnic equality and tolerance. It flouts its human rights obligations, but the ultimate goal of its repression is not the annihilation of Soviet Jews, but their assimilation into the Soviet masses. Most importantly, Moscow

has demonstrated that it can be induced to release Jews if it feels that will help it attain arms control agreements or economic benefits. No doubt, in the 1930s the proper response of Western democracies to Hitler's regime would have been constant protest coupled with vigorous efforts to isolate Germany, both economically and morally. But what would have been the appropriate response to Hitler in the 1930s is not the appropriate response to the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

The United States could continue its present policy and, as Anatoly Shcharansky suggests, maintain and reinforce the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. It could continue to exert what diplomatic pressure it can on the Soviets to let the Jews leave. There is ample legal justification for this. The Soviet Union in 1975 signed the Helsinki Final Act, in which it pledged to act expeditiously on requests to reunite families. By reference, the Helsinki accords incorporated the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, which asserts the right of an individual to enter or leave his or her own country. It is not unreasonable to demand that the Soviets live up to those promises. But, as noted above, the Soviets have their own reasons for keeping the Jews in. And any Soviet policymaker who argued for letting them out would find it difficult to answer a colleague who pointed out that the Soviets already tried that, in 1978–79, and got nothing in return. The unfortunate likelihood is that if the United States retains its current policy, so will the Soviet Union. The refuseniks will continue to languish, and many thousands of other Jews who might have applied to emigrate under more promising circumstances will continue to lead their lives of quiet desperation.

Humanitarian concern impels the United States to take the initiative to break this impasse. The challenge is to do this in a way that promotes the emigration of Soviet Jews without compromising American principles or interests. The history of the past 15 years suggests that there are two carrots to which the Soviets will respond: trade and arms control. Clearly, arms control policy, which so directly affects American national security, cannot be determined on the basis of what is likely to aid Soviet Jews. But trade is another matter. The trick is to devise a set of trade incentives—to be extended one at a time depending on Soviet behavior—that serves both American interests and those of Soviet Jews.

The United States can and should initiate a phased removal of the trade barriers between itself and the Soviet Union. As

this process begins, Washington should explain to the Soviets, privately, that continuation of the process, and removal of the more substantial barriers, would depend on their response to the initial steps. A satisfactory response need not be as wrenching as simply opening the gates to anyone who wants to leave. This would require the Soviets to flirt with social unrest and chaos. The goal should be a controlled, steady flow of perhaps 20,000 emigrés per year until the people who want to leave have done so. If the Soviets respond by allowing emigration at about that level, the process of removing trade barriers could continue. If not, it could be stopped and rolled back.

The proper first steps in this process would be the repeal of the Stevenson Amendment and a modification of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, deleting the clause that requires the president to "receive assurances" from the Soviets on emigration. Neither step would give anything tangible to the Soviets. The Stevenson Amendment is meaningless as long as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is in effect. The "assurances" clause in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment has been, as noted above, a particular obstacle in improving the Soviet emigration record. The Soviets have consistently maintained that they will not give the United States any assurance about something they consider an internal matter. Deleting the clause would leave the amendment in force but free the president to respond to what really matters in this issue: the number of people allowed to emigrate. These two steps would constitute a demonstration that both the executive and Congress are prepared to respond to improved Soviet performance.

If the Soviets did respond by increasing the emigration rate, the next American step would be a presidential waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, giving the Soviets most-favored-nation status. This American carrot would still be largely symbolic; MFN status would put the Soviet Union in a less-than-exclusive group of 152 countries. It would mean a reduction of tariffs on Soviet manufactured goods entering the United States. But it would hardly revolutionize U.S.-Soviet trade.

In 1985 the Soviets sold only \$400 million worth of goods to the United States. Petroleum products and chemicals like ammonia accounted for more than three-fourths of that total. Their prices would not be affected by reduced tariffs, since tariffs do not fall on raw materials. Nor would MFN status be likely to cause any flood of Soviet manufactured goods into the American market. That is not the case now in Japan, West

Germany or other developed countries with normal trade relations with the Soviets. Regardless of tariffs, Soviet manufactured goods are simply not capable of competing in open world markets. Soviet exports to the United States would continue to be comprised largely of raw materials. The Soviets would become eligible for Export-Import Bank credits but under current federal budget restraints, those credits are all but unavailable anyway. And even if they were granted, they would be used to buy American products—an ostensible goal of American foreign policy.

Even with a waiver of Jackson-Vanik, the more substantive trade barriers would remain in place, giving the Soviets ample incentive not to backslide on emigration policy. If the Soviets continued to perform satisfactorily, the United States might consider the desire recently expressed by the Kremlin to participate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Further down the road, the United States could review its present policies on technology sales to the Soviets, which are governed both by the Export Administration Act and by the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) of the Western allies. If the Soviets continued to meet American expectations for the release of Soviet Jews, the United States might, for instance, respond by liberalizing the rules on the export of oil exploration equipment. Although the Reagan Administration has theoretically loosened export controls on that equipment, the Soviets still find it difficult to purchase because of objections from the U.S. Defense Department, which contends that some of the technology has potential military applications.

VI

Several broad objections can and would be raised against such a course of action. The first is that the United States should not make the first move, that the Soviets must allow significant emigration before they are “rewarded” with MFN status. This argument has two problems. First, the Soviets have made the first move—in fact they made it twice. In the early 1970s and again in 1978–79, they allowed significant levels of emigration in the expectation that it would lead to normal trade relations. In both cases they were disappointed. Moreover, there is no “giveaway” involved. A phased removal of trade barriers as outlined above would require genuine increases in emigration before the Soviets reaped any tangible benefits.

A more substantive argument holds that it is not in American interests to trade with the Soviets, particularly in high technology. Of course, the United States must protect vital military technology. But several examples from the recent history of East-West trade suggest that excessively tight restrictions on technology transfer damage the United States at least as much as the Soviets. In the early 1980s the United States successfully denied the Soviets the right to purchase American compressor technology for the gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe. Faced with this embargo, the Soviets managed to develop their own compressors. They may not be as good as the American brand, but they work—and the Soviets, in the bargain, have developed an important industrial capability they did not have before.

In contrast, the Soviets in the mid-1960s were able to buy a Fiat automobile factory from Italy. Twenty years later, they are still turning out a car (called the Zhiguli) that is, in effect, a 1965 Fiat. Twenty years of improvements in auto technology have thus passed them by. The general principle seems to be that denying technology to the Soviets spurs them to develop their own. Selling it to them dulls their incentive and freezes their technological progress—while the West marches on.

Particularly in the area of oil drilling and exploration, the United States gains little by making its technology difficult for the Soviets to buy. Are American interests served by the present situation, in which Soviet oil production has begun to decline? In the midst of an oil glut, it may seem so. But when the glut ends, it would clearly be an advantage to have the Soviets producing at high levels, selling their surplus on the spot market, and helping keep the world price down.

A final argument holds that the Soviets are not going to respond to trade incentives by releasing large numbers of Jews. And indeed, there are no guarantees. In comparison to the 1970s, MFN is a debased currency. The window of easy credit at the Export-Import Bank is closed. The Soviets now know that, regardless of whether they have MFN status, access to American high technology is hardly guaranteed. But Mikhail Gorbachev, no less than Leonid Brezhnev, needs that technology. Moreover, the Soviets are apparently interested in participating in the next round of Middle East peacemaking; their chances of doing so would be enhanced if they allowed some emigration and restored diplomatic relations with Israel. Finally, by releasing Anatoly Shcharansky shortly after his first

meeting with President Reagan, Mr. Gorbachev seemed to be signaling that, like his predecessors, he is willing to use Soviet Jewry to pay for improved relations with the United States. That signal was reinforced after Reykjavik when the Soviets allowed refusenik David Goldfarb and his wife to go to the United States and Inessa Flerov and her family to go to Israel.

After Reykjavik the situation of Soviet Jews, like arms control and the entire East-West relationship, seems to be teetering delicately between progress and deterioration. It is an opportune time for a serious American initiative. That initiative would cost the United States nothing. It would not "give" the Soviet Union anything except incentive. If that encouragement failed, the United States would lose little. If it succeeded, the increased Soviet-American trade might have a mildly beneficial impact on the American balance of payments. More important, it could have an immeasurably beneficial impact on the lives of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Soviet Jews. Clearly, it is the Soviet government that bears the blame for their plight. But just as clearly, it is the Jews who pay the price of retaining a failed American policy. Their lives are being wasted.

Thomas G. Karis

SOUTH AFRICAN LIBERATION: THE COMMUNIST FACTOR

In a free election in South Africa, the now-outlawed African National Congress could possibly win three-fourths of the black vote as well as some white votes.¹ No such election is in sight, but the popularity of the ANC poses a challenge for U.S. policy. Since one of the ANC's allies is the pro-Soviet South African Communist Party, there is apprehension that the Communist Party dominates or controls the ANC. This issue has become so contentious that the October 1986 U.S. Anti-Apartheid Act, which imposes sanctions on South Africa, also directs the president to report to Congress about "the extent to which communists have infiltrated" black South African politics. As the conflict in South Africa intensifies and becomes more violent, the issue of who the ANC is and what it stands for will preoccupy U.S. policy.

This essay argues that focusing on the role of communism or the Communist Party risks misunderstanding the nature of the ANC. Although some of the ANC's support is only symbolic, and its capacity to control events in South Africa is weak, its strength lies in its stature as a national movement rather than a party.² Most students of South African black politics do not believe that the ANC is dominated or controlled by the South African Communist Party. Their key premise, grounded in South African history, is that non-Communist African leaders

¹ The term "black" is used in this essay to refer to Africans, Indians and mixed-race "Coloureds"; African is used to denote indigenous Bantu-speaking people.

² On the ANC's history and developments that overlap the subject of this essay, see Thomas G. Karis, "Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in South Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/84, pp. 378-406; and "Black Politics: The Road to Revolution," in Mark A. Uhlig, ed., *Apartheid in Crisis*, New York: Vintage/Random House, 1986. Some historical quotations in the text are from Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter, eds., *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964* (4 volumes), Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972-1977. The writer is indebted to Gail M. Gerhart and seven South Africans for commenting on parts of this essay.

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work with Communists for their common end of opposing white domination.

From its formation in 1912 by a group of African nationalists, the ANC has been the standard-bearer of the African's quest for equality and full political rights. It has sought to unify all opponents of white domination. After five decades of peaceful protest, the ANC was outlawed in 1960, forcing its leadership into exile and its cadres underground. But open support for the ANC since its resurgence in the late 1970s has been defiant and nationwide, cutting across classes and ethnic groups and bridging the racial divide. Its goal is a democratic, nonracial and undivided South Africa, and its economic program is moderate and pragmatic.

In contrast, the South African Communist Party, founded in 1921 and outlawed in 1950, is a clandestine Marxist-Leninist party, claiming to be tightly controlled and highly disciplined. Its membership, undoubtedly very small, is almost entirely secret; its program is rigidly ideological and pro-Moscow. It responds primarily to its own elitist perception of the interests of the working class, although African nationalism has influenced the party. Beginning in the late 1920s, a few African Communists joined the ANC, some later becoming major figures in it. They are there today, valued and trusted by nationalists as comrades in a common struggle.

The allegation of outright Communist control over the ANC cannot be substantiated, and estimating the degree of Communist influence in the ANC is nearly as difficult. Though the Communists' ideological convictions and long-range agenda distinguish them from many in the ANC, at this stage of the struggle for national liberation Communists and non-Communists in the ANC have no significant differences on policy or strategy. Furthermore the Communists and the ANC share an anti-imperialist stance, condemnation of many aspects of U.S. foreign policy, and embrace of all who support the ANC.

II

At present, the Communist factor is in many ways less significant than other groups supportive of the ANC. Both white and black leaders representing a wide diversity of interests have met with leaders of the African National Congress in Lusaka, Zambia, the group's headquarters, or elsewhere, demonstrating a recognition that the ANC is essential to any negotiations. The visitors have been seeking reassurance or demonstrating

support for the ANC. The visits have strengthened the international legitimacy of the ANC and furthered its campaign to attract white support. The first important white group came in September 1985: businessmen and journalists headed by Gavin Relly, chairman of the Anglo American Corporation.

Others include leaders of the Progressive Federal Party, which is the official white opposition, multiracial delegations of Dutch Reformed, Roman Catholic and Anglican clergymen, and Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking student leaders. Representatives of the broad-based Soweto Parents Crisis Committee obtained the ANC's concurrence on the need for students to return to school in early 1986. And officers of the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce came, as did a 21-member delegation led by the chief minister of the KaNgwane "homeland."

Joint communiqués issued after these meetings underlined the ANC's importance now and "in a free South Africa." Representatives of the National Union of South African Students and the KaNgwane "homeland" agreed that the majority of South Africans recognize the ANC as their "genuine representative."

Among participants in the meetings were adherents of the United Democratic Front, whose support is of obvious importance to the ANC. Formed in 1983, the UDF brought under its decentralized federal umbrella a wide array of some 700 affiliated political, community, labor, religious, youth and other anti-apartheid groups representing a claimed two million members of all races. Its three presidents are veteran ANC activists; the UDF looks to the ANC as the leader of the liberation movement, but it does not advocate violence.

The meeting with the ANC that deserves the closest attention is that of March 5–6, 1986, with representatives of the Congress of South African Trade Unions. COSATU emerged late in 1985 as the largest union federation in South African history, with some 500,000 signed-up members, most of them Africans. It is important because of its potential labor power and the independence of its approximately 10,000 shop stewards, who are elected by the workers and not appointed.

At first, COSATU's primary objective was to build national industrial unions that were nonracial and based on shop-floor strength. This is still the federation's long-range goal, but in the latter part of 1984 the government's new constitution focused attention on basic questions of political power. The

reaction, combined with local grievances, sparked a wave of protest and violence that has bordered on countrywide insurrection. In such a defiant climate, COSATU came into being with a commitment to joint political action.

The joint communiqué that emerged from COSATU's meeting with the ANC said: "There was a common understanding that . . . lasting solutions can only emerge from the national liberation movement, headed by the ANC, and the entire democratic forces of our country, of which COSATU is an important and integral part."

The delegation included Cyril Ramaphosa, the 34-year-old general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, who in conversation with this writer before the Lusaka meeting expressed his concern, as a socialist (but not a Communist), about the direction that the ANC leaders might be taking by meeting with the chairman of the Anglo American Corporation and other businessmen. (In the eyes of some sectarian critics on the left, the ANC confirmed the reformist and petit-bourgeois nature of its leadership by doing so.) Ramaphosa's concerns appear to have been met. The joint ANC-COSATU communiqué, while ignoring the role of the Communist Party, criticized "the apartheid system of national oppression and class exploitation," and recognized the need for "economic emancipation."

In observing the movement toward common cause with the ANC, one must stress the determination of the new generation of labor leaders to maintain their unions' independence from populist movements and leaders, including men as respected as the imprisoned Nelson Mandela and ANC President Oliver Tambo. For the new unionists, democracy requires accountability to their members on the shop floor. Ramaphosa believes that unions face a serious danger when a powerful political party presses them to accept party affiliation and to place party men in positions of union leadership, as in Zimbabwe.

At the height of the Solidarity union movement's challenge to the Polish state, organized black workers in South Africa were strongly pro-Solidarity, not so much because they were anti-Communist but because they favored workers' control and were anti-state. COSATU, in sum, represents the kind of autonomous force that could not easily be manipulated or controlled by a Leninist party or a party of pro-Soviet ideologues. Men like Ramaphosa, with their experience of prolonged detention, their own approach to socialism, and their political evolution

from Black Consciousness to affinity with the ANC have developed a self-confident spirit of independence and a vision of democracy that is accountable to the grass roots.

III

Like other ANC leaders before him, Oliver Tambo has from time to time praised the contributions of individual Communists. In 1981, however, on the 60th anniversary of the party, he went beyond such praise and extolled the alliance—"a living organism that has grown out of struggle"—and the reciprocal influence of the organizations on each other. But the practical meaning of such an alliance is not clear; for instance, aid from the Soviet Union does not depend on alliance with the South African Communist Party.

From its formation in 1921 as the first Marxist-Leninist party on the continent, the Communist Party struggled with the need to reconcile race and class, nationalism and socialism in its doctrine. Formed by whites but for over 30 years the only nonracial political party in South Africa, it initially appealed to the white working class. Skilled artisans and intellectuals had brought socialist thinking from Britain around the turn of the century. In 1909 a Labour Party was formed but split over the World War. Those who opposed participation and were enthusiastic about the Russian Revolution joined with several small Marxist groups to form the Communist Party of South Africa.

The party's notorious but anti-capitalist slogan during the white mineworkers' uprising of 1922 was "Workers of the World, Fight and Unite for a *White* South Africa," (emphasis added). The strike was brutally crushed. Recognizing the hostility of white workers to it, the party turned to the African working class, conducting night schools and organizing trade unions. In 1928 almost all of its 1,750 members were Africans. Only about 150 were whites, but they continued to predominate.

Within a few years the party was shattered, hit by government repression but even more by the consequences of obedience to the Moscow-based Comintern. Despite remonstrances about the need for appealing also to the white working class, the Comintern in 1928 ordered as correct the slogan: "an independent native South African republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' republic with full, equal rights for all races." The factionalism and expulsions that followed this declaration virtually decimated the party. With the rise of

Hitler and Moscow's new emphasis on organizing all-class united fronts, the party slowly revived.

Early party efforts to establish tactical alliances with African groups came up against conservatism, resentment of whites and competition for position or power. Links with a diffuse mass movement of African workers known as the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, more important than the ANC at the time, were broken in 1926 when the ICWU leadership expelled members of the Communist Party. Even brighter prospects were dashed in 1930 when a conservative leadership reasserted control of the ANC and defeated proposals for a tactical ANC-SACP alliance, after the incumbent ANC president went to the Soviet Union and returned with glowing praise for the equality he had observed there.

Another feature of the party's history, to this day, is attacks upon it from ultraleft or, more recently, "workerist" groups which accuse it of delaying the revolution because of insufficient commitment to working-class leadership. Among the Communists' critics in the 1940s were radical groups which advocated boycott of government-sponsored institutions over pragmatic efforts to exploit them, the Communists' preferred strategy. For example, Communists ran and were elected by Africans to the all-white Parliament before 1950.

From the 1920s, South African governments have found communism a useful scapegoat. After the 1946 mineworkers' strike, led by African Communist and ANC member J.B. Marks, the government charged members of the party's central committee with sedition in a lengthy but abortive trial. In contrast, the target of the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act was so broadly defined that even virulently anti-Communist opponents of the regime were later to be banned under its provisions.

When the party's legal existence came to an end in 1950, it had about 2,000 dues-paying members. The number of whites was still only about 150, and about 250 were Indians. Since the government knew the identity of virtually all the members and the party had failed to prepare for a move underground, its central committee decided on dissolution.

Former members of the party reconstituted it underground in 1953, but only during the 1960 emergency did it publicly announce its existence. In 1962 the party finally formulated its theory of revolution in South Africa, which is still authoritative today. According to this statement, the first stage of the

revolution was to build "a united front of national liberation [primarily African liberation] that would unite all sections and classes . . . to destroy white domination." Eventually the second stage would emerge, one of advance to "the establishment of a socialist South Africa, laying the foundations of a classless, communist society."

IV

The ANC's attitude, and that of most blacks, toward the Communists can be traced through three rough stages: distance from Communists; joint action with them and all races; and increasing reliance on groups within South Africa. The major challenge facing the Communist Party over the years has come from Africans whose thinking reflects a deeply rooted strain of "Africanist" exclusiveness, self-reliance and national pride. Although nonracial in their ends, they have been suspicious of non-African ideologies and hostile to tactical cooperation with privileged whites and Indians, especially those thought to have conflicting allegiance due to membership in other organizations.

From the 1920s through the 1940s many ANC members, some of them temperamentally averse to militant protest, opposed cooperation with Communists. This was the early orientation of Mandela and Tambo, founding members of the ANC Youth League in 1944 and the two preeminent leaders of the ANC today. They proposed the expulsion of Communists from the ANC in the late 1940s. On the other hand, older leaders, long familiar with multiracial political contact, subordinated such differences to the need for wider unity. For example, Dr. Alfred Xuma, the exemplar of "moderation" as president of the ANC in the 1940s, joined in a declaration of cooperation in 1947 with the Indian leaders of the Transvaal and Natal, one a prominent Communist, Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, and the other a Gandhian.

The high point of the Youth League's influence was the adoption by the ANC in 1949 of a program for mass action: illegal but nonviolent tactics of civil disobedience as well as boycotts, strikes and noncooperation. The program was clearly the work of non-Communist and anti-Communist African nationalists.

The second phase in the ANC's attitude toward Communists was marked by the shift of Mandela and Tambo toward acceptance of joint action with the left and all races. This change

was largely a reaction to the policies of the new National Party government, which came to power in 1948. By discriminating against Coloureds and Indians (policies it has sought to reverse in recent years) as well as Africans, it widened the ground upon which a common opposition could be built. Moreover, the government's drive to destroy communist influence by outlawing the Communist Party in 1950 stimulated wider unity, since it was perceived as a threat to the entire extraparliamentary opposition. While entrenching white domination, the government warned that Communists were undermining "our democratic institutions and our Western philosophy."

Not surprisingly, when the Communist Party was banned, African Communists who were members of the ANC redirected their energies to this still-legal movement, and Communists of other races sought close cooperation with them. African nationalists such as Mandela and Tambo reassessed the need for allies. Mandela later, in explaining "why experienced African politicians so readily accept Communists as their friends," said, "Communists were the only political group . . . who were prepared to eat with us, talk with us, live with us and work with us."³ Close cooperation with whites and Indians probably contributed to the growing self-confidence of Mandela and Tambo as leaders of a multiracial movement.

In 1952 Africans and Indians, including former members of the Communist Party, worked together for the first time in a mass "Defiance Campaign" against apartheid laws. In 1955 the Congress alliance, an ANC-led coalition of Indian, Coloured and left-wing white organizations, sponsored the "Congress of the People," a two-day outdoor mass meeting. It endorsed the "Freedom Charter," which declared "that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white." Africanist and other critics complained that the meeting forestalled proper deliberation of the charter within the ANC, but early the next year ANC leaders closed ranks and formally adopted it. The Freedom Charter still expresses the ANC's basic policy. It is not socialist or Marxist, nor is it anti-capitalist; it envisages a democratic welfare state and a mixed economy. For the first time,

³ Youth Leaguers who did not have Mandela's experience of intimate cooperation, and who resisted the shift, remained within the ANC as "Africanists" until they finally split to form the Pan Africanist Congress in 1959. Some American officials were attracted to it since they saw the PAC as anti-communist and anti-Soviet. In exile, the PAC turned to China for support. It continues today as a repository of potential appeal, but internal disputes and the resurgence of the ANC have left it with marginal importance.

however, the ANC accepted nationalization of “the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry.” This is not a radical program today in the light of the South African state’s control of the economy, including ownership of telephones, railroads, airlines, electricity, iron and steel, atomic energy, the arms industry and the production of oil from coal.

The government’s counteraction, as the 1950s drew to a close, further dramatized the need for unity. In December 1956 the police rounded up 156 men and women, almost all of them activists in the Congress alliance. For their militant advocacy of equality, they were accused of high treason as members of “a countrywide conspiracy” inspired by international communism to overcome the state by violence. During the trial, a few Communists were among the Africans, Indians, whites and Coloureds who sat together day after day in the unsegregated dock of a segregated courtroom. The case finally collapsed in 1961 when the judges ruled that the state had not proven that the ANC had a policy of violence or that it was a communist organization.

In what could be called a third phase in the evolution of the ANC’s relationship with Communists, the change was marked not so much by a different posture toward the Communists as by a relative increase in the importance of aboveground groups based in South Africa, such as those described earlier. When the ANC was forced underground and into exile after its banning in 1960, the task of maintaining a unified movement became infinitely more difficult. Another new development, in which Communists participated, was the forming of a military arm of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, in Zulu), to lead a largely symbolic “armed struggle” in tandem with political mobilization. The growing efficiency and ruthlessness of the South African police state and its ability to enlist collaborators made the task more daunting. A political lull settled over the country after discovery and raiding of the ANC’s underground headquarters and, in 1964, the sentencing to life imprisonment of Nelson Mandela and seven others, four of them Communists.

The year 1973 marked the beginning of a new period of militancy among African workers, and trade union organization. The Soweto uprising of 1976, the first substantial exodus of young blacks for ANC guerrilla training, and the crackdown on Black Consciousness organizations (which arose in the late 1960s to champion “psychological liberation” from racial

oppression) in the following year led to the resurgence of the ANC. While aboveground groups were nearly immobilized by intense government repression, the ANC sponsored sabotage and small-scale guerrilla attacks that were primarily exercises in "armed propaganda." These were greeted by popular manifestations of support for the ANC and Mandela. In the 1980s the red Communist flag has been sporadically displayed at such demonstrations.

Continually seeking the widest unity among groups opposed to apartheid, the pragmatic leaders of the ANC maintained informal relations with Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, head of the KwaZulu "homeland." By mid-1980, however, Buthelezi's own hopes for a "united front" with the ANC appeared at an end when Tambo declared that Buthelezi had "emerged on the side of the enemy against the people." Only afterward did Buthelezi, one of whose white advisers (Rowley Arenstein) is a Marxist-Leninist opposed to the Moscow line, begin to attack the ANC for working with the Communist Party.

v

African, Indian and white Communists have influenced the course of the ANC to an extent greater than their numbers, but they have not dominated or controlled the movement. In the pre-1960 period, one would have to believe that elder statesmen such as Chief Albert Lutuli, the ANC president-general after 1952, or Professor Z.K. Matthews, ANC leader in Cape Province and the preeminent African academic in South Africa, were naïve or gullible. Or that young African nationalists such as Mandela, Tambo or Walter Sisulu had come to accept the discipline of a minor and doctrinaire party or were manipulated by it.

The ANC did move in a more militant and radical direction after World War II. Its accommodation with the left can largely be explained by the circumstances of mounting repression and the priority that African nationalists gave to unity and the appearance of unity among the opposition forces. Issues of international policy were a matter of disagreement, but since leftists considered them more important, their views tended to prevail in the adoption of resolutions. A related problem for the ANC was the fact that it did not have its own national newspaper. *New Age*, the paper most widely read by ANC sympathizers during the 1950s, was pro-ANC and often gave the

impression that it was speaking for the ANC, although on international issues it was pro-Soviet.

Critics of the ANC also cite activities that presumably affected individual thinking, for example, the trips of some dozen Africans to Soviet-bloc countries in the 1950s. Another example is the cordial hospitality that the Soviet consulate in Pretoria extended to blacks during the years 1948–1956, before it was closed down; the American embassy, meanwhile, maintained a social policy of whites-only until 1963. The importance of such activities in judging the Communist role is a matter of speculation.

Much is made of the fact that a few Communists held office in the ANC. Although no Communist held any of the top three offices (except the secretary-general in the late 1920s), three became members of the National Executive Committee in the late 1940s. One was Moses Kotane, general secretary of the Communist Party from 1936. Another was J.B. Marks, who also won election as president of the Transvaal ANC in 1950.⁴ His victory, however, was a personal one and did not signify that the ANC was substituting class for national appeals.

Senior leaders such as Lutuli and Matthews, as well as Xuma, opposed Communist domination. In a conversation I had with Lutuli in 1955 about the hypothetical consequences for him of a Communist government, he replied by motioning that his throat would be cut. Similarly, in a later conversation, Matthews expressed his belief that in an ultimate conflict between the aims of the Soviet Union and those of the ANC, a dedicated African Communist would follow the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, they regarded men such as Kotane and Marks to be outstanding and trustworthy members of the ANC. Matthews considered Kotane “more of a nationalist than a Communist.”

After 1960 the circumstances of life underground and in exile made the question of dominance a shadowy one at best. Like the ANC, the party was virtually decimated in the 1960s, and individual relationships within the ANC inevitably became still closer as leaders sought to regroup and plan. Individual Communists who were not Africans became formal members of the ANC beginning in 1969. Although the ANC's constitution

⁴ In reviewing the history of African politics, John Vorster as minister of justice declared erroneously that Marks had become secretary-general of the ANC in 1936; and “from that moment Communism took over the ANC hand over hand and made it its tool.” *House of Assembly Debates*, Apr. 24, 1963, cols. 4638–4644. *South African Digest*, published by the government, repeated the statement about Marks in its Sept. 19, 1986, issue.

was nonracial in its membership provisions, not until then did the ANC extend an invitation to whites, Indians and Coloureds to join (a small number, including non-Communists, have), while reserving membership on the National Executive Committee for Africans.⁵

In 1985, at the first conference to be held since 1969, the committee was finally opened to all races, over the argument of some whites, Coloureds and Communists that the time was not ripe. Joe Slovo, a lawyer who was to become the chairman of the Communist Party in 1986, was the first white member. Two Indians and two Coloureds were also elected to the executive committee.⁶

Speculation about Communist influence focuses upon its extent rather than its nature. Its nature, over the years and during the current stage of the struggle, is pragmatic and tends toward caution and restraint. In addressing the Communist Party's 65th anniversary meeting on July 31, 1986, Slovo saw "a protracted conflict" in South Africa of increasing complexity; he saw no need for the party to "seek to occupy the dominant position in the liberation alliance." His nondoctinaire open-mindedness about the future and the problems that might face the opposition were evident in a conversation with me in late 1985. He could not envision a clear revolutionary timetable, saying that nonradical "forces for change" have arisen. He wondered whether these forces might lead the South African government to release political prisoners, unban the ANC and allow political freedoms. Such actions might be calculated to expose Communist and ANC intransigence; he ruminated about the problems that would be posed by such a development, but in any case did not expect it to happen.⁷

VI

One reason for the difficulty in assessing Communist influence in ANC decision-making is the absence of significant dif-

⁵ In 1969 the ANC also established a Revolutionary Council, with responsibility for directing the armed struggle. Like Umkhonto we Sizwe, which had been multiracial from its inception, the Revolutionary Council was multiracial. Under Tambo as chairman, the vice-chairman was Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, the Indian Communist. The council's abolition in 1983 appeared to underline the centralized responsibility of the National Executive Committee, which was all-African until 1985.

⁶ About 250 delegates representing ANC branches in Africa and around the world attended the conference. According to a participant, Tambo and Alfred Nzo were reelected as president and secretary-general respectively, without opposition. Two candidates were nominated for treasurer general; Thomas Nkobi, the incumbent, was reelected. The election of the remaining 27 members of the enlarged committee proceeded without nominations as each delegate wrote down 27 names from the full roster.

ferences in policy or strategy during the current stage of the struggle for national liberation.⁸ Another reason is the nature of influence that arises from personal friendship and shared experience. Influence, furthermore, is a two-way street—although anti-communists often assume that only Communists can exert it effectively. Walter Sisulu, former secretary-general of the ANC who is now, with Mandela, in prison for life, would say to friends about critics who assumed that Communists would dominate any collaboration: cannot these people see that *we* might be using the Communists?

When asked about Communist domination, Oliver Tambo, clearly not a Communist, said: "It is often suggested that the ANC is controlled by the Communist Party . . . by Communists. Well, I have been long enough in the ANC to know that that has never been true."

Another ANC spokesman has pointed out that "at the peak of the civil rights struggle in the United States, [Martin Luther] King was called a Communist." The occasion for his remark was a meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, on August 23, 1986, between a delegation of Rev. Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, which was visiting the Front Line States, and a delegation of 17 ANC leaders, a majority of them members of the National Executive Committee. The meeting was unprecedented, said Alfred Nzo, the secretary-general; "for some of us, today is like a dream." In a spirit of solidarity rather than skepticism, a Jackson delegate and former activist in the civil rights movement asked the first question: how should he deal with the Communist issue when he returned home?

Pallo Jordan, a member of the National Executive Committee in his early forties who has lived in the United States, and

⁷ The influence of the Communist Party on the ANC was described as anti-revolutionary by Neville Alexander in a conversation in Cape Town on November 2, 1985 with Gail M. Gerhart and this writer. Alexander, a so-called Coloured, is a well-known and influential Marxist intellectual who heads the Cape Action League. Through the Communist Party's two-stage theory of revolution, he believes, the party is "entrenching the illusion" that a democratic bourgeois alternative to the Nationalist government is possible. Communist Party conservatism, he argues, is due to the Soviet Union, which prefers a simmering situation in South Africa and favors revolution only when the Soviet Union can control it.

⁸ In addressing an ANC youth conference in Tanzania in 1982, Moses Mabhida, general secretary of the Communist Party, identified only one issue on which the ANC and the party had "markedly different" approaches. There was no "unwritten agreement," he said, "according to which the ANC will head the struggle for a democratic revolution, . . . while the Party will be responsible for leading the advance to socialism." In a somewhat obscure explication, he said that the party did not contemplate "a neat progression from one 'stage' to another" but proposed to destroy apartheid's political institutions immediately "during the struggle for the seizure of power" rather than postponing this to "the possible advent of another 'October' phase of the Revolution." *The African Communist*, No. 92, 1st Quarter 1983, pp. 81-82.

who is not considered a Communist, gave a spirited reply. It was "absurd," he said, to assume that Communists are "smarter and cleverer than anybody else." (There were as many "geniuses and fools" among non-Communists as among Communists, he had said earlier in private conversation.) To assume that ANC members who were not Communists can be dominated now or in the future was "an insult." Africans who were Marxist-Leninists were not exempt from apartheid and had been welcomed as members of the ANC since the 1920s along with everyone else opposed to racism. "If this makes people in Washington uncomfortable, too bad."

Unlike speculation about influence, inquiry into the number of Communists in the National Executive Committee has the appeal of statistical objectivity, the assumption being that the number correlates with influence. Indeed, if it were true that the committee was dominated numerically by Communists, the question of influence and manipulation would become irrelevant. A further reason for interest in the composition of the committee is the presence of whites and Indians. One suspects that this interest may resemble a habitual racist assumption of white South Africans: that when Africans engage in complex activity, whites or Indians must be manipulating them behind the scenes.

The London *Economist* of July 26, 1986, declared that the ANC's 30-member National Executive Committee contained at least ten "members" of the South African Communist Party "and perhaps as many as 14 or 15." That such a judgment has become commonplace illustrates how an assertion can take on authenticity through repetition, even if based only on flimsy evidence. Senator Jeremiah Denton's (R-Ala.) Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism began the process in 1982 with assertions and information that were provided by South African intelligence and contained major inaccuracies.

In June 1986 the South African government distributed a booklet listing 23 members of the ANC executive committee as "members and/or active supporters of the SACP." In the same month, Congressman Dan Burton (R-Ind.) listed in the *Congressional Record* the names of 19 who were "members" of the party, adding that "we believe that as many as 25 of the 30 are Communists."⁹ His information had been "compiled from South African intelligence and other sources" by Senator Den-

⁹ *Congressional Record*, June 18, 1986, pp. H3901-3902.

ton's staff. Two months later, Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) announced that William Casey, director of Central Intelligence, had declassified at his request "the biographies of the Communist members of the Executive Committee."

In my view, the CIA biographies do not substantiate the conclusion that all or even more than three of the 18 men profiled are "Communists." Three men in these biographies are publicly known as members of the Communist Party: Joe Slovo, 60, the party chairman, and, as chief of staff, the third-ranking officer of the ANC's military wing; Steve Dlamini, who was imprisoned on Robben Island and later tortured, and Dan Tloome. Dlamini and Tloome, both in their seventies, are well-known stalwarts of trade unionism, the Communist Party and the ANC.¹⁰ Other members of the executive committee may also be party members; many almost certainly are not. Definitive proof most likely will not be forthcoming, though accusations with insufficient evidence are just as likely to continue.

But more important are the attitudes of current key ANC leaders toward the Communist Party, its thinking and its aims. The three top officials of the ANC are all in their sixties and veteran activists. Oliver Tambo, 68, the president, has been in the ANC forefront for some 40 years. He is a lawyer, an African nationalist, a practicing Christian, and a man of widely respected integrity, who is committed to Western forms of polit-

¹⁰ Moses Mabhida was a member of the executive committee, but is not profiled because he died in March 1986. The 14 remaining CIA biographies, excluding that of Alfred Nzo, contain a number of errors. The biographies may be placed in four groups. (1) Five contain no data that justify inclusion in the list. Two men have received training in the Soviet Union; two have expressed commonplace beliefs. (2) Two are based solely on the grounds of association with "Communist front groups." Thabo Mbeki, 44, the widely known and nondoctrinaire ANC director of information, is said to have been associated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth in the 1960s. Mbeki's father, Govan, now in prison for life, was a member of the Communist Party, but Mbeki is not known as a member of the party. (3) The inclusion of two men, Francis Meli and Pallo Jordan, is based solely on an assertion by the South African government; in the case of Meli, that he is "either a Communist or a supporter of communism"; in the case of Jordan, that he is "either a Communist or an active supporter of communism." About Francis Meli, the editor of *Sechaba*, the ANC's journal, one could adduce evidence of his strong Marxist orientation that is not in the biography; the judgments of the South African government, on the other hand, may be based on definitions of such breadth that they are useless. A third, Aziz Pahad, may be included in this category since "a South African political scientist" lists him as a possible member of the party. He is also said to have written articles in *The African Communist*; but if he has, he has done so under a pseudonym. (4) In the final category, the biographies simply assert that four men are Communists. One is also said to have had contacts with Communist front groups. Another, Mac Maharaj, is said to have joined the British Communist Party in the 1950s before returning to South Africa, where he was convicted of sabotage and "furthering the aims of communism." *Congressional Record*, Aug. 14, 1986, pp. S11655-11656, S11660-11661.

ical democracy. It is difficult to think of any major African leader less interested than Tambo in personal power.

Another top ANC leader is Thomas Nkobi, an African nationalist who has not been prominent as a political spokesman. Perhaps because he succeeded Moses Kotane, a Communist, as treasurer general, there has been speculation about his possible relationship to the Communist Party, but his biography was not among those submitted by the CIA to Senator Helms.

The third top ANC official is the secretary-general, Alfred Nzo. The CIA describes him as "a self-avowed Communist" although he has never made such an avowal. In conversation with me on June 27, 1986, he emphatically denied being a member, saying he was "an African nationalist." This characterization is consistent with his public record and reputation. Another major ANC leader, although not among the top three, is Joe Modise, who is in his early fifties. He is commander of the military wing and has a reputation as a man of action who talks little of politics. His biography is among the CIA 18, but it is devoid of any facts that would justify a supposition about orientation toward the Communist Party.

Communist Party membership is kept strictly secret except for the chairman and general secretary and a few well-known members.¹¹ Determining who is a member is complicated by the fact that some members of the pre-1950 legal party did not join the post-1953 clandestine party, and others have since dropped out. ANC leaders do not seem to talk among themselves about the identity of party members; it does not appear to be of particular interest. Joe Slovo has said that "a speculative numbers game is being played . . . to spot the Communists" in the National Executive Committee, a practice that the writer does not publicly indulge in. When asked about the number of Communists on the executive committee, Oliver Tambo said, "I have never counted how many, but they all owe their primary allegiance to the ANC and that's all that matters to me."

Whether or not Nelson Mandela differs from Tambo regarding cooperation with Communists and the ANC's more militant evolution has been a matter of speculation among

¹¹ Even the editor of *The African Communist*, the party's quarterly journal, is not publicly known. Vladimir Shubin, a Soviet expert on the ANC, told the writer in June 1986 that according to *Pravda* the editor is Brian Bunting, the son of Sidney Bunting, a founder of the Communist Party.

government officials considering his release from prison.¹² A long-standing friend of Mandela who consulted with him told me that Mandela dramatically emphasized his relationship to Tambo in order to remove any doubts about their unity when he replied to President Botha's offer of conditional freedom. Speaking of "my greatest friend and comrade for nearly fifty years," Mandela said of Tambo in a statement read to a mass rally in Soweto, "there is no difference between his views and mine."

Nzo's CIA biography, more than any other, epitomizes the pro-Soviet charge that is levied against the ANC. Nzo, it says, is "the ANC's contact point with the Soviet Union"; he is a vice-president of the World Peace Council; and a high Soviet official has presented him with an award. These facts are not proof of party membership but obviously they indicate appreciation of the Soviet Union and points of agreement. Furthermore, Nzo expressed some typical ANC positions in a speech at the 65th anniversary meeting of the South African Communist Party on July 30, 1986, in London, where he extended "fraternal greetings." He condemned "the bellicose policies of international imperialism, first and foremost American imperialism," and cited conflicts or struggles in which the ANC opposed U.S. policy: the Vietnam War, Palestinian liberation, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Afghanistan, Mozambique and Angola.¹³ And he condemned the invasion of Grenada and attacks on Libya.

Nzo does not make judgments about internal Soviet policy, but he praises assistance from the Soviet Union, a praise that appears genuine and not, as one analyst has said, the currency with which Soviet arms are purchased. In his single-minded pursuit of nationalist goals, Nzo has no problem in accepting the embrace of all who support the ANC, not only the Soviet Union and its allies but also the Nonaligned Movement, the Organization of African Unity, the Palestine Liberation Organization and "many countries in Western Europe." In his

¹² South African government officials have been inconsistent in expressing their opinion about whether or not Nelson Mandela is a Communist. He has denied ever joining the party and has described himself as a socialist who has been influenced by Marxism. The government continues to cite a document in Mandela's handwriting that was introduced at his trial, entitled "How to Be a Good Communist." This is apparently an example of Mandela's habit of copying material while studying. It contains a quotation from a Chinese leader beginning "We Communist Party members," which the government quotes as if it were Mandela's words.

¹³ The National Executive Committee in its political report to the ANC's 1985 conference contained praise for the Soviet Union's role in Afghanistan. The relative unimportance of this issue to the ANC is indicated by the fact that it was dealt with in one sentence in a document of some 18,000 words.

speech at the Communist Party meeting, he praised “capitalists [who] . . . act against the apartheid regime” and Churchill, Roosevelt and de Gaulle, “who emerged as giants” in the fight against Nazism.

Nzo’s eclectic reach is reflected in the sources of financial and material aid received by the ANC. Nearly all of its military support comes from the Soviet bloc through the OAU. The kinds of assistance received from governments, anti-apartheid groups, churches and the United Nations are extraordinarily varied and fluctuating. The ANC has particularly sought aid from Western countries, which it says has increased in recent years. In response to an inquiry in October 1986, the ANC’s Lusaka office stated that probably more than half of its total aid now comes from Western and Third World governments and private donors, and from China.

The ANC has sympathetic relations with social democratic parties, the Socialist International and anti-apartheid groups in the United States such as the Free South Africa Movement and the American Friends Service Committee. In Lusaka in August 1986, Rev. Jesse Jackson pledged that his Rainbow Coalition would campaign for humanitarian and educational aid for the ANC, and announced an initial gift of \$10,000.

The ANC’s radical anti-imperialist stance and rhetoric are hardly surprising in the light of the history of U.S. and Western complicity in bolstering the South African regime. What is surprising is the fact that the ANC continues to look to the United States for understanding and solidarity, and hopes for incremental pressure on South Africa by the U.S. government. Despite much of its rhetoric, the ANC historically, politically and culturally is more attuned to the United States and the West than it is to the Soviet bloc. Criticism of U.S. policies does not mean that the ANC accepts the Soviet Union’s political system as a model or that an ANC-led government would be aligned with the Soviet Union. Despite the typically cold shoulder shown to Alfred Nzo in Washington in mid-1986, unlike receptions in Moscow, Oliver Tambo stands ready to meet with Secretary of State George Shultz, even though the United States may be sharing intelligence on the ANC with the South African government.

VII

Since the ANC’s formation about 75 years ago, its leadership has often had the problem of keeping up with its followers.

The leadership has displayed remarkable continuity and a strong sense of responsibility for the kind of nonracial South Africa that will emerge in the future. But angry and impatient militants inside South Africa have tended to see its pragmatism as foot-dragging. Thus supporters of the ANC in Natal condemned Zulu Chief Buthelezi as a "traitor" while some ANC leaders outside the country, even after the public break in 1980, continued until recently to speak cautiously of him in hope of reconciliation.

Since 1984 South Africa has entered a new period whose end is not yet in sight. Black protest has shown unprecedented confidence in the coming of majority rule. The police and military have been unmonitored in their beatings and torture; they have shown that they intend to eliminate the ANC physically. A major problem now is the uncontrolled fury of many youths in the townships, some of whose violent tactics such as "necklace" killing (burning people with gasoline-filled rubber tubes) are not sanctioned by the ANC. The ANC has caught up with the mood by calling for a "people's war." Its Radio Freedom often uses lurid language and, by endorsing the "elimination" of informers, policemen and "collaborators," leaves open the methods to be employed.

The mixed signals emanating from the ANC reflect the dual needs of maintaining leadership of violent resistance and guiding it in accordance with fundamentally moderate aims. ANC policy clearly rejects the indiscriminate targeting of whites because they are whites. As the distinction between white civilians and whites who reinforce military power becomes increasingly blurred, however, white casualties can be expected. Meanwhile, the ANC resists pressures that would justify the label "terrorist." It is constrained not only by a desire to maintain its international reputation but also by its campaign to win white support and the need it recognizes for whites to stay if South Africa's advanced economy is to be maintained. However, if official violence—by far the preponderant violence that occurs—continues unchecked, latent anti-white hatred could erupt.

Black South African political differences may appear unusually complex, yet major trends of thought stand out. On goals, blacks are fundamentally more united than whites in their aspirations for a nonracial democratic system. On international issues, the key to understanding attitudes and perceptions is to

be found in the maxim: the enemy of my enemy is my friend, and the friend of my enemy is my enemy.

Interviews conducted during June-August 1986 by a perceptive South African highlight trends that have been evident for some years.¹⁴ Broadly, there is a growing anti-capitalist sentiment, growing interest in socialism, great disappointment with the United States and antagonism toward it, and in particular, a deep anger toward President Reagan that is "felt equally by professional people, senior managers and businessmen and as much by middle-aged people as young people." The perception of the United States as a supporter of the South African government and a major hindrance to liberation unfavorably affects attitudes toward the U.S. role in Angola, Nicaragua, Libya and Afghanistan. Israel also is widely seen as a close ally of South Africa, and therefore sympathy for the Palestinians is growing. On the other hand, widespread criticism is extended also to Soviet "imperialism" in Afghanistan. Remarkably, neither the deep antagonism toward the United States nor acknowledgment of Soviet assistance to the ANC results in a pro-Soviet attitude on international issues. Support for a future policy of nonalignment is dominant.

The U.S. attitude toward the ANC can be described as at best ambivalent. "Today, an extraordinary movement toward democracy is unfolding in diverse corners of the globe," Secretary of State Shultz said on April 14, 1986. In his review of the worldwide "struggle . . . for democracy," however, he made no reference to the extraordinary upsurge of popular resistance to South African tyranny by supporters of the African National Congress and other activists. Yet in later congressional testimony, he recognized that "the ANC has emerged as an important part of the South African political equation" and that there was "a compelling need" for both its leaders and those of the United States to obtain "authoritative insight" into each other's policies and interests.

The ambivalence of U.S. policy is now enshrined in the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, passed over President Reagan's veto. On one hand, it states wisely that the United States will work toward an end of the state of emergency, the release of Nelson

¹⁴ David Hirschmann, "Changing Attitudes of Black South Africans toward the United States of America," an unpublished paper presented in September 1986 at the Overseas Development Council, Washington, D.C. Interviews were conducted with an occupationally diverse group of urban blacks who were, with a few exceptions, below the level of national leadership and were representative of a broad ideological spectrum.

Mandela and all other political prisoners, the unbanning of the ANC and other political movements, and the opening of the political process. The act also states the sense of Congress that the president himself or other high officials should meet with opposition leaders. Oliver Tambo would certainly be among them.

On the other hand, the act reveals some of the misperceptions underlying U.S. policy. It calls for "power-sharing with the black majority" rather than a universal franchise and majority rule with protection of minority rights. The act postulates that the ANC is engaged in "terrorism," expresses the belief that it has been "infiltrated by Communists," and asks that the ANC's "commitment to a free and democratic" South Africa be made known (even though it has been clear for over half a century). Furthermore, in encouraging the ANC to "reexamine . . . ties to the South African Communist Party," it underlines the American lack of confidence in the independence of black South African leaders and in the consequences of an unfolding democratic process.

The United States should support a democratic process in South Africa in every way it can even though such a process carries no guarantee of a particular outcome. The probability is that any majority government in South Africa will be "socialist" in some form and committed to a redistribution of wealth. A danger exists that Americans who look at South Africa through ideological blinders and see in the ANC only the threat of pro-Soviet "extremism" will mistakenly urge support of unpopular "moderates" against the ANC and the overwhelming majority that identifies with it. This would be disastrous to the interests of the United States.

Karel G. van Wolferen

THE JAPAN PROBLEM

The relationship between the world's two greatest economic powers is in serious trouble. With a frightening momentum economic disputes between Japan and the United States are growing into a political conflict. Still, attempts by both sides to create a situation they can live with are unpromising. The Reagan Administration gives the impression of preferring to avoid thinking about it. Although the "Japan problem," as the fundamental conflict has become known, is already many years old, what must pass for a Japan policy in Washington is so unrealistic that it may make the situation considerably worse.

There is much more at stake than America's growing trade deficit with Japan. If present trends are allowed to continue they will eventually lead to a gradual loss of industrial capacity in the United States. At some point an irate Congress is likely to apply the brakes to these trends by passing undifferentiated trade legislation that is even tougher than what is being contemplated today. Uncontrollable consequences in Japan, including political instability and a xenophobic reaction, could follow.

What makes conflict between Japan and the United States so menacing is that the two countries do not know how to cope with each other. The United States does not understand the nature of the Japanese political economy and thus cannot accept the way it behaves. Americans can hardly be blamed for this, as the Japanese themselves present their country as simply another member of the community of democratic nations committed to the free market. Japan is largely unaware of the threat posed by America's unwillingness to accept it for what it is. Never having experienced its wrath, Japan does not believe in the powers of the American legislature. The Japanese make things worse with ritualistic arguments and empty promises

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that only convince congressmen, businessmen and other Americans that they are being deceived.

I believe that two fictions are central to the outsiders' inability to come to grips with Japan.

II

First there is the fiction that Japan is a sovereign state like any other, a state with central organs of government which can both recognize what is good for the country and bear ultimate responsibility for national decision-making. This illusion is very difficult to dispel, since diplomacy must take it for granted.

In fact, statecraft in Japan is quite different from that in the rest of Asia, Europe and the Americas. For centuries it has entailed the preservation of a careful balance between semi-autonomous groups that share power. Today, the most powerful components of what I will call the Japanese System are certain groups of bureaucrats, some political cliques and clusters of industrialists. There are lesser ones, such as the agricultural cooperatives, the police, the press and the gangsters. These semiautonomous components, each endowed with great discretionary powers, are not represented in one central ruling body.

It is crucial to distinguish Japan from other nations with governments that are besieged by special interest groups or that cannot make up their minds because of interdepartmental disputes. We are not dealing with lobbies but with a structural phenomenon not encompassed by the categories of accepted political theory. A hierarchy, or rather a complex of overlapping hierarchies, is maintained, but it has no top. There is no supreme institution with ultimate jurisdiction over the others. Thus there is no place where, as Harry Truman would say, the buck stops. The buck keeps circulating.

Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) has written that he does not accept the excuse that "the career bureaucrats who run the government in Tokyo just listen politely and ignore the instructions of their political superiors." He finds it difficult to imagine "a political system in which the elected officials cannot get something done if it's sufficiently important."¹ Yet Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone can imagine such a thing very well. He is a victim of it. He regularly finds

¹"We've Nothing More to Say to Japan but *Open the Door*," *Los Angeles Times*, March 31, 1985.

himself in the classic Japanese situation in which he is ritualistically criticized for not showing enough leadership, and simultaneously rapped over the knuckles by the press and his peers in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for interfering in bureaucratic decision-making. A Japanese prime minister, in fact, has less power than the head of government of any Western country.

Although Japanese history has known experiments with centralized political power, they did not result in lasting patterns of government. The most recent and most important experiment was the famous Meiji Restoration in the second half of the 1800s when, after centuries of nearly total isolation, Japan was suddenly confronted with the turbulent community of world powers. But political power was subsequently dissipated, giving competing military groups the opportunity to hijack the nation and putting Japan on a course that led to Pearl Harbor and from there to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

General Douglas MacArthur and his team of Occupation reformers arrived in 1945 to dismantle what was widely imagined to be the remnants of a solid dictatorship. The idea that it could have been the absence of strong leadership which had allowed Japan to contemplate its suicidal attack did not occur to anyone at that time.

After the postwar industrial reconstruction, which as an obvious choice for the nation hardly required strong centralized political control, the political assumption emerged that unlimited industrial expansion must be Japan's first priority. No politician made an issue out of this. The bureaucracy, which had been left almost entirely intact during the Occupation, was to administer this policy. The *de facto* one-party system of Japan, dominated by the LDP, guaranteed that there would be no disturbing confusion from messy parliamentary processes. But it also meant that the politicians abdicated responsibilities that in the Western democracies are crucial for major policy adjustments.

No essential political decisions to change the priority of unlimited industrial expansion have been made since this period. Indeed, the political mechanism for such a momentous decision does not exist. The bureaucrats tinker with the economy by making adjustments that enable its further growth. Even though the Diet technically controls the national budget and finances, most of the time the politicians and everyone else keep out of the bureaucrats' way. The industrialists carry on

expanding their market shares, enter new markets with the help of the bureaucrats, and are kept in line by their peers. As these different components make sure that none of the others become too powerful, this system guarantees an orderly state of affairs in Japan. The problem, however, is that looked at from an international perspective it is an anachronism, for its finely meshed all-Japanese components are glaringly deficient in providing the country with an effective foreign policy.

One major reason for nations to create and accept relatively strong central ruling bodies is that these are needed to deal with other nations. But after 1945, foreign policy requirements were no longer felt in Japan. In the late 1940s and the 1950s, Tokyo discovered that all those activities by which a state is known and recognized externally could be carried out by American proxy. Japan is not only totally dependent on the United States for its defense, but also ultimately for its diplomacy in all its problematic international relationships. In effect, the United States provided the diplomatic shield behind which Japan could build its economy by neomercantilistic trade practices. Japan's so-called omnidirectional diplomacy (which, before Yasuhiro Nakasone became prime minister, was presented to the world as an idealistic peaceful innovation in diplomacy) was an attempt to be all things to all men who bought Japan's products and sold it raw materials—that is, to the extent that America would tolerate.

So far there has been no reason to speculate about a Japanese "Gaullism" in foreign policy. Although it seemed that independent approaches to Beijing and Moscow were developing, these also were soon enough shown to be waiting for cues from Washington. This is not because the Japanese have an overriding desire to coordinate their foreign policy with that of their American ally, but because the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Japanese institutions are not in a position to accept the consequences of genuine shifts in policy or to deliver on promises made. Nakasone's rise to the prime ministership in 1982 has not led to any dramatic change. If Japan were ever to go it alone, it would first have to create a political center, and that would require the overhaul, if not the overturning, of its entire political-economic system.

III

The second fiction that hampers the formulation of an effective policy toward Japan is the premise maintained by the

United States and Europe that Japan belongs with them in that loose category known as capitalist free-market economies. Although the Japanese economy is very extensively commented upon in the West, it still causes tremendous conceptual difficulties for foreigners and Japanese alike. Japanese officials usually bristle with indignation at the suggestion that their country is something other than advertised. Yet Japanese economists I talk with often remind me that Westerners writing on Japan commonly exaggerate the function of the market mechanism. On the other hand Western academic economists, including current presidential advisers, appear horrified at the suggestion that Japan does not in fact belong in the club of capitalist free-market nations. For many of them, the idea that there can be a successful economy which is not based on the free play of market forces is tantamount to heresy.

As Japan also clearly does not belong in the category of the centrally controlled Soviet-type economies, does it then belong to a category of its own, as quite a few commentators have implied? The rapid rise of South Korea and Taiwan as industrial states suggests that this is not the case: even when shorn of its cultural and psychological specifics, the Japanese “economic miracle” constitutes a model that can be pursued by at least some others. South Korea and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan—both states having a strong central government—have economies that appear to be driven by a phenomenal force similar to that of Japan, even in the absence of Japanese-style “harmony,” lifelong employment, management techniques—all of which are often cited as reasons for the Japanese success. Analysis shows that a third category of political economies can exist, besides the Western type and that of the communist world. Chalmers Johnson of the University of California, Berkeley, has isolated this category of industrial nations and has labeled the type Capitalist Developmental State.²

The strength of the CDS is a partnership between central bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. The bureaucrats never attempt to gain absolute power over the nongovernmental corporations. They guide the economy while using the entrepreneurs as antennae. The central planners of the CDS know what is happening at the periphery through constant monitoring of the experiences of capitalists trying to find new ways of making

² See, for example, his *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975*, Stanford (Ca.): Stanford University Press, 1982.

money. The mistakes the planners undoubtedly make are more than compensated for by the unified forces they bring to bear on industrial development. The economy prospers because promising areas of industry are stimulated by central policies favoring investment. Those that appear to have reached a dead end are more easily abandoned through policies forcing reorganization. In other words, it is a partnership that has an industrial policy and a trade strategy. Freedom of the market is not considered a desirable goal in itself, but only one of several instruments for achieving predetermined effects that are totally subordinated to the ultimate goal of industrial expansion.

The CDS is structurally protectionist in the sense that all kinds of informal, if not official, barriers to imports must ensure that foreign competition will not undermine its aims. It has to remain so if it wants to continue enjoying the proven benefits of this model. But, as is becoming abundantly clear, in the long run this causes political problems in its relations with other states. The question is whether the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial partnership will continue to flourish after its industries face market saturation at home and inhospitable markets overseas. Related to this is the even more important question of whether the international free trade system, made up of countries without a trade strategy, can survive as it struggles to accommodate the CDS.

It is not likely that the partnership between the state and private enterprise in Japan will break up. The official line is that the various forms of governmental guidance (if acknowledged at all) now carry much less weight with the private sector than in the past. This contention is habitually accompanied by a demonstration that current tariff regulations make Japan about the freest market in the world. In Japan, quite often—and always more frequently than in the West—what is true on paper is not true in practice. Japanese spokesmen widely advertise the fact that a number of foreign firms that have tried hard enough have been successful in their market. These firms are well known because they belong to the same small sample always mentioned in this context. A select few foreign firms receive assistance to serve as fresh examples of Japanese openness. What we should look at, however, are distribution systems in a few controlling hands, regulations dictated by Japanese competitors, new product standards, and other barriers that a potentially powerful foreign competitor faces in the Japanese

market. The bureaucrats in Tokyo are extremely inventive when it comes to subtle controls and euphemisms for rendering them more palatable to foreigners.

Moreover, what has given the Japanese CDS system durability is the obliteration of the line dividing private and public sectors. Japanese power relationships have evolved into something far more intricate than a "bureaucrats-businessmen partnership." In South Korea one can distinguish the government from the entrepreneurs; in Japan, however, it is not only impossible to locate a center, it is also not possible to separate the realms of public and private business. In the higher reaches of Japanese economic activity, bureaucrats, former bureaucrats in top business positions, and bureaucratically inclined leaders at the top of the business hierarchies are as one as they mingle with each other busily monitoring the economy. Antagonisms exist in the higher reaches of the system—quite a lot in fact—but they rarely, if ever, pit the formal organs of state against the industrial organizations. The great rivalries and territorial wars between the different ministries are significant and publicized, whereas genuine confrontations between the bureaucrats and recalcitrant corporations are almost never heard of. Only much lower down, among the newer firms and especially the vitally important sectors of small subcontracting firms, can one find more traditional entrepreneurs without strong ties to the bureaucracy.

Because it is impossible in Japan to extricate the state from the socioeconomic system, monumental communication problems arise when foreign businessmen or government representatives at the higher levels attempt to negotiate with what they think are their Japanese counterparts. The confusion is made even worse by the peculiarly Japanese institution of the "buffer," the person who is entrusted with the task of making contacts with foreigners as smooth as possible. Resident foreign diplomats and businessmen usually deal with the Japanese through an intermediary community of English-speaking, "internationalized" Japanese who absorb the shocks that an unpredictable outside world might deliver to their institutions. These buffers can be amazingly frank, can convey genuine understanding of the foreigner's difficulties and create the impression of willingness to cater to his wishes.

Japan has a handful of super buffers who spend much time traveling the globe, troubleshooting and explaining the Japanese case at international conferences. Two of them, Saburo

Okita and the late Nobuhiko Ushiba, were even made ministers for external economic affairs. This increased the confusion further because they had no actual mandate to decide or negotiate anything. Ministers more influential than these two, or leaders of economic federations, and even the prime minister himself, often play the buffer role when speaking with foreign trade envoys. The foreign negotiator who arrives home yet again with the news that this time he has *really* talked with the proper authorities, who have impressed him with their readiness to take effective action, is deceiving himself. Such persons with the necessary broad authority simply do not exist in Japan.

IV

Thus the communication gap appears as unbridgeable as ever, and the Japan problem grows worse all the time. It is generally summed up by record-breaking trade surpluses: \$45 billion in 1984 and \$61 billion in 1985. For 1986, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has projected a Japanese surplus of up to \$85 billion; more than \$50 billion of that will show up as a bilateral trade deficit with the United States. Japanese competitiveness and the inhospitality of its own market to foreign products are helping to bring about further de-industrialization in the United States and Europe. After the virtual loss of the motorcycle and consumer electronics sectors in the United States, the Japanese are gaining leverage over such crucial industries as semiconductors, machinery and telecommunications equipment.

The number of trade bills introduced in Congress demonstrates that Americans think this is intolerable and that patience is wearing thin. But protestations from Washington, accompanied by demands that the Japanese market be opened wider, are met by little more than Japanese rhetorical assurances of their commitment to free trade. Efforts by the bureaucracy to ameliorate the situation are designed to keep the Americans quiet. They do not get to the root of the problem, for as things stand nothing can. As far as the politicians are concerned, many, if not most, have a stake in what is euphemistically known as *boeki masatsu*, or trade friction. They want to keep it from doing too much damage, and they instruct bureaucrats accordingly, but if *boeki masatsu* disappeared so would a lucrative source of income. This is because the sectors of the business community that most fear foreign competition at home

through liberalization measures urged by the United States are also the most generous with political donations. As the various ministries involved in “liberalizing” blame each other for being the bigger obstacle to effective measures, they come up with minute compromises, presented together as “market-opening packages.” The effect of the half dozen of these presented thus far has been practically nil. In mid-1985 much propaganda accompanied a so-called Action Program, but the nature of that effort was succinctly characterized by Foreign Affairs Minister Shintaro Abe, who called it a table of contents without contents.

To be sure, Nakasone has made quite a difference when compared to his four predecessors. He has continued a campaign, begun by former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, to increase the leverage of the LDP politicians over the bureaucrats. For this, he has utilized the talents of the experts whom Tanaka had collected in his group, the largest and unquestionably the most powerful of the *habatsu*, or political cliques, of which the ruling party is a coalition. He has been helped by the circumstance that bureaucratic territorial wars over newly developing industrial sectors, like telecommunications, have given the politicians a relatively new function as arbiters. Nakasone has also found a new use of the *shingikai*—advisory committees expected to present high-minded schemes, long on abstract ideals and short on concrete proposals, which previous prime ministers could pass off as policy. He has handpicked *shingikai* chairmen and key members and does not leave it to their imagination as to how he expects to be “advised.” But all this falls very much short of what Japan needs in the way of centralized power to cope with the problem of its economic relations with Europe and the United States.

v

Increased congressional pressure on the Reagan Administration has brought to the fore a double formula to help reduce the trade imbalance: push up the value of the yen and make Japan stimulate its economy.

Nakasone has shown his willingness to cooperate by directing an advisory committee under the chairmanship of former Bank of Japan Governor Haruo Maekawa to present guidelines for making domestic demand, rather than exports, the main engine for economic growth. However, the final version of the Maekawa report has been picked clean of the originally suggested

concrete proposals by éminences grises from the important ministries, notwithstanding the fact that an angry Nakasone had ordered it rewritten in order to reflect an awareness of the hostile international situation that the Japanese economy was faced with.

While Nakasone was presenting this most recent token of Japanese goodwill in Washington last April, his countrymen were pulling the rug out from under him. LDP politicians said that they could not accept the Maekawa report. Top bureaucrats leaked their worries that Nakasone was misleading Reagan. The *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Japan's version of *The Wall Street Journal*) tore the report to pieces. And the *Asahi Shimbun* commented in an editorial, "Every time a political leader says one thing abroad and something else at home, distrust of Japan in the world community grows. It is ironic that Nakasone, who is proud of his diplomatic prowess, now repeats the same mistake."³ Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs weighed in with a statement that the report did not represent Japanese policy.

All this did not deter President Reagan, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, *The New York Times* and others from praising it. But suppose the Maekawa report were a truly serious blueprint for a campaign to stimulate the domestic economy of Japan, what good would it do America? The idea that Japan can help tow the world's less powerful economies has become untenable after all the years in which its domestic growth has not had any significant influence on the level of imports from the United States or Europe. When things are booming, raw materials find their way to Japan, of course, but not the finished products that America wants to sell there.

Perhaps in no other area is the inapplicability of conventional economic theory as blatantly obvious as in the case of the yen-dollar exchange rate. The current Administration in Washington is probably like no other recent government in its firm conviction of the healing powers of the free market. It is therefore no wonder that its favorite theory as to why Japan is competitive in America but America is not competitive in Japan revolves around prices. If only those Japanese goods in American shops could be made expensive enough, and American goods in Japanese shops cheap enough, everything would fall back into place again. Or at least the incredibly lopsided trade

³ April 21, 1986.

balance could be brought to proportions that one could live with.

Japanese officials and economic commentators had for years been pleased enough with the conclusion that the yen was undervalued, as this meant that the dollar was worth too much, which put the ball in America's court. Thus it was difficult for the Japanese monetary authorities to object when, in September 1985, the finance ministers and central bank governors of the five largest economies of the Western community agreed in New York to manage a decline in the value of the dollar. Nine months later the Japanese currency had appreciated by roughly 40 percent against the dollar, much more than either side had anticipated. This currency realignment is said to be a better reflection of fundamental economic realities.

Is achievement of American aims in sight with more expensive Japanese goods in American shops? Only in the cases where the higher prices will not endanger the market share that Japanese firms have in the United States. In some areas there is no longer any competition. In others, it is possible for Japanese exporters to subsidize vulnerable items with surplus funds from highly profitable company divisions.

Or, if need be, domestic prices will go up in order to offset losses in the overseas market. Cheaper American goods in Japanese shops? Japan's newspapers and magazines have been searching for months for instances where the benefit of the strong yen has been passed on to the consumer. Their findings all show that the effect is marginal at best and that in some cases prices of imported goods have actually gone up. Nakasone has repeatedly told his ministers to instruct those below them to see to it that not only the importers but the whole nation profits from the lower import prices. But the bureaucracy itself sets a bad example: officials who administer the government import programs of beef and wheat use their exchange gains to help subsidize the highly inefficient domestic agricultural sector.

In some industries the high yen is causing an acceleration of the shrinking that has been going on for years. In others, plans to move simpler production lines to the much cheaper labor markets in other parts of Asia have been accelerated.

But from the viewpoint of Japan's Western trade partners the most important thing that is happening is that the subcontracting firms are being forced to streamline. These are the hardworking, often tiny, outfits that occupy a key position in

Japan's dual economy. They form a shock-absorbing cushion underneath the large conglomerates. They are currently being asked to absorb much of the exchange rate losses, and are therefore trimming their costs as never before. While more automation is introduced in these small- and medium-sized subcontracting firms, the larger Japanese manufacturers are buying parts in South Korea and Taiwan. Both measures enable them to continue exporting to the United States at roughly the old dollar prices.

In short, the Japanese System continues to shield the home market against imports, and Japanese firms are going to extremes in order to hang on to overseas market shares. There is a good chance that when the American effort to "talk the yen upwards" runs out of steam, the value of the yen will drop to the lower, fluctuating levels desired by the system. At that point the workers who were dismissed from the subcontracting firms, who have spent some time in the parasitic distribution system (which is a large reservoir of the would-be unemployed) or who have cultivated a few square yards of heavily subsidized rice paddy, will return to help make new cheap export products. With more efficient subcontractors, Japan will be commercially more battle-ready than ever. An intensification of the conflict appears inevitable as many billions of dollars are added to the bilateral trade deficit, as expectations in connection with new unrealized Japanese plans are frustrated, as Japanese attitudes begin to grate on members of Congress, and as new moral shortcomings are discovered of the kind conveyed by Nakasone's recent remark that America's minorities have lowered the nation's average intelligence level.

VI

Anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States could conceivably surge, not the least because a great deal of criticism today is defused by the artificial means of Japanese money. No country has ever spent as much on officially recorded lobbying as Japan spends in Washington today. The Japanese government and corporations hire the best lawyers and former Administration officials to defend their position. A large proportion of academic research by American scholars of Japan is funded by Japanese institutions. For many real and supposed specialists who hold forth at seminars or conferences organized to improve "mutual understanding," defending Japan is their bread and butter. A large number of foreign businessmen and

consultants in Japan, who have had to become part of the system in order to function in it, cannot risk alienating themselves from it by critical analysis.

In this context it is useful to know what in Japan is meant by "understanding." The Japanese connotation of this term is acceptance or tolerance. You show true understanding of people or things by accepting them the way they are if you are not strong enough to change them. If you have strength, the other party will show understanding by a certain degree of adaptation to your wishes. Foreigners who keep on protesting about Japanese trade methods in spite of the many Japanese explanations demonstrate their lack of understanding. Europeans, who are less powerful than Americans, are also considered less capable of understanding Japan.

It has often been pointed out that Japanese are uncomfortable with the idea that they might actually be understood. The uniqueness and the spiritual dimension of being Japanese, which by definition cannot be grasped by foreigners (as Japanese constantly persuade themselves in schools and via the media), is too important an ingredient of Japanese self-esteem. In practice, therefore, "mutual understanding" implies that foreigners should accept the picture of Japan presented by its spokesmen.

With regard to the Japan problem, the bureaucracy, the business world, some politicians and many editorial writers routinely confirm the need for structural adjustments, for breaking through the traditional isolation and for a more responsible global role. On the other hand these same groups wage a rather successful campaign to portray Japan as the victim of unreasonable demands and criticism by less hard-working foreigners.

Some respected authors see an alleged American racism at the root of the problem, an interpretation that finds takers in the United States as well. There are echoes, too, of Japanese wartime imagery in which an American loss of will is contrasted with the strength and dynamism of a Japan where collective hard work is still valued. The United States is chastised for believing that its norms are universal by authors who may be oblivious to European protests (or indeed, those of China, Southeast Asia, Pakistan, and nearly everyone else). America is even taken to task for not appreciating the Japanese contributions to world peace.

Official American remarks are not always helpful in sorting

out the Japanese confusion. It is hard for an observer in Tokyo to assess praise from Washington for measures that informed Japanese understand to be ineffective from the start. The Reagan Administration has eagerly presented Japanese financial "liberalization" measures as a fundamental breakthrough, when in fact they were designed to make Japanese financial institutions more internationally competitive rather than to give foreign financial institutions a larger share of the Japanese market. In the area of market-opening packages, Washington announced success in sector-specific trade talks in the field of communications equipment while its negotiator on the spot was telling me that he had not yet finished negotiating. The Departments of State and Defense still appear to believe that trade sanctions would endanger the status of American military bases in Japan. The different departments in Washington speak with different voices, not unlike the Japanese ministries.

Taking a longer view of the conflict, it seems pointless to apportion blame. In the eyes of the Japanese, it is the United States that wants to change things. As far as they are concerned the relationship is like a common-law marriage. No papers were signed, no firm arrangements established, but force of habit has forged something that is not less established and should not be less reliable than if a formal treaty had spelled out all the advantages that Japan today enjoys. In American eyes Japan does not perform commensurately with its wealth, in any field, so it is time for Japan to grow up and play a responsible role in the international community. Japan is all the more obliged to do this, according to the American perception, after four decades of American nurture, help and protection. The United States, of course, has helped create the current situation by providing diplomatic and military shelter for Japan, by discouraging strong central rule and by accepting, at least initially, Japan's postwar economic practices. But how could Washington have known what the result of all that would be?

VII

What does make sense, however, is for the United States to decide quickly on measures constituting a Japan policy, to stave off an otherwise seemingly inevitable confrontation that would harm the non-communist world and destroy what remains of the international free trade system.

A Japan policy must necessarily contain ingredients that

diverge widely from accepted diplomatic practices between countries at peace. To see that clearly, it is useful to recognize how the Japanese System itself handles conflict. In Japanese society conflict is avoided, ignored, denied, exorcised by ritual, but rarely solved. There is no tradition of appealing to universal principles or of using legal procedures to keep order in society. Individuals and groups accept their positions and their lot because a stronger power holds them in place, although subtle acts of sabotage are expected and condoned. The ins and outs of the grand balancing act among the semiautonomous components of the system are not finally determined by reason, but by power. Conflicts between parties that have no hierarchical relationship with each other and refuse to accept subordinate positions fester and cannot be resolved. Conflicts with the outside world are comparable, as Japanese groups will not subordinate themselves voluntarily to foreigners, while the reasoning that outsiders bring to bear can never be convincing enough. The situation is insoluble unless, of course, the other country adopts the means of the system and forces recognition of proper positions.

If he listens carefully, the foreigner will quite often hear his contacts in Japan say that there will be no essential shift in policy until relentless and consistent outside pressure forces the change. The Japanese political-economic system fosters inward-looking attitudes. It is incapable of selfless gestures, but it can react with alacrity once it is imbued with a pervasive sense of crisis. In the growing conflict with America no significant Japanese adjustments can be expected until the entire establishment has been thoroughly imbued with the idea that there is a new reality to which it must adjust, like the reality created by OPEC. No verbal threats serve this purpose, because they have for many years proved quite empty.

International trade legislation of the most general kind is unlikely to have enough effect on Japan. Only action that specifically singles out Japan, in a carefully measured dose, will imbue the Japanese System with the sense that the situation has become intolerable for the United States. The Reagan Administration could usefully give up its efforts to remind Japan of the teachings of Adam Smith and jettison the fiction that Japan has a free-market economy similar to those of the West. It is one thing to fight the growth of government control over one's own economy but quite another to blind oneself to the Japanese reality of a highly controlled economy. To make

the point perfectly clear it is necessary for the United States to stop agreeing diplomatically with the Japanese argument that American companies also must try harder to penetrate the Japanese market.

When the Japanese System has become fully alerted to the new reality, a *modus vivendi* must be arranged with it. One part of the new set of conditions could be direct fixed commitments between Western and Japanese economic institutions for an international division of labor. The "voluntary" quotas on car exports demonstrate the feasibility of such agreements. The cartelization that they necessitate is nothing new to the Japanese System, and would even be preferred by some of its components. Yoshihiro Inayama, the former chairman of Keidanren (the most influential club of Japanese industrialists), has actually stated that it would be better if the United States decided unilaterally to restrict the import of Japanese products until the trade imbalance is rectified.

It must be remembered that the essence of the problem is not that Japan exports much more than it imports, but that its exports systematically undermine Western industries. Peter Drucker calls this adversarial trade, as distinct from competitive trade whereby a country also imports manufactures of the same kind as it exports. Germany's trade surpluses are very large too but Germany practices such competitive trade, as does the United States.

The important thing for the American government to realize is that in order for the relatively free international trade system to survive, the world needs a different kind of discipline. The increasing impact of Japan's imitators and the possibility that China will in the future develop a CDS apparatus make it all the more urgent. The hue and cry in Japan that almost inevitably will follow such American measures may give the impression that the Japanese are being punished. But that will not be the case at all. Quite the contrary, by preventing waves of uncontrollable retaliatory protectionism, these measures will most probably preserve the health of the Japanese economy, considering how dependent it is on exports, and thereby promote continued political stability.

Bennett Ramberg

LEARNING FROM CHERNOBYL

The accident last April at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant demonstrates that planning conducted at a national level alone cannot eliminate the risks posed to all nations by nuclear energy. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, an attitude of “business as usual” will not sustain the atomic power industry worldwide.

The scope of the challenge to make nuclear energy production safer is even greater than that shown by the well-known accidents at Chernobyl and the Three Mile Island plant in the United States. Between 1971 and August 1984, two “significant” and 149 “potentially significant” mishaps occurred in 14 industrial nations outside the two superpowers.¹ Even aside from the danger of accidents, the normal operation of nuclear power plants presents problems. These include the management of materials—plutonium and weapons-grade enriched uranium—which could be diverted for non-peaceful use by nations and terrorists, and the possibility of sabotage and military attacks on power plants. The potential damage from such actions includes radiological consequences far worse than those witnessed in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident.

International institutions have not been oblivious to the challenges posed by the 382 commercial reactors presently operating in 26 countries. Emerging today are worldwide nuclear standards—albeit imperfectly applied—that attempt

¹ United States General Accounting Office, *International Responses to Nuclear Power Reactor Safety Concerns*, GAO/NSIAD-85-128, Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.A.O., Sept. 30, 1985; *International Nuclear Safety Concerns*, Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986; *The New York Times*, May 7, 1986, p. 9.

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to treat each risk in a distinct manner. The Soviet accident and the international response it generated make this an opportune time to consider a more comprehensive approach.

II

At the time of the accident the Chernobyl energy complex consisted of four nuclear reactors, each producing 1,000 megawatts of electricity, and two additional reactors that were under construction. Situated on the Pripyat River, which feeds a reservoir of the Dneiper River above Kiev, Chernobyl is surrounded by an agricultural region that produces rye and dairy products. To the south is the Ukraine's rich wheat belt. With the exception of Pripyat, a community of 49,000 built in the 1970s to accommodate construction workers and plant employees, and the town of Chernobyl, with 12,000 inhabitants, only villages with populations of 500 to 700 residents dot the nearby countryside. Chernigov, a city of some 210,000, lies 55 miles to the north; Kiev, the Soviet Union's third-largest city with 2.3 million residents, lies 60 miles to the south.

Unit 4, the reactor involved in the accident, started operation in 1983. Like the other Chernobyl reactors, and ten similar plants—in some cases not as modern—near Leningrad, Kursk and Smolensk, Unit 4 is a RBMK (an acronym derived from the Russian initials for heterogeneous, water-graphite channel-type reactor), which uses graphite as a “moderator,” i.e., to slow down neutrons and thereby sustain the nuclear chain reaction. The reactor's design evolved from the smaller Obinsk plant built in 1954, one of the earliest Soviet models. The Soviets made the leap to the 1,000-megawatt (electric) RBMK reactor, the Chernobyl type, in 1974 when the first of these went into operation about 60 miles from Leningrad. A much larger 1,500-megawatt plant at Ignalino, Lithuania, went to full power in 1985; a twin is currently under construction on the same site, as are two other similar plants at Kostroma, 125 miles northeast of Moscow.

Before the Chernobyl accident, the European portion of the Soviet Union relied on the atom for one fifth of its electricity. Twenty-three graphite-moderated reactors throughout the country supplied 24,000 megawatts of electricity, or roughly half of nuclear energy's 11-percent contribution to Soviet power generation. The remaining nuclear contribution came from pressurized, light water reactors (PWRs), similar in design to most plants in the West. PWRs use water, not graphite, to

moderate and cool the reactor core. The Soviets intend to rely mainly on this PWR design to carry them into the 21st century, by which time they hope nuclear energy will satisfy over 30 percent of their electrical needs.

Graphite-moderated RBMK 1,000s, in comparison to PWRs, are physically larger, more complex in design and inherently more difficult to control. Some 2,500 hollow vertical channels run through the 12- by 7-meter, 1,700-ton graphite moderator. Within 1,659 of these channels are "pressure tubes" that house the reactor's 30,000 fuel rods in bundles of 18 each. Cooling water circulates through the tubes; some of it boils, and the resulting steam drives two 500-megawatt (electric) turbines. Control rods inserted into 211 graphite channels manage the reactor's power level. An automatic system adjusts the positions of the individual control rods, and a separate control system is able to shut down the reactor entirely. These mechanisms cannot, however, be described as a quick shutdown system to bring the reactor under control.

Graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactors have a peculiar feature—a "positive void coefficient"—that contributed to the Soviet accident by resulting in a sudden surge of power. In the water-moderated environment of a PWR, we find a negative void coefficient, which means that the formation of steam slows the generation of energy. In the RBMK, as in other graphite-moderated reactors, the formation of steam tends to enhance the chain reaction.

But the RBMK design also has advantages over PWRs. RBMKs do not require the costly and difficult-to-fabricate reactor pressure vessel or the complex and expensive steam generator system of PWRs. Since fuel channels are individually cooled in the RBMK, a break in one will not result in a loss of coolant for the entire core. Furthermore the channels can be refueled while the reactor is in operation, thus allowing the plant to be kept on line. PWRs, by contrast, must be shut down for refueling.

Soviet authorities have been sensitive to the danger of nuclear accidents. The Soviets suffered a major nuclear disaster in 1957 in the Urals which may have cost hundreds of lives. Its nature remains a mystery to the West; it is widely believed not to have involved a reactor but rather a waste storage dump. But Russian reactors, like Western reactors, are known to have been subject to emergency shutdowns. We are not sure if these have involved the release of radioactivity, although Sweden,

which was dusted with radiation coming from the direction of the Soviet Union in 1981 and 1983, is suspicious. As in Western reactors, ruptures of the large coolant-carrying pipes are assumed to pose the greatest hazard to Soviet plants, and therefore concrete-walled compartments—considered by Western experts to be adequate to the danger—have been built to shelter the conduits. In the event of a large pipe break, steam is channeled to two condenser pools of water in the basement of the plant. To make up for any loss of coolant, the Soviets have installed in the RBMKs an emergency core feedwater system. A leakproof cavity around the core, topped by a steel cover and situated in a heavy concrete-walled building with a thin roof, provides the final defense against the release of radioactivity to the environment. Some new Soviet PWRs have the more conventional heavy steel-reinforced concrete domes found in many Western containment buildings.

A report in a Ukrainian newspaper in March 1986 stated that the Chernobyl facilities were built with “defective materials,”² but Unit 4 had performed almost flawlessly until the accident, perhaps lulling the operators into believing the plant was impervious to disaster.

The Chernobyl accident resulted from gross operator incompetence—not entirely unlike that which resulted in the accident in 1979 at Three Mile Island—compounded by the managerial difficulties of the RBMK.³ Ironically, the origins of the Chernobyl accident lay in a decision to test safety systems.⁴ It is unclear whether officials in Moscow or those at the site

² Erik P. Hoffman, “Nuclear Deception: Soviet Information Policy,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August/September 1986, p. 33.

³ Both the Soviet post-Chernobyl report and the Kemeny Commission investigation of the Three Mile Island accident place heavy emphasis on inappropriate operator actions. See State Committee for Using Atomic Energy of U.S.S.R., *The Accident of the Chernobyl AES and Its Consequences*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, Aug. 17, 1986; and the President's Commission on the Accident at TMI, *The Accident at TMI*, Washington, D.C.: The President's Commission on the Accident at TMI, October 1979.

⁴ The accident generated numerous press accounts, journal articles, government and international reports. Among the noteworthy are: State Committee for Using Atomic Energy of U.S.S.R., *op cit.*; International Nuclear Safety Advisory Board, *Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident*, Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, unpublished mimeograph, 1986; *Nucleonics Week*, Sept. 4, 1986; “Chernobyl: The Emerging Story,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–60 (12 articles); Marvin H. Dickerson and Thomas J. Sullivan, “ARAC Response to the Chernobyl Reactor Accident,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Report UCID-20834, July 1986; “The Chernobyl Accident,” *Nuclear News*, October 1986, pp. 59–66; Colin Norman, “Chernobyl: Errors and Design Flaws,” *Science*, Sept. 5, 1986, pp. 1029–1031; Eliot Marshall, “The Lessons of Chernobyl,” *Science*, Sept. 16, 1986, pp. 1375–1376; Helen ApSimon and Julian Wilson, “Tracing the Cloud From Chernobyl,” *New Scientist*, July 17, 1986, pp. 42–45; *The Washington Post*, Oct. 26, 1986, pp. 1 and 34–35, and Oct. 27, 1986, pp. 1 and 20–21.

authorized the test. The rationale was that all nuclear power plants, including Unit 4, rely on offsite power to drive pumps and other devices necessary to operate the installation when onsite generation ceases. A failure of such power could cut off the flow of coolant; a meltdown and release of radioactivity could then result even after a shutdown, due to residual heat. To compensate for this possibility, plants are built with emergency diesel generators that activate in the event of a power failure, but these diesels require up to 40 seconds to come on line. The operators wanted to determine whether the plant's turbine generators, through their residual kinetic energy, could provide electricity for vital systems during the period between the loss of offsite power, or an internal power failure, and activation of the diesel generators.

In tests conducted at Chernobyl in 1982 and 1984, the reactor's mechanical energy was exhausted before the diesel generators came on line, and voltage to maintain feed pumps declined too soon. The 1986 Chernobyl experiment was to test a new device to keep voltage up until the diesels were able to power the pumps. The operators, joined by the firm that had installed the plant's electrical system, set in motion a chain of events that amounted to an accident simulation—giving little thought to the dangers. They chose April 25, when the reactor was scheduled to be brought down for maintenance.

Preparations for the test began at 1:00 p.m. with a 50-percent reduction of power generation and the shutdown of one of two turbines. At 2:00 p.m., operators took the first of several steps to block critical response systems, deactivating emergency core-cooling pumps to prevent their interference with the experiment. Shortly thereafter, the test was delayed for nine hours as the plant was placed back on the power grid to meet a new and unexpected demand for electrical generation. At 11:10 p.m. the reactor was taken off the grid and preparations for the test resumed.

From this point on, until the beginning of the experiment over two hours later, the reactor became increasingly difficult to control, due to the operators' failure to observe standard low-power operating procedures. Problems began with a rapid decline in power—from a planned level of 700–1,000 megawatts (thermal) down to only 30 megawatts—well below the permissible safe operating level. To increase power, operators then withdrew the control rods, holding in reserve only six to eight rods instead of the 30 required by plant safety margins.

According to plan, extra coolant was pumped into the core. But in the plant's unstable low-power state, the water saturation of the pressure tubes increased the danger that small changes in temperature could cause extensive steam formation which might result in power surges. Because operators negligently continued to shut down more automatic safety systems to avoid their interference with the experiment, such surges became difficult to control. Although computer printouts warned operators just before the initiation of the test that the reactor was losing its emergency shutdown capability, the late hour, coupled with operator fatigue and impatience, led administrators to press ahead, knowing that if they failed to complete the test they would have to await the plant's next annual maintenance.

At 1:23 a.m. on April 26 the operators cut off the steam supply to the turbine generator to simulate a failure of the plant's internal support power. Coolant water from the pumps began to decline. With decreasing water flow and turbine generator inertia, boiling increased, due to the positive void coefficient. Power levels accelerated and the reactor became increasingly unstable and difficult to control. Thirty-six seconds into the experiment, operators attempted to drop the control rods, but not enough rods fell into place. By the time the minimum "safe" number of rods were finally in place, steam generation had diminished their ability to contain the chain reaction. In less than three seconds, power surged to 530 megawatts (thermal), accelerating even faster thereafter to the point where, American analysts believe, a "prompt neutron power burst" resulted in a rapid heating of the fuel, which in turn caused a massive steam explosion. A second explosion followed two to three seconds later, either because of the mixing of hydrogen or carbon monoxide with air or because of a second power surge. The detonations ripped through the thousand-ton, steel-plate encasement and the roof of the reactor, which were designed to withstand only two atmospheres of pressure, not the ten atmospheres to which they were now subjected.

One quarter of the graphite in the core was ejected in the explosions; 30 fires ignited in and around the plant, some flames leaping 30 meters into the air. One fire, on the roof of the turbine building shared by Units 3 and 4, raised the specter of another reactor accident. Fortunately, about 250 firemen who arrived soon after the accident extinguished all of the

blazes by 6:35 a.m. except for the graphite fire burning within the Unit 4 core itself.

The battle to contain the release of radioactivity from this inferno—a fire that ultimately consumed about ten percent of the graphite—had only begun. It took almost two weeks to bring the situation under control. In the end, the plant released between three and four percent of the total core fuel inventory of radioactive materials: 15–20 percent of the radioactive iodine, 10–20 percent of the radioactive cesium and less than 5.6 percent of other radioisotopes, including three percent of the plutonium. One fourth of the release of radioactive material occurred within the first day; the remaining three-fourths was released in the following two weeks. The final solution was found in starving the graphite fire of oxygen. First, to stop the chain reaction, the Soviets dropped 40 metric tons of boron carbide on the core from helicopters. They bombarded the reactor with 800 metric tons of dolomite, followed by 2,400 metric tons of lead and 1,800 metric tons of clay and sand to afford shielding. To cool the reactor under the debris and prevent a meltdown through the reactor floor which could have contaminated the water table 50 feet below, Soviet engineers pumped in liquid nitrogen.


Notwithstanding the silence of Soviet officials at the time, policymakers in Kiev and Moscow were informed within hours. Major General Gennadi Berdov, the Ukrainian deputy minister of internal affairs, initially took command of efforts to control the situation 90 minutes into the accident, sealing off the immediate area around the complex with local militia. A team of doctors and technicians from Moscow reached the Chernobyl environs at 8:00 a.m. on April 26. But it was not until a senior delegation of government and party members arrived at the site that evening that policymakers at the highest level understood the seriousness of the disaster.

In the meantime the Soviets mobilized considerable resources to mitigate the consequences. Implementation of civil defense procedures in Pripyat was delayed at first because of an inadequate emergency plan and the presence of significant contamination on forested evacuation routes. Once communications with the inhabitants of affected areas were established, citizens were told to stay indoors. Officials felt that the shielding afforded by buildings provided the best defense, in light of their uncertainty about the location of early radioactive emissions. Volunteers went door to door distributing potassium


iodide tablets to block thyroid intake of radioactive iodine (I-131), the most important immediate hazard. Soviet aircraft sprayed silver iodide through rain clouds moving toward the region to cause rain to fall before the clouds reached Chernobyl and thus prevent any precipitation from concentrating the fallout. Thirty-six hours into the accident, as radiation levels which were initially light in Pripyat climbed, 1,100 buses evacuated the population living around the plant. Ultimately, 135,000 people in an 18.6-mile radius around the reactor were relocated, some, including the citizens of the town of Chernobyl, nine miles away from the plant, as late as one week after the accident began. As the government further understood the gravity of the situation, it sent several hundred thousand children from Kiev, Byelorussia and the northern Ukraine to recreation camps. When summer ended, these children returned to their communities. Those from the original exclusionary zone did not return to their homes, however; they joined their parents in new and temporary housing near Kiev.

Radiation spread across Europe from the start. Days after the accident, prevailing upper-level winds swept radiation over the Arabian Peninsula, Siberia and eventually North America. Although the accident induced a good deal of concern and psychological trauma, the World Health Organization at the time determined that the contamination posed no immediate acute health hazard to any areas except the region directly around the reactor and some "hot spots" in the Soviet Union and Europe created by rain-bearing radioactive clouds. (After the accident, the Soviets estimated that half the released material fell within an "exclusionary zone" 18 miles in radius around the plant, posing immediate contamination problems in a zone extending at points 18 miles farther.) Nonetheless, the European Economic Community, recognizing that consumption of even lightly contaminated produce could increase the probabilities of cancers and thyroid maladies, banned all fresh food imported from nations within 1,000 kilometers of the accident, effectively barring agricultural exports from Eastern Europe (with the exception of East Germany, excluded at the request of the Bonn government). At the same time, public health officials, using different radiation standards, took a variety of steps to prevent consumption of homegrown leafy vegetables and milk. In countries bordering the Soviet Union, notably Poland, governments administered potassium iodide to children.


**DISPERSION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
AFTER THE ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL, 1986**




April 29 (3 Days)



May 1 (5 Days)



May 3 (7 Days)



May 5 (9 Days)

SOURCE: Simulation by the PATRIC computer model. Maps courtesy of Marvin H. Dickerson and Thomas J. Sullivan, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Firemen, other rescuers and plant personnel (176 operation staff and 268 construction workers from Units 5 and 6) suffered the most serious consequences of the accident. To date, the Soviets report that of the 203 persons hospitalized with thermal burns and acute radiation poisoning, 29 have died (the initial explosion took the lives of two others). An unknown number, perhaps thousands, of others were given medical examinations and released. At first glance, the fatalities seem rather low, certainly not the thousands that some speculated a major accident would produce. Indeed, the fatalities are modest compared to other industrial accidents such as the poisonous gas leak at a chemical plant in Bhopal, India, which took 2,000 lives in its immediate aftermath.

III

In some respects, namely the number of early fatalities (as distinguished from cancers that may not manifest themselves for years), the world escaped the worst that could have occurred at Chernobyl. There was an elevated temperature inversion over the plant the night of the explosion, which allowed the radioactive debris to rise quite high, thereby diminishing the density of its concentration in the atmosphere. Prevailing winds initially carried the radioactivity away from Pripjat. A less energetic plume, released at the base of the reactor during the daytime, when people would have been out on the streets, coupled with a steady drizzle which would have washed radioactivity down to earth, could have resulted in many early fatalities. Thus, generalizations drawn from the number of early deaths in the aftermath of Chernobyl must be treated cautiously.

Another somber but less definable aspect of Chernobyl is the emotional distress reported by the Soviets as a particular problem among children. Most troublesome will be further illnesses and deaths. The Chernobyl reactor emitted two types of radiation that are of prime concern: iodine 131 and cesium 137. (Strontium 90 may also pose a problem, but scientific calculations have not focused on it.) Radioactive iodine concentrates in the thyroid and may be absorbed through breathing or food consumption. Fortunately, I-131 has a short half-life of eight and one-half days. Although it induces nodules in the thyroid rather easily, most of the nodules could be surgically removed. A small percentage, though, will be cancerous and fatal if not caught in time. Because I-131 quickly accumulates in the

thyroid, and assuming that large populations were not administered potassium iodide soon enough or at all, we can anticipate that nodules may be the earliest, and quite possibly the most common, physical manifestation of the accident. Tens to hundreds of thousands of people may be affected.⁵

Had Chernobyl contaminated large populations with hundreds of rems (a unit for measuring the biological impact of radiation), projections of the ultimate extent of the accident's human costs might be relatively easy to define, given the present state of medical knowledge. But beyond the exclusionary zone within which some residents absorbed tens of rems, 75 million Soviet citizens and tens of millions of other Europeans residing in contaminated regions and eating radioactive food produced in contaminated soil will be exposed to well below five rems over a lifetime as a result of the Chernobyl explosion. No expert consensus about the physiological impact of exposure at this low level has been reached. Scientists express an extraordinary range of calculations about the long-term effects of Chernobyl, the low being 210 deaths and the high, one million deaths. To the extent that there is a consensus—and it is a quite shaky one—deaths are predicted in the range of 20,000 to 40,000 within the Soviet Union, with substantial numbers outside.⁶ Whatever the figure, nonfatal cancers will

⁵ Thomas Cochran and Frank von Hippel, "Estimating Long-Term Health Effects," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁶ The low figure comes from Richard Wilson of the Department of Physics, Harvard ("Assessing the Accident," *Issues in Science and Technology*, Fall 1986, p. 25); the high figure from E. J. Sternglass of the Department of Radiology, the University of Pittsburgh ("The Implications of Chernobyl for Human Health," *International Journal of Biosocial Research*, July 1986, pp. 7–36). Other fatality estimates include: 2,000, from Dan Beninson, director for licensing of nuclear installations in Argentina and chairman of the International Commission on Radiological Protection ("International Atomic Energy Agency Press Release," Vienna: IAEA Press Release 86/22, Aug. 26, 1986); under 4,750, from Ralph Lapp, consulting physicist ("Summary/Critique [of the Soviet post-Chernobyl report]," unpublished mimeograph, August 1986); up to 4,000–5,000, from Marvin Goldman, professor of radiology, University of California, Davis, and director of the U.S. Department of Energy's study group on the biological effects of Chernobyl (telephone interview, September 1986); 25,000, from Morris Rosen, assistant deputy director general and director, Division of Nuclear Safety, IAEA (in Colin Norman and David Dickson, "The Aftermath of Chernobyl," *Science*, Sept. 12, 1986, pp. 1041–1043); 20,000–40,000, from Frank Congel of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (telephone interview, September 1986); 24,000–40,000, from the State Committee for Using Atomic Energy of U.S.S.R. (in Norman and Dickson, *op. cit.*, and *Nuclear Engineering International*, October 1986, p. 8); 40,000, from Seymour Jablon of the National Academy of Sciences, and Warren Sinclair of the National Commission on Radiological Protection (also from Norman and Dickson, *op. cit.*); 210,000, from Thomas Cochran, physicist, Natural Resources Defense Council (*The Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 25, 1986, and interview, August 1986, Washington, D.C.); 800,000, from John Gofman of the Department of Biophysics and Medical Physics, University of California, Berkeley ("Assessing Chernobyl's Cancer Consequences: Applications of Four 'Laws' of Radiation Carcinogenesis," paper delivered to the national meeting of the American Chemical Society, Anaheim, California, Sept. 9, 1986).

be of a similar magnitude and genetic effects may appear in future generations.

What accounts for these diverse estimates? What is the significance of the precise magnitude of the final casualty figure? The latter question may be easier to answer, political considerations being the “bottom line” in assessing a disaster with as many possible ramifications as Chernobyl. If the low figures prove correct, nuclear energy proponents will argue—indeed some already have argued⁷—that atomic power poses problems not entirely distinguishable from those presented by other energy sources and toxic waste-producing industries with which we have learned to live. After all, following the Bhopal accident we have not abandoned the pesticide industry, nor have we tried to shut down coal-powered electricity-generating stations that emit sulphur dioxide and thus contribute to widespread respiratory problems for millions of people worldwide and threaten the stability of the earth’s climate by creating a “greenhouse effect.”

On the other hand, if the moderate or higher casualty figures are correct, opponents will make a stronger case that nuclear energy creates an unacceptable risk. Sweden adopted this position even before Chernobyl; the incident only served to harden Swedish nuclear opponents in their opinions. Sweden intends to eliminate its use of atomic power by 2010. Several years ago, Austria decided not to license a newly constructed reactor, in effect discontinuing the country’s nuclear power program. Given the global nuclear energy policy debate, it is important to strive for better estimates of the human costs of Chernobyl.

Doing so will be difficult. Scientists are deeply divided on the biological impact of low-level radiation; they base their beliefs on vastly different assumptions, due to an absence of definitive data for the effects of low doses of radioactivity. We know that exposure to radiation from natural sources, such as uranium and thorium in the earth and cosmic rays in the atmosphere, is inevitable. Certain radioactive substances occur in the body. This “background” radiation, which is not necessarily harmless, varies at different points around the globe, but it is usually on the order of 100 millirems per year. This figure is used as the baseline for setting standards of man-made radiation. There is considerable controversy among scientists

⁷ Richard Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

over the level at which man-induced radiation results in significant biological effects. Some argue that there is no threshold below which man-made radiation exposure is harmless, that the consequences are not reparable by the body's defenses, that radiation accumulated over time has the same effects as a single, acute dose and that the effects of low doses are proportionate to higher ones. Another school holds that the biological risk is less below a certain threshold, because cells are able to repair sublethal damage.

To form hypotheses, scientists rely on studies of Japanese atom bomb survivors, Marshall Islanders irradiated by weapons-test fallout in 1954, uranium miners exposed to radon, doctors and patients using radiotherapy, and the results of animal experiments. Despite large study samples, researchers face difficulties in accurately measuring radioactive dosages and creating exactly equivalent control populations; they cannot always isolate radiation effects from those of other chemical or physical agents. They cannot easily establish a cause-and-effect relationship when there is a long period (30 years or more) between the exposure and manifestation of the effect, particularly in light of the fact that cancer "naturally" kills 20 percent of the West's population. Scientists are groping for conclusions because the myriad of variables produces remarkably different results based on different interpretations of the risk level. The Soviets suggested that casualties from Chernobyl could at worst amount to two cancer fatalities per 10,000 people exposed to at least one rem of radiation, while International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials estimated fatalities at half that rate.⁸ Complicating matters will be the difficult assessment of measures taken to minimize exposure to radiation. Controlling the consumption of irradiated produce and scraping away affected soils or treating them with potassium fertilizers and calcium compounds to minimize cesium and strontium contamination may help ameliorate later health problems, but to varying and uncertain degrees.

The Soviets have promised to study intensively the 135,000 evacuees from the exclusionary zone around the plant and to share the information with specialists in the United States and elsewhere. This information, if tangible—a big "if" considering that precise dosimetry may not be available—may help

⁸ Norman and Dickson, *op. cit.*

resolve the disputes that have risen over the human costs of Chernobyl.

Along with the human costs are still-uncertain economic ones. The Soviets place the direct cost near \$3 billion. This includes lost electrical generation which, although mitigated in October 1986 by the resumption of generation at Chernobyl Units 1 and 2, will result in a five-percent reduction in Soviet energy generation in 1986–87, as similar RBMK plants are shut down for remedial improvements to be undertaken as a result of the Chernobyl accident. Also involved in assessing costs is the expense of relocating 135,000 people from the exclusionary zone and reimbursing them for their personal belongings.

The cleanup work was massive. To contain further releases, a concrete and metal “sarcophagus” now entombs the reactor. It will be in place for centuries and will require monitoring and continual reinforcement. To conduct heat away from the still-simmering core during the weeks after the accident, engineers pumped nitrogen into a basement vault now underlaid with a concrete slab to prevent groundwater contamination. However, the danger of a lateral spread of radiation into the Dneiper River remains. To address this problem, the Soviets entered into a \$23-million contract with two Italian firms for equipment to build a “diaphragm,” four kilometers in radius and 100 meters in depth. To impede the dissemination of surface contamination by local winds, cleanup personnel spread polymerizing solutions over 150,000 square yards of land and removed tons of the most contaminated soil to a depth of five to ten centimeters for deposition in dumps.

It is unclear whether the Soviets include in the cost of the accident the expense of updating other RBMKs with modern computers; the cost of lengthening and increasing the number of control rods; the price of improving reactor monitoring and automatic shutdown mechanisms; the expense of boosting the capacity of coolant pumps; and the cost of replacing the core with more highly enriched fuel to provide greater stability. To these figures must be added tens of millions of dollars for oil to generate substitute electricity, oil that otherwise would have been exported. There are also projections of power brownouts in months to come, which will result in a loss of industrial capacity. In addition there are the modest costs of medical monitoring that will have to be conducted for decades ahead, and the price to Soviet agriculture of land rendered unproductive, of discarded produce, and of scrutiny for contamination

that will vary in duration from months to years depending on the growth cycle of plants and patterns of radioactive redistribution by wind and rain.

The human and economic price of Chernobyl will take years to compute, during which time policymakers around the world will be forced to make difficult decisions about the future of nuclear energy in their respective countries. The benefits of atomic power will have to be weighed against the availability of other energy options, the risks of nuclear energy and the experience of other countries with reactors.

Even before Chernobyl, the nuclear industry worldwide was in a serious slump. Forecasts made in the 1970s of installed nuclear capacity in OECD countries through the 1990s were, by the early 1980s, reduced by 75 percent. Hopes for a burgeoning nuclear power market in developing countries failed to materialize due to the unavailability of capital and hard currency, rising construction costs, falling oil prices, slackening demand in industrial countries for electricity, and grass-roots anti-nuclear sentiment. Still, by 1990, 118 new plants in 17 countries will probably go into operation. At the present time, it does not appear that Chernobyl by itself has affected these plans markedly. What the accident may do is discourage countries from laying future plans for construction. Other considerations will include demand for electricity, the state of capital markets and the ability of reactor vendors to reassure consumers that atomic power facilities can be built safely and with features that avoid other strategic nuclear energy risks as well.

IV

Clearly, Chernobyl is the most serious civil nuclear energy accident to date. It demonstrates that major accidents are possible because of inadequate reactor design and incompetent employees. It also illustrates that such incidents require heroic measures to combat them.

Notwithstanding more rigorous safety standards, reactors manufactured in the West have also experienced important mishaps. In 1984, for example, at one French reactor at Le Bugey, the failure of an electrical component and an emergency diesel generator, coupled with operator error, almost led to a major accident. In the United States, there was Three Mile Island; no early deaths resulted and, given the low amounts of radioactivity released, late-developing cancers—if there are any—will probably be limited to fewer than four

cases, but the event highlighted the fragility of nuclear facilities. There were also several near-misses: the partial core melt in 1966 at the Enrico Fermi demonstration breeder reactor 30 miles from Detroit; the electrical cable fire at Browns Ferry, Alabama (which started because a technician used a candle to check for air leaks, and which resulted in several hours' loss of control over the reactor); and the mishap at Toledo Edison's Davis-Besse plant in 1985, caused by equipment failure and human error, which started a sequence similar to that at Three Mile Island.⁹ Whether any of these and other incidents could have progressed to the point of becoming a Chernobyl-like disaster in the absence of remedial measures, given dissimilar reactor designs, negative void coefficients and different containments, is debatable, but there is growing concern.¹⁰

Serious questions have been raised about the safety of one American graphite-moderated plant that has no containment: the "N" reactor at the Hanford nuclear reservation in Washington State, a dual-purpose facility producing plutonium for the Defense Department's weapons program and electricity for the northwestern U.S. power grid.¹¹ Four other small plutonium production reactors at Savannah River, South Carolina, also have no containment features at all.

Besides reporting the 151 nuclear safety incidents noted above, the General Accounting Office has suggested that the outlook is questionable for assuring the safety of 73 plants either already in operation or on order in 17 developing nations, because most of these countries "lacked trained personnel to draft nuclear safety standards to train nuclear safety personnel."¹² Assuring adequate standards will become more complex as South Korea, China, Argentina, India and other countries increasingly manufacture their own nuclear hardware and components rather than rely on imports. Developing countries as well as many developed states commonly recognize that they are unprepared to address a major nuclear accident alone.

⁹ Daniel Ford, *The Cult of the Atom*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982. The Le Bugey incident is reported in *Nature*, May 19, 1986, p. 462.

¹⁰ Gordon Thompson, "What Happened in Reactor Four," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-31. See also *The New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1986, pp. 1, 8; and Elliot Marshall, *op. cit.*

¹¹ *Nucleonics Week*, May 8, 1986, p. 7. See also the testimony of Dan Hirsch, James Warf and W. Jackson Davis, General Oversight Subcommittee, House Interior Committee, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, May 19, 1986, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1986.

¹² United States General Accounting Office, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

But accidents are not the only problem for the nuclear industry:

Nuclear Sabotage. Between 1970 and 1984, 292 acts or threats of sabotage or diversion of nuclear materials took place worldwide. These incidents—including some bombings and arson—involved nuclear power installations, transport and personnel, and were perpetrated by terrorists, criminals and hostile employees. Recently, the number of such incidents has declined. Still, as a recent RAND Corporation report notes, “this should not lead policymakers into a false sense of security.”¹³ Underscoring this admonition was the saboteur disabling of three of four offsite power lines feeding the Palo Verde, Arizona, nuclear energy complex in May 1986.

Neither this incident nor the hundreds of others around the globe have resulted in important radiological releases. Still there are ominous trends such as state sponsorship of terrorists which gives them access to sophisticated tools and training, and there is an apparent willingness by terrorists and their sponsors to take more lives than in earlier years. It is debatable whether a group would be willing to murder truly catastrophic numbers but sabotage of highly visible nuclear plants remains a possibility.

Too many countries are simply unprepared to address this threat. For example, U.S. regulations dating from the mid-1970s prescribe that reactor operations need not protect against more than one internal or more than three external attackers, against “enemies of the United States,” or against attackers operating with anything more threatening than hand-held automatic weapons or explosives in quantities small enough to be carried by hand (thus excluding protection against truck-bomb assaults). Power reactors, therefore, are required to have a minimum of only five guards. Though most facilities employ more, recent congressional investigation found that security around military production reactors and other sensitive defense establishments is a “shambles.”¹⁴

Military Attacks on Reactors. Since Iran (or, some speculate, Israel) initiated the first military attack on a nuclear reactor in 1980, when jet aircraft bombed Baghdad’s nuclear research

¹³ Bruce Hoffman, et al., “A Reassessment of Potential Adversaries to U.S. Programs,” RAND Corporation Report R-3363-DOE, p. 7. For different perspectives on the vulnerability of nuclear plants to sabotage see Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds., *Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat*, Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1986.

¹⁴ Peter Stockton, in Leventhal and Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

facility at the outset of the Iran-Iraq war, reactors have been struck five times: Israel's destruction in 1981 of the same Iraqi facility, three Iraqi attacks against Iran's Bushehr installations along the Persian Gulf and one Iraqi strike against a small Iranian nuclear research center. Fortunately, none of these plants were operating at the time and nuclear releases were avoided. We cannot assume that releases will be avoided in the future.

Beyond Israel's rationale, namely to preempt an adversary's acquisition of atomic weapons; military attacks on reactors may occur for a variety of reasons: to cripple an antagonist's industrial warfighting capability by depleting energy generation, to destroy the environment for military purposes through the release of radioactivity; or to make the war more costly for the adversary by destroying a valued capital asset (perhaps the rationale for attacks in the Iran-Iraq war). Then, too, an aggressor may bomb a nuclear power station accidentally, or the parties to a conflict might consider sabotaging a facility to escalate the war. Since the citizens of many countries have become acutely concerned about radioactive releases from nuclear power accidents, a belligerent could capitalize on this fear for purposes of intimidation. Unfortunately such threats are consistent with international law and are not explicitly opposed by the United States. Washington takes the position that an international convention prohibiting military attacks on nuclear reactors would not be meaningful in light of the defense requirements of the United States and its allies.

Conventional weapons presently in the arsenals of many countries are quite capable of breaching the hardest reactor containments or destroying critical equipment outside nuclear power plants. A wartime attack could produce radiological releases much greater than those from Chernobyl. War raises two distinct and additional dangers: first, remedial assistance to diminish escaping radioactivity might be less readily available than it was in the Ukraine, as civil defense needs would complicate the situation. Second, the contents of not just one but all reactors at the same site could be released.

Diversion of Nuclear Material for Weapons. Six countries have detonated nuclear explosives: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China and India. Many analysts suspect that Israel and South Africa also have the bomb. Over the years, Libya, Iraq, Pakistan and other nations have voiced openly their aspirations to have nuclear weapons.

In the years to come the prevention of nuclear proliferation may be made more difficult with the introduction of nuclear reprocessing, which will increase the worldwide plutonium supply considerably. Extraction of plutonium from spent fuel—with its nuclear weapons applications—now takes place in reprocessing plants in France, Germany, India, Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. By the end of the 1990s, 350 to 400 metric tons of plutonium will have been separated from spent fuel in the West. If history is any guide, we will find that, as this material enters nuclear commerce, the opportunity for nations and terrorists to divert poorly safeguarded stocks will increase. In the United States alone, 9,000 pounds of plutonium are already missing from the books.¹⁵ Although a large fraction may have been lost due to accounting errors or the manufacturing process, the lack of accountability portends a troubled future. The same problem applies to exported, highly enriched uranium, which the United States has had trouble tracking.

v

For decades, policymakers have attempted to lessen the global risks of nuclear energy. Proposing the ambitious “Atoms for Peace” program in 1953, President Eisenhower called for the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although established as a promotional body, the IAEA gradually acquired a monitory function to verify that nations were not diverting sensitive materials for atomic weapons production; addressing other risks, including plant safety, was a lesser priority.

Through the mid-1960s, the IAEA was an ineffectual policing organization. Moscow, its allies and some developing nations strongly opposed its regulatory functions. The U.S.S.R. repeatedly denounced the concept of safeguards, i.e., onsite inspection of nuclear materials, as a “spider’s web, which would catch in its threads all the science and scientists in the world.”¹⁶ India also opposed the agency:

¹⁵ Thomas D. Davies, “What Nuclear Means and Targets Might Terrorists Find Attractive,” in Leventhal and Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 55. See also David Albright, “World Inventories of Plutonium,” also in Leventhal and Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 159–192.

¹⁶ Quoted in Pierre Lellouche, “Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Non-Proliferation Strategy: Lessons and Prospects,” Cambridge: Harvard Law School, S.J.D. dissertation, November 1979, p. 161.

If safeguards are applied by the Agency to those states which cannot further their atomic development without the receipt of aid from the Agency or other member states, the operations of the Agency will have the effect of dividing member states into two categories, the smaller and less powerful states being subject to safeguards, while the greater powers are above them. This will increase, rather than decrease, international tension.¹⁷

However, the United States and its allies persisted. Roll-call votes became a regular component of the debate, with the West usually prevailing in the effort to establish safeguards.

By the time the IAEA was operational at the end of the 1950s, the United States had signed some 40 bilateral nuclear cooperative agreements. These agreements allowed American inspection of U.S.-supplied nuclear materials to ensure their peaceful use. However, many importers did not wish to accede indefinitely to U.S. scrutiny. With the additional personnel burden that inspections placed on the United States, U.S. officials increasingly looked favorably upon the IAEA as an enforcement vehicle, adding impetus to creation of an agency inspectorate.

By 1959 the Soviet Union was reevaluating its own position, spurred by China's nuclear development, which the Soviets supported until they recognized its threat to themselves. The Soviet Union then became both a supporter and innovator of nuclear safeguards; it limited exports to only light water reactors that did not use weapons-grade material; it required all spent fuel to be returned to the U.S.S.R. to minimize the danger of plutonium diversion by importers; it forbade East European recipients to build their own enrichment and plutonium reprocessing installations.

The tightening Soviet export criteria did not initially include a role for the IAEA, but as the United States increasingly surrendered safeguard responsibilities to the agency and as West European nations overcame their own concern that the organization would be used for industrial intelligence, the Soviets became more supportive. The IAEA expanded its safeguards to cover reactors of all sizes in 1964 and to reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants in 1966 and 1968. The IAEA enforcement staff has grown from three inspectors in 1961 to 250 today. The agency now devotes over one third of its budget to more than 2,000 inspections conducted each year, compared

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

to less than four percent of total expenditures devoted to safeguards in 1962.

The willingness of nations to allow extra-national entities to scrutinize a most sensitive industry is remarkable indeed. Warren Donnelly, a senior analyst of nuclear affairs for the Congressional Research Service, noted: "[IAEA] safeguards are unique. It is the first time in history that sovereign states have invited an international organization to perform inspections on important installations within their territories."¹⁸

For all its progress, this international nuclear regime has been subject to increasing stress. In 1974, India detonated a "peaceful nuclear device" manufactured with equipment imported from abroad and indigenous materials; the plutonium was produced in a Canadian-supplied reactor using heavy water from the United States, and the device was powered with Indian uranium. India's action was disruptive, but it did not prove as damaging as some feared. New Delhi did not go on to build up a nuclear weapons arsenal.

Yet the event had both negative and positive consequences: it provoked Pakistan to undertake development of a bomb, but also encouraged nuclear suppliers to convene talks that resulted in export guidelines in 1977. When Pakistan and South Korea tried to acquire reprocessing plants from France, the United States prevented consummation of these arrangements. In the process, Washington stimulated European sensitivity to nuclear trade (although it failed to prevent West Germany from exporting to Brazil reprocessing and enrichment technology). Alerted by the Soviets to a planned South African nuclear detonation in 1979, the United States and other governments pressured Pretoria to desist.

The most dramatic and controversial effort to prevent nuclear proliferation occurred in June 1981 when Israel destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor, which Israel suspected was a guise for developing an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. The Israeli action stimulated concern for the vulnerability of nuclear plants to military bombardment, but also had political consequences. IAEA members voted to withdraw Israel's credentials to attend the agency's annual general conference in 1982, in part because of the attack, in larger measure because of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. The United States then walked

¹⁸ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1983*, New York: Taylor and Francis, 1983, p. 72.

out of the meeting and suspended its support for the agency. Although the matter of Israeli participation in the IAEA was resolved within a few months and the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the agency, the organization's ability to deal with external strains was brought into question.

Still, the IAEA has been able to cope with this and other challenges. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s it steadily expanded the number of its safeguard agreements with Non-Proliferation Treaty signatories. To address the issues of nuclear safety and security, the agency formalized a set of voluntary guidelines and established standing expert committees—albeit with limited resources—to assist nations requesting advice. Complementing these efforts are bilateral, regional and multilateral ventures. The United States has nuclear safety cooperation agreements with a number of countries. It also works with the membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Nuclear Energy Agency to share safety information. Argentina and Brazil recently entered into an agreement whereby each will warn the other of mishaps; they also have discussed measures to minimize nuclear proliferation, thereby helping to reinforce the Treaty of Tlateloco, which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America. Euratom continues to verify the peaceful and safe development of the atom in Western Europe. Finally, in 1985 parties to the NPT held their third review conference. As opposed to their experience in a previous meeting in 1980, in 1985 the signatories reached a formal consensus in support of the nonproliferation regime. This consensus will be reviewed in 1990, and tested in 1995 when the NPT is due to expire and parties are given the option to extend it.

In sum, the international nuclear energy regime is battered but still viable. In the 1950s few thought it would get off the ground; in the 1960s few believed that safeguards could be implemented in a world of sovereign nations. Yet the regime has made remarkable progress, despite the strains experienced in recent years. Ideally, Chernobyl should provide the impetus to reinforce a new regime, based on common interest. No nation wants a nuclear accident; no nation wants nuclear weapons used on its territory; no nation wants sabotage or military destruction of its plants. Save for the phasing out of nuclear energy, there are few options. There will always be risks, but the risks can be minimized by authoritative institutions ready, willing and able to apply preventive medicine.

Before Chernobyl, attention focused on minimizing the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation. Some suggested ways to discourage states from acquiring nuclear weapons include expanded sales of conventional arms, strengthening alliances, creating nuclear-free zones and establishing multilateral fuel banks, reprocessing plants and spent-fuel storage facilities. To address safety questions, calls are also heard for the development of a new generation of inherently safer reactors, which could come on line in a decade or two.

But in the wake of Chernobyl, pessimism seems to dominate. The principal IAEA remedies enacted in the aftermath of the incident are two conventions: one mandates that states suffering accidents which may result in “an international transboundary release” notify nations that “are or may be physically affected,” either directly or through the IAEA.¹⁹ The second agreement encourages international assistance for nations suffering nuclear power accidents.²⁰ Although valuable and negotiated remarkably quickly—the impetus of Chernobyl overcoming earlier opposition—these agreements are inadequate, akin to closing the barn door after the horse has escaped. They will not prevent future Chernobyls. The IAEA is mindful of this fact. It is looking to enhance safety through a modest increase in its budget, creation of study groups to examine such matters as the interface of nuclear operators and their machines and the expansion of expert committees that can advise nations about safety. But even this would not be enough, a fact acknowledged when West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl called for an international institution to prescribe safety standards and verify implementation, and when Hans Blix, director general of the IAEA, suggested binding, minimum safety standards.²¹

These last recommendations should be viewed as a point of departure to address nuclear energy risks comprehensively. Had the Chernobyl accident resulted in a very large number of early fatalities rather than potentially numerous later fatali-

¹⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency, “Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,” Vienna: IAEA, mimeograph, Aug. 15, 1986. (The convention is equivocal with regard to nuclear weapons accidents, requiring only that parties “may” notify others in such an event.)

²⁰ International Atomic Energy Agency, “Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,” Vienna: IAEA, mimeograph, Aug. 15, 1986.

²¹ *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 23, 1986, pp. 1, 12.

ties, and had it occurred in a country subject to intense press scrutiny, perhaps there would have been impetus for greater international regulation. While the Soviet Union displayed remarkable willingness to expose itself to international review and criticism in the IAEA post-accident review conference last August, its openness should be considered only the beginning of an intense effort to examine more effective modes and methods for managing nuclear energy.

The question remains: how far will countries go to increase national and multilateral scrutiny of nuclear energy? It is not enough to have adequate controls in one nation and not in its neighbors. Given the concern over state sovereignty, it is probably unrealistic to expect foolproof international remedies. But because nations share the common goal of minimizing nuclear risks, I have proposed several multilateral alternatives which I call International Nuclear Reviews (INRs), distinguished by a formal structure and incrementally increasing authority, that address the whole range of nuclear risks. The diverse efforts of such a comprehensive approach could mutually reinforce one another to better ensure a benign nuclear regime.

The most elementary form would require the IAEA to publish a set of guidelines, portions of which would be relevant to exporters, importers and domestic manufacturers. These guidelines would require definition of the contemplated nuclear project, its economics, the operator's disposition toward nuclear weapons, the facility's vulnerability to sabotage and military attack, safeguards against diversion of sensitive nuclear materials, and the operator's ability to run the plant and to manage materials safely.

The assessment also would have "action options" —suggested remedies, incentives and sanctions that might be applied by IAEA member-states should an operator be found out of compliance with INR guidelines. The checklist in this least restrictive INR would not be enforceable but it would serve as a standard of conduct, just as IAEA guidelines on physical security and nuclear safety already do.

More elaborate INRs, to be adopted as confidence in such a regime grew, would upgrade the expert assessment of proposed facilities, define the obligations of suppliers and importers and even make compliance with the impartial findings mandatory. This would be consistent with the call of Morris Rosen, IAEA director of safety, for "development of a clear and universally acceptable approach to safety guided by an international body

composed of prominent exporters [that] could alleviate national and international safety concerns, and . . . also positively influence public opinion.”²² In the most ambitious form of INR, the IAEA would license all nuclear facilities, whether imported or domestically produced.²³

Would such an incremental but comprehensive approach work? Certainly all the stages of INRs are more comprehensive, and most are more authoritative, than the institutions addressing nuclear risks today. In Chernobyl the most powerful INR might have prevented the accident by, at a minimum, requiring installation of quick-starting emergency diesel generators (which are available in other countries), thereby eliminating the rationale for the ill-fated “safety” test in the first place. Efforts of this sort are not cost-free. Nations would have to accept greater international scrutiny of their nuclear programs. But this burden is not entirely foreign to today’s nuclear regime, which embraces IAEA and NPT nuclear safeguards. Considering the dangers now evident, it is reasonable to argue that the cost involved is nominal compared to the consequences of another Chernobyl—or worse.

²² Morris Rosen, “Establishment of an International Nuclear Safety Body,” *International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin*, September 1983, p. 3.

²³ For elaboration of the INRs see Bennett Ramberg, *Global Nuclear Energy Risks: The Search For Preventive Medicine*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986.

Edward Schumacher

THE UNITED STATES AND LIBYA

U.S.-Libyan relations have come “pretty darn close” to war, Secretary of State George Shultz said recently. In 1981, just four months into office, President Reagan closed Libya’s embassy in Washington, citing Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi’s support for international terrorism. Shortly afterward, U.S. navy jets shot down two Libyan warplanes after being fired upon by them. American pressure reached dramatic intensity last April 15 with the bombing raid on Qaddafi’s headquarters and home in Tripoli. Later, some officials sought to destabilize Qaddafi with deliberate plants of disinformation.

If the ouster of Qaddafi has not been the Administration’s avowed goal, it clearly has become a virtual obsession. “If a coup takes place, that is all to the good,” said Shultz in April, in a rare example of an American cabinet official in effect advocating the overthrow of another government. At the core of the Administration’s pressure on Qaddafi is a belief that, by dealing with him, the United States will lead the Western world in dealing a fatal blow to the promoters of international terrorism.

Indeed, the April 1986 raid on Libya brought a lull in Arab-related terrorism. And the governments of Western Europe, scarcely supportive of the American show of force, nevertheless imposed sanctions, in part to placate the Americans. The sanctions prompted the departure of more than 600 Libyans from Western Europe, thus dismantling a logistical network for terror.

But developments since the bombing raid have raised questions about the effectiveness of American policy. Inside Libya Qaddafi overcame what many around him said was a state of depression. After the raid he reemerged in public on September 1 with a forceful speech celebrating his 17th anniversary in power. He began the speech “America is filth.” The next day he defied predictions of a coup by sitting openly in an armchair reviewing a military parade for more than one hour.

The lull in terrorism was short-lived. In September terrorists

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seized a Pan American plane in Karachi, shot up a synagogue in Istanbul and went on a bombing spree in Paris. Some American officials saw a Libyan hand in Karachi. But there was no definitive proof, and the focus of international pressures shifted to other promoters of terrorism.

Not only is Qaddafi back, he is back with a difference. Distrustful in the past of the Soviet Union, Qaddafi is now calling for an ever closer alignment of Libya with Moscow—a prospect that raises questions about the wisdom of U.S. policy. West Europeans, at least, fear closer Soviet-Libyan ties even more than Libyan support for terrorism. The Soviets had not come to Libya's aid during or after the April bombing raid, but now the possibility exists that Qaddafi will grant Moscow's strategists just the foothold in the Mediterranean that has long eluded them.

The main problem in Washington seems to be that the goals of stopping Libyan-sponsored terrorism and overthrowing Qaddafi have become confused. The Libyan colonel has become such a symbol of terrorism to the United States that it has lost sight of practical realities. Pressing Qaddafi can curb some terrorism—but only some. Pressing hard to overthrow him is even more problematic. A look inside Libya reveals it may be neither necessary in the long run nor advisable in the short run. For who would replace Qaddafi is an open question, and the possible answers are hardly encouraging.

II

Without terrorism, Libya would not draw much attention. Though about one-fifth the physical size of the United States, the country is almost all desert. Its entire population is only about three million—about that of greater Houston.

Libyans did not even think of themselves as a nation until independence in 1951. Historically they were members of tribes grouped in three general regions—Tripolitania and Cyrenaica on the coast and Fezzan in the south—whose land had been marched through by Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Spaniards, Turks and, finally, Italians. Invading in 1911, Italy amalgamated the territory in a costly venture. The nomadic tribes fought back in a brutal war that lasted more than a decade. Aid sent by Arabs to support the struggle against the Italians partly explains the continuing strong pan-Arab sentiment of Qaddafi and many Libyans today. At the same

time, Italy remains the European country with the greatest cultural influence in Libya.

U.S. influence was a key factor in shaping the new nation. The British and the French occupied the colony after the defeat of the Italians in World War II. American lobbying in the United Nations helped defeat a move by the European victors and the Soviet Union to carve up the area again. King Idris, the emir of Cyrenaica, had befriended the British during his exile in Egypt; they were instrumental in his elevation to leadership of a united Libya.

His position was hardly one to be envied. Decades of war had left the area so poor that the major export was World War II scrap metal. Distrusting political parties, Idris banned them from the beginning. He turned over much of the nation's administration to locally powerful families, fostering rampant patronage and corruption while impeding national integration and maturation.

The United States and Britain provided critical aid and rents for military bases such as the gigantic U.S. Wheelus Air Force Base outside Tripoli. The discovery of oil in 1959 turned the economy around but exacerbated political problems. Corruption and the king's pro-Western stance at a time of rising pan-Arab sentiment alienated Libyan youth. Colonel Qaddafi had popular support as he led a group of young army officers called the "free officers" in a bloodless 1969 coup overthrowing Idris.

Geographic fortune helped Qaddafi in his drive to power. The son of humble Bedouin nomads, he was born near Sidra, on the line between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. He was raised in the Fezzan oasis of Sabha. He thus to some extent bridged the frictions among the three regions. But his tribal loyalties remain; many of Qaddafi's personal bodyguards come from his tribe, the Qaddafadam.

Though his age is disputed among observers, Qaddafi is thought to have been only 27 years old at the time of the coup; but he was politically driven since youth. He has said that he entered the Libyan military academy precisely in order to bring about political change. He was sent to train for four months in England, where he also pursued an interest in Western political philosophy, developing a liking for the utopians and anarcho-syndicalists. In the Arab world Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser was his hero. Even today propaganda posters picture the young Qaddafi with Nasser.

Many have wondered: is Qaddafi mad? A megalomaniac? Otherwise respectable psychologists have tried to analyze him from afar. More reliable is what Qaddafi says about himself; he considers himself a visionary. While many of those around him are corrupt, Qaddafi by all accounts is not, making him the worst sort of dictator: a true-believing one.

What Qaddafi believes is a muddled mix of Nasserist nationalism, Western anarcho-syndicalism and Bedouin desert egalitarianism. He has set forth his truths, known collectively as the Third International Theory, in the Green Book, a slender volume quoted in Libya as Mao's Red Book once was in China. Billed as an alternative to capitalism and communism, the Green Book program calls for the eventual abolition of government, private profit, mandatory schooling, representative democracy and the like, to achieve a utopian society. "Democracy is supervision of the people by the people" is a typical motto. "Freedom means that every human being gets that education which qualifies him for work which is appropriate to him" is characteristic of the book's contradictory dictums.

Qaddafi's vision extends beyond Libya's borders. Believing he is a revolutionary world leader, he has compared himself to historical figures from Ché Guevara to Garibaldi. He has provided military and financial aid to governments as far afield as Nicaragua and to subversive groups as diverse as the Basque ETA, the Irish IRA and the Philippine Moros. Last March he hosted a convention of some 258 extremist political groups, which included even American Indian and Black Muslim representatives.

But much of this support has been a sideshow to his main area of interest: Africa and the Arab world. Though he calls himself the inheritor of Nasser's pan-Arab mantle, Qaddafi has gone far beyond Nasser. He has at one time or another backed subversive groups in almost every other North African country. Among his deeds have been the 1984 mining of the Red Sea, the continued occupation of northern Chad and the sending of hit-and-run insurgents into Tunisia. His meddling has generally been in moderate states friendly to the West. He has singled out Egypt as a special target for having recognized Israel.

Backing Palestinian terrorist groups is especially important to his self-image. He has openly admitted to funding them, arming them and operating training camps for them in Libya. Qaddafi sees support of these groups as part of his pan-Arab

mission to oppose any settlement with Israel, and indeed its very presence.

Since 1980, when he ordered a campaign to assassinate leaders of the Libyan exile community, Qaddafi has moved directly to carry out his own terrorism as well. The Libyan government has proudly acknowledged having killed more than a dozen of these "stray dogs." More recently Libya has also struck at several Western targets, including a West Berlin nightclub, the bombing of which prompted the American air raid. The number of such direct Libyan actions is small, however, and mercenaries are usually employed to do the actual dirty work.

Behind Qaddafi's activism at home and abroad has been the financial freedom he has derived from oil. Qaddafi helped spearhead the great increase in world oil prices during the 1970s. Oil income allowed him to splurge in arms purchases at the rate of almost two billion dollars a year. According to the Institute for International Strategic Studies, Qaddafi's 73,000-man military has 535 combat aircraft, among them 143 MiG-23 E's and 55 Mig-25 A's and U's. His 20 tank battalions have 300 Soviet T-72 tanks and 2,500 lesser Soviet models. He has a variety of Soviet antiaircraft missiles, including three batteries of long-distance SAM-5s.

But despite his avowed radicalism, Qaddafi has been careful not to offend American and European oil companies, whose technology and skilled labor he needs. Except for the nationalization of British Petroleum in 1971—after he charged it with helping the shah of Iran in a Persian Gulf dispute—Qaddafi has cautiously negotiated the purchase of an average 60 percent of each foreign oil production company in Libya in making them joint ventures. The even more critical oil-field service companies have been altogether untouched.

Meanwhile, the majority of the Libyan people, overlooked and unconsulted, hardly seem to share in Qaddafi's international designs. While popular sympathy for the Palestinians runs high, the depth of commitment of many Libyans, living far from the Israeli front, is questionable. Qaddafi's involvement in areas such as the Caribbean is even more remote to them. Few Libyans seem to believe in terrorism. Some still refuse even to believe their government has been involved in it. A largely apolitical people, Libyans are in fact known among Arabs as wistfully peaceful, with little taste for fighting—in ironic counterpoint to their leader.

But Libyans by and large have not actively opposed Qaddafi's foreign ventures. Until two years ago, the oil largesse allowed him to buy popular support through such genuine accomplishments as building houses, schools, roads and hospitals. A generous social welfare scheme guaranteed income. At the same time, his ability to tweak the nose of the West brought pride to a long downtrodden people. A repressive apparatus discouraged those who might dissent.

Recently the colonel's fortunes have been changing. His Achilles' heel is the world price of oil, and it has plummeted. Libyan oil income has dropped from a high of \$22 billion a year in 1980 to an estimated \$5 billion in 1986—and oil accounts for more than 99 percent of Libya's export earnings. Libya has fallen in arrears on its foreign arms and construction contracts by an estimated \$8 to \$12 billion, much over two years old.

Qaddafi's ambitious development programs have been thrown into disarray. A \$4.2 billion Soviet nuclear power plant and more than \$1 billion in housing and road projects have been canceled since mid-1985. Cranes are stilled on many projects as European and Asian contractors work on a go-slow basis, waiting to be paid. A foreign work force that once numbered in the hundreds of thousands has been sharply cut. About the only project going forward as planned is Qaddafi's pet scheme, the "great man-made river," a mammoth undertaking to pump underground water from the desert to the coastal region.

Yet, in spite of these troubles, Qaddafi has pressed ahead with his iconoclastic revolution. In backhand ways, the declining fortunes of his twin assets—oil and a vision—have opened a window for American policy.

III

The United States' disenchantment with Qaddafi did not start with President Reagan. Shortly after the 1969 coup the Nixon Administration blocked the sale of 12 C-130 military cargo planes to Libya. Arms, technology and trade embargoes were progressively extended by the Ford and Carter Administrations. Now little more than humanitarian and journalistic contacts are allowed under the terms of a January 1986 executive order requiring all American citizens to leave Libya.

The Administration deliberately set out to punish Qaddafi in March 1986 when ships of the U.S. Sixth Fleet crossed the

"Line of Death" drawn by Qaddafi in the Gulf of Sidra, which he claims as territorial waters. The claim has little historical basis or international recognition, but American officials have admitted that their intrusion was designed less to uphold international law than to provoke Qaddafi. It did. The Libyans attacked; the Sixth Fleet responded by sinking at least two Libyan patrol boats and hitting an antiaircraft missile site. The Libyan regime has never clarified how many Libyans died in the confrontation, but a memorial list posted inside the Benghazi naval barracks listed 72 drowned sailors; some Libyan naval officers have put the number much higher. No Americans were killed.

The April 15, 1986, air raid on Tripoli and Benghazi brought the hostilities to a peak. The raid came in announced retaliation for the death of an American soldier in a bomb blast at a Berlin discotheque. The Americans mounted an extraordinary operation in which planes flying from air fields in Britain were coordinated with others flying from carriers in the Mediterranean. The Libyan regime said that 36 civilians and one soldier were killed, but estimates based on burials around the country put the number of Libyan deaths, mostly military, between 50 and 100. One American F-111 jet was shot down and its two pilots killed. Eight bomb craters stretched out about 300 yards from just in front of the colonel's house to the front of his office building. Qaddafi's wife and two of his sons were injured, and an infant girl taken in by the family was reportedly killed. Qaddafi, in his underground bunker at the time of the bombing, escaped unharmed.

The Reagan Administration has since continued to apply more subtle military and covert pressure in hopes of provoking a Libyan coup. In addition to Sixth Fleet flybys and ship maneuvers within radar range off the Libyan coast, the Administration reportedly sponsored a disinformation campaign, outlined in an August 1986 memorandum to the President from his national security adviser, John M. Poindexter. False or exaggerated reports of internal dissent and opposition were advocated in order to unsettle Qaddafi psychologically. President Reagan said in a news conference that he wanted Qaddafi to "go to bed every night wondering what we might do."

Over the years the Central Intelligence Agency has maintained contacts with Libyan exiles and internal opposition groups. It has even flirted with backing coup attempts, though there is no public knowledge that it has ever attempted a coup

operation. The CIA has also long been spreading rumors, or disinformation, but the Poindexter memo suggested a more directed and coordinated effort.

What has been the effect of this long record of American military, economic, diplomatic and covert pressures? Each had different short-term and long-term results. But the goals of stopping terrorism and overthrowing Qaddafi have not been met.

IV

Qaddafi was still in power long after the bombing raid. Worse, the air raid, the jolt designed to provoke a coup, proved to have the opposite immediate effect of strengthening him vis-à-vis his rivals inside the government.

The Libyan government is so tightly closed and its officials so fearful or hostile about speaking that it is difficult to establish the details of internal political maneuverings with certainty. American officials complain that the amount of intelligence on Libya even inside the CIA is meager. Rumors abound, the wildest often repeated by diplomats and reported to their home governments.

Reports of coup attempts put out by American officials and some journalists in the first days after the American bombing now appear to have been ill founded and possibly ill intentioned. There have been no known purges or executions in the months since the bombing that would indicate a coup was attempted. Furthermore, if Qaddafi had been in danger of a coup, it is unlikely that he would have gone into near seclusion after the raid. Since his reemergence, he has mixed brazenly in public and even left the country for nearly a week to attend the Nonaligned Movement's summit and visit Sudan.

That is not to say Qaddafi was not psychologically shaken by the raid. Always virtually paranoid about his personal security, he became even more so in the first months afterward because he feared another bombing or an American-backed assassin, according to members of his retinue. He abandoned his headquarters, the Bab al-Azzaziya barracks, and moved around the country in an armored bus. He faltered and his mind seemed to wander in the few taped speeches he made, though staff members said this was due largely to the strain of never sleeping in the same place two nights in a row.

Qaddafi's continued rule has been ensured in large part because the military, the most likely source of any uprising,

lost influence within the government after the April attack. At the same time Qaddafi's loyal ideological shock troops, the "revolutionary committees," have been gaining power. The fall of the one and the rise of the other are a partial fruition of Qaddafi's manipulations to entrench himself in power. While he has control for now, he still faces long-term threats.

There have long been frictions between Qaddafi and the military leaders. A number of coup attempts over the years have underlined the dissent inside the armed forces. In the last three years, moreover, discontent has been rising to new heights. It is due in part to the country's declining economy, leading Qaddafi to freeze most promotions and end once generous commissary, housing and travel privileges. More than \$700 million in military construction projects were canceled in 1985 alone. Meanwhile, the military has tired of the constant state of hostilities, not only with the United States, but also with France in Chad and with Tunisia and Egypt. Many officers question the cost in lives and money of maintaining several thousand troops in Chad, where they occupy the northern third of the country; in October Libyan troops even turned on Chadian rebel forces they were backing. Finally, as professionals, many officers especially resent Qaddafi's plan to abolish the formal military hierarchy and replace it with a vaguely defined people's militia that would be more ideological.

The discontent is said by numerous Libyans and foreigners close to the military to have taken an upward turn since August. That month Qaddafi demoted to colonel the army's only two generals, Abu Bakr Jabber Younis, the commander in chief, and Mustafa Kharroubi, the inspector general. Several colonels were downgraded as well. At the same time Qaddafi carried out his plan to move the military's general command headquarters. Over their loud objections, he forced the senior echelon of officers and their staffs to move to a headquarters complex constructed at Hun, a desert village roughly 300 miles southeast of Tripoli where water and amenities are scarce.

The reason Qaddafi has been able to treat the armed forces with such impunity is the revolutionary committees. To understand the committees is to understand how Qaddafi rules Libya.

The committees exist in every neighborhood and factory and government office. They are made up of loyal political zealots, many of them young, who act as informants and increasingly have come to supplant the police and the courts. They have also taken over the operations of some factories,

offices and an airport. Some committee members are qualified professionals but others are mere patronage appointees or just thugs. Many ranking Libyan diplomats avoid postings abroad because the committees even run many embassies.

The committees also exist inside the military. There they are made up of loyalist soldiers of various ranks. While not always in the most senior positions, they are in many of the most critical positions, such as holding the keys to ammunition stockpiles. Their presence makes organization for a coup virtually impossible.

Qaddafi has also kept the military in line by skillfully rotating his commanders to keep any one from gathering power. The Libyan leader can be ruthless if some officer might still pose a threat. In November 1985 Colonel Hassan Ishkal, a powerful and popular troop commander, was shot and killed as he was on his way to voice some of the military's complaints to Qaddafi. He was killed despite being a close cousin of Qaddafi. Questions over Qaddafi's role in the murder and whether a coup led by Ishkal was in the works remain unanswered.

The military was thus already shackled at the time of the April bombing. The attack ruined any remaining chances of a military revolt. This was not because the Libyan masses rallied around Qaddafi, the underdog fighting the giant, as is often said. Rather, by failing in confronting the Americans, the armed forces were discredited and further demoralized. After the attack, there was no support for a coup.

The demotion of the two generals reflected the military's declining stature and the revolutionary committees' relative ascendance. Beyond this, since the bombing the committees have become a virtual parallel government. They have all but replaced the country's formal, partially representative political structure of "people's congresses," which are made up of government unions, professional associations and the like. While the congresses had little power, at least some complaints could be aired at their meetings. But over the past year their meetings have been fewer and poorly attended as the revolutionary committees have grown in power. During the September 1 festivities several thousand committee members from around the country met in Tripoli in a national convention, which issued the same sort of national policy declarations that the congresses had issued in the past. Qaddafi attended, basking in nearly 45 minutes of nonstop cheers and chants.

The rise of the committees is also seen in the rise of their

leader. He is Major Abd al-Salam Jalloud, since Ishkal's death clearly Libya's number-two man. Jalloud, a sort of prime minister, took on the critical oil portfolio as well last spring. A childhood friend of Qaddafi, he is less abstemious and more pragmatic than Qaddafi, and very loyal. Speculation periodically arises whether Jalloud might have ambitions to replace his boss, but he is careful never to take a tack different from Qaddafi, prompting an Arab saying that the two are fingers of the same hand.

Qaddafi's final assurance of power lies in the Revolutionary Command Council, a weak kind of junta. Once made up of 12 of the original coup leaders, it is now down to five. Most of the others have gone into exile abroad or political oblivion at home for having views different from Qaddafi's. Among the five are Qaddafi and Jalloud, and the two demoted generals, Younis and Kharroubi. Neither of the latter two is considered personally forceful or politically ambitious. The fifth member is Major Akweldi Hamadi, who is often used as a diplomatic emissary. Hamadi also heads the popular military militia, a ragtag force of mostly students and elderly reserves.

While little is known about the personal views of the four members other than Qaddafi, the sum is a loyalist council that shares with him the interest of staying in power. Qaddafi himself admits to being bored with the day-to-day details of governing and so allows some debate within the council, at times letting it act on its own. Appropriating the title "the leader of the revolution," he paints himself as a guru overseeing the philosophical direction of the nation. By all accounts, however, he makes the big decisions himself.

Thus, the bombing and military pressure have failed to destabilize Qaddafi in the short term. The military was in no position to take over. But while Qaddafi's position appears secure for the moment, there are signs of popular discontent that could in the longer term spell his downfall. U.S. actions have helped heat the cauldron of unrest.

V

Power commands respect in the Arab world, and the American bombing showed that Qaddafi's power was limited. If the Libyan military was discredited inside the government by its failure to protect Libya, so was Qaddafi among the public. Ordinary Libyans have been angered that his arms and rhetoric did not in the end protect them. Some have denounced Qaddafi

among themselves and to foreigners with a boldness that would have been unthinkable before the bombing. Qaddafi, in other words, has lost much of his charisma.

It has been long coming. Over the last five years economic problems and Qaddafi's domestic policies have created many grievances. The effects of the fall in oil prices and continuing arms purchases have been aggravated by mismanagement and Qaddafi's Green Book theories, under what is called a policy of "partners not wage earners." A private employer hiring a Libyan worker must automatically cede half of his enterprise to the worker and make him a partner. Foreigners can be wage earners, but nearly 40,000 Tunisians and Egyptians hired by Libyans to work in shops, bakeries and fields were evicted in 1985. Some were replaced by Angolans and Moroccans, but in general employers and farmers have lacked both ownership incentives and a ready supply of labor.

The result has been a rampant shortage of food and consumer goods. Libyans are forced to stand in lines to buy things from milk to shampoo. Cavernous government supermarkets stock little more than Cuban sugar and Italian tomato paste. A thriving black market has broken out for scarce goods such as lamb. Price controls falsely repress dangerously building inflation. The black-market dollar during 1986 was running three times the official rate. No one starves, but the poor can afford little, and for the middle class there is little to buy.

The hardships have worsened in recent months. The regime has cut back salaries, research allowances and welfare benefits. In a draconian move, it ordered that every white-collar government employee without a college degree and over the age of 40 be fired by December. The move is designed both to cut the government payroll and to turn more Libyans into blue-collar laborers. Another order issued in August 1986 banned government offices from hiring new university engineering graduates. Overloaded with engineers, the government suggested they join the military.

The regime's growing radicalism has made daily life ever more chaotic. The government is considering banning the first four years of elementary school as a step toward education by parents; kindergarten admission was restricted this fall. The teaching of foreign languages was also largely banned. In September the government announced that money would be abolished after the "coming season" of people's congress meetings, creating great uncertainty. Further, the radicalism and

increasing bullying of the revolutionary committees have fostered widespread public antipathy. Mandatory military training for high school students and the constant threat of war have aggravated resentments.

Middle-class Libyans could once escape by traveling and studying abroad, but growing travel restrictions imposed by the Libyan government and by Western countries have robbed them of even that outlet. Libyan student programs were shut down in Spain, Ireland, Britain and elsewhere in 1986. Travel to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is not attractive to most Libyans, while the United States and most West European countries have made it very difficult for Libyans to get even tourist visas. And when Libyans do travel to the West, the popular suspicion and tough immigration checks they encounter for fear they might be terrorists humiliates them. They blame Qaddafi.

American economic sanctions have squeezed the Libyan economy and fed the discontent. Oil production has been disrupted by the 1986 presidential orders that forced all American oil companies to leave. Some of the service companies stayed by putting their operations under independent foreign subsidiaries. Occidental, W. R. Grace and the Oasis group companies of Marathon, Amerada Hess and Conoco turned their operations over to Libyans, through formulas that may allow them to return in the future. Meanwhile, the American trade embargo has made it difficult for Libya to buy such items as spare parts for its commercial airliners. In August Libya managed, only via a ruse, to buy two European Airbuses, which have American components.

European economic measures have added to the pressure. For example, the two Airbuses, which belonged to British Caledonian Airways, have been restricted from leaving Libya by suits brought by airlines. Most West European airlines have drastically cut back their service to Libya, Britain's stopped altogether. Because of unpaid debt, Italian courts have frozen nearly \$5 million of Libyan funds in Italian banks. Fearing more such seizures, in September Libya sold its 15-percent stake in Fiat. The United States has frozen nearly \$1 billion in Libyan funds in American banks.

The threatening maneuvers by the Sixth Fleet, covert disinformation and rumors have further stirred the simmering pot of social dissent inside Libya. Fear of another American attack is widespread. Exile broadcasts from Iraq of insurgents landing

on the beaches in rubber rafts led to the arrest of many ordinary fishermen over the summer, which interrupted the fish supply. Tripoli was largely evacuated September 1 and again September 5 due to rumors of an impending coup and invasion. It is unclear to what extent the rumors were American-inspired.

Still, popular revolt is not imminent; Libyans are not fighters. Moreover, the repressive apparatus is also strong. Hundreds of Libyans have been executed over the years, some in public hangings. Thousands of dissidents are in jail, where torture is reported to be common. There are no leaders or groups to channel the discontent; membership in political parties and fundamentalist Muslim groups is punishable by death. Qaddafi keeps a tight control over what Muslim religious leaders preach, and most of the intelligentsia are among the 50,000 Libyan expatriates.

Perhaps the discontent will someday explode. Perhaps it will move the army to revolt. But most likely, it will provide the rationale and motivation for the assassin many Libyans—and Qaddafi himself—are convinced will someday try to take Qaddafi's life. Change will not come peacefully to Libya.

VI

If U.S. pressure may ultimately contribute to Qaddafi's downfall, what success has the policy had in achieving the other goal, that of stopping terrorism? It was, by and large, a quiet summer for terrorism. The American air raid, combined with European expulsion of Libyan organizers, seemed to have curbed Libyan terrorism in the short term. Since then Libya has been directly involved in two terrorist attempts that failed. Both attempts, to bomb a Bank of America branch in Madrid in May and an American officers' club in Ankara in late April, appeared to be results of plans set in motion before the raid. It is possible that the April U.S. action has some ongoing restraining effect upon Qaddafi; but how much and for how long is unclear.

It is clear, however, that stopping Libya has only limited value in stopping Arab terrorism in general, as the September spate of attacks in Karachi, Istanbul and Paris demonstrated. All were carried out without Libyan involvement, as far as has been determined. In any case, Western intelligence agencies agree that Syria and Iran are much larger and more effective state sponsors of Arab-related terrorism. What terrorism Libya does carry out directly is more often than not botched. The

foiled Madrid bombing was typical in that the Libyan "People's Bureau" in Madrid hired second-rate smugglers, who talked when arrested. In the Berlin discotheque bombing proof of Libyan involvement came from intercepting a clumsy radio message. Libyan security is so drafty that some groups, such as ETA, have decided to stop taking Libyan aid.

Among state sponsors of terrorism, Qaddafi has stood out largely because of his outspokenness and his generosity with money. Palestinian leaders say he continues to help fund them, but then so do moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia. And Western intelligence agencies and Palestinians themselves agree that despite the support he gives, Qaddafi has little or no direct control over the Palestinians and their operations.

An example is the Arab National Command. It is made up of all the dissident PLO groups, as well as the ruling parties in Syria and South Yemen. Qaddafi is its creator and titular commander. The Reagan Administration has charged that the command is a terrorist network, and Qaddafi had indeed boasted before the air raid that he would order it into action against American targets worldwide if Libya were bombed. But no such orders have come down and none would be followed if given. The command has held two congresses in Tripoli in the last two years but otherwise exists only on paper. The Palestinians take Qaddafi's money but look on him with some disdain as an armchair soldier far from the Israeli front.

Stopping Qaddafi, then, will not end PLO terrorism. It will continue so long as the Palestinian issue remains unresolved. It grows out of nationalism and despair, and has a dynamic independent of outside support.

Does all this mean that punishing Libya for terrorism was futile? No. It forcefully underlined the point that state terrorism is distinguishable and carries a price, making Qaddafi hesitant. The air raid also sent a message about that price to Syria and Iran, which are said to have become more cautious since the bombing. But the value of the air raid should not be exaggerated. Qaddafi's florid rhetoric made the bombing popular for American home consumption, but Libya was, in the end, little more than the easy target.

In fact, what is remarkable is that Qaddafi, despite all his activism, is largely politically isolated today. Because of fallen oil income, he is unable even to buy support. A number of non-Palestinian radical groups report that he has cut their aid. Meanwhile, three of his neighbors—Egypt, Tunisia and

Chad—have military forces confronting him. The three others—Algeria, Niger and Sudan—regard him with suspicion. In the Sudan he has stopped backing rebels in the south and given aid to the new government, but it remains unconvinced of his sincerity.

In August Morocco became the fifth Arab nation to break a “union” with Libya, two years after Qaddafi had signed the treaty with King Hassan precisely as a way to escape isolation. Black Africa had already largely turned against him by denying him the chairmanship of the Organization of African Unity in 1982. Outside the region, Nicaraguan officials say they have stopped taking aid from Qaddafi because his image damages their diplomacy. The Arab and Third World reaction to the American air raid on Libya was markedly mild; only verbally did they come to Qaddafi’s defense. Syria’s Hafez al-Assad visited Tripoli in August and pledged to “put all its potential alongside Libya in confronting any act of aggression,” but it was a pro forma statement.

This lack of support led to Qaddafi’s outburst at the Non-aligned Movement’s summit in Harare. “I want to say goodbye, farewell to this funny movement, to this fallacy—farewell to this utter falsehood,” he said. He did not quit, but the performance pathetically underlined that for all his showmanship Qaddafi has become increasingly marginal in the world. Qaddafi is not a leader of the Arab or Third World, not even of its radical members; he remains an isolated, idiosyncratic figure.

VII

The Reagan Administration offended many West European countries by carrying out the April bombing just hours after the European Community had voted diplomatic sanctions on Libya in an emergency meeting called by Italy. The Mediterranean countries—Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey—also were particularly concerned about turmoil and retaliatory actions in what is their backyard. The attempted Libyan attack of April 15 on the Italian island of Lampedusa was an example of what they feared.

All the European countries have resisted an American call for more sanctions. Europe’s economic interests in Libya remain considerable. Some 10,000 West Europeans still live and work in Libya, including over 3,500 British and about 2,400 Italians; 10,000 Turks are also there. As of October, Libya owed Italy roughly \$600 million in arrears, and South Korea

and West Germany each another \$300 to \$400 million. Turkey, France, Great Britain and Spain also held sizable Libyan portfolios. Each wants to stay to ensure it is paid.

The fundamental difference between the United States and West European governments over Libya is that the latter almost unanimously think that the United States has exaggerated the Libyan threat, and has overreacted to it. They especially think so in light of the Soviet risk. They are concerned that U.S. overreaction could well precipitate a threat greater than the one Qaddafi presently poses.

West Europeans fear a Libyan Soviet base in the Mediterranean, directed at the soft southern belly of Europe itself. The Soviets have long coveted the former British deepwater naval base at Tobruk, near the Egyptian border. Until recently Soviet-Libyan relations have been testy. Distrustful, Qaddafi has resisted giving the Soviets automatic port privileges. He abhors communism as godless and, while he has dutifully backed the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, he vocally opposes Soviet efforts for a Middle East peace conference. He has further irked the Soviets by reselling Soviet-bought arms to Iran while the Soviets themselves are supplying Iraq. The Soviets, for their part, have denied Qaddafi the mutual defense treaty he wants. Soviet diplomats confide that they do not trust the Libyan leader's mercurial ways. The Soviets have thus contented themselves with massive arms sales for which Qaddafi is more than \$5 billion in arrears, allowing Moscow to extract payment in the form of oil below world prices.

Yet since the April bombing Qaddafi has turned strongly pro-Soviet in his pronouncements. Calling at Harare for alignment with the Warsaw Pact, he said "nonalignment has become a word that should not be said." Whether he has been offering the Soviets anything concrete to forge a closer alliance is not publicly known. It is assumed that there is some offer—Tobruk?—which the Soviets might bite. What worries Europeans is that the raid and continued pressure could drive Qaddafi to make such an offer, and give the Soviets a strategic outpost that would alter the Mediterranean balance of power.

It is unclear whether the Soviets will judge it in their interest to respond to Qaddafi's appeals, especially if they are interested in courting European public opinion to divide the Western alliance or in improving superpower relations for the sake of progress on arms control. It is possible that they are content with the status quo in Libya, and would even prefer to wait

until Qaddafi is overthrown to make another move there. As it is, an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 Soviet military advisers and an equal number of East European ones are strategically spread through the Libyan armed forces. Thus they would be in a good position to take advantage of a coup—or possibly even stimulate one.

There is little reason for the Soviets to instigate a coup against Qaddafi, given his current pro-Soviet stand; they probably would not stand in the way of one, however, given their wariness of Qaddafi's unpredictability. The Soviets are widely thought to favor the pragmatic Jalloud if Qaddafi were to be replaced, although opinions differ over whether Jalloud is in fact pro-Soviet. If he is not pro-Soviet, a bevy of Libyan officers who have been trained in Warsaw Pact countries are, and the Soviets could back them.

VIII

So what should the United States do about Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi? The Administration's obsession with overthrowing him is not the answer.

Another direct attack risks alienating Western Europe. It also risks provoking a genuine Soviet-Libyan alliance. Pushing Qaddafi toward Soviet protection hardly serves America's greater interests. Soviet bases in Libya would present a threat to NATO, as well as expand Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, all vital areas of American interest.

Even short of forcing a Soviet-Libyan alliance, a second American attack without clear justification could force the Soviet Union into some kind of strong reaction, if for no other reason than to gain credibility in the Arab world.

American interests in Arab and Third World countries could also be damaged. Their reaction to the April air raid was minimal, in part because many countries, whatever their public pronouncements, saw that Qaddafi was playing with fire by directing terrorism against American targets. Obvious military bullying to overthrow Qaddafi, however, is not likely to meet with such a quiescent response. There is no such thing as a united Arab world, but there is an Arab brotherhood that resents outside bullying of one of their own. Even Egypt, the most anti-Qaddafi Arab state, has refused to join in American contingency plans to overthrow the Libyan.

Bombing is of marginal military value anyway. A massive operation was mounted and two American pilots died in April.

The political message was clear, but the actual military damage was minimal—little more than a handful of parked Libyan planes. Meanwhile, a number of civilians were killed as American bombs hit a Tripoli neighborhood. The best plans and latest technology can go awry in combat.

American zealotry to overthrow Qaddafi may thus bode failure—failure for U.S. policy in Europe, with the Soviets, and in the Arab and Third Worlds. It may also bode failure inside Libya itself. A coup brought about purposefully and clearly by American provocation stands to be counterproductive. Pro-American and possibly even moderate forces inside Libya would likely be discredited as American lackeys. Libya is filled with competing pro-Soviet, radical nationalistic and Muslim fundamentalist currents that are both anti-Qaddafi and anti-American. In the grab for power that is likely to follow the killing of Qaddafi, the moderates could very easily be branded as U.S. agents and lose out to forces inimical to U.S. interests.

All this is not to say that the United States should discard another military attack as a policy option. Should Libya commit an egregious terrorist attack against an American target, a second attack could be considered to deter further state terror. But the terrorist act must be egregious, and the proof of direct Libyan involvement must be so clear that American military retaliation appears justified to Western Europe, to the Soviet Union and to the Arab and Third Worlds. Otherwise, the risks outweigh the gains, which in any case are primarily short term.

This suggests that the best tools for dealing with Qaddafi are economic and diplomatic. The fortuitous drop in the world price of oil has undermined Qaddafi and his foreign adventurism more than the American air raid. The current economic and travel restrictions by the United States and Western Europe augment the effect, stirring a popular disenchantment in Libya which makes it almost certain that Qaddafi will sooner or later be overthrown. Such economic and diplomatic measures do not provoke European, Soviet or Arab opposition. They allow for moderate elements inside Libya to maneuver legitimately to replace Qaddafi.

The United States can help these moderate forces with covert aid. It can also help stir the cauldron of Libyan society and unsettle Qaddafi with such subtle psychological warfare as spreading rumors among Libyans. Overt lying by American officials via the press, however, goes beyond the pale. It under-

mines the credibility of both the press and the American government at a time when the truth about what is happening inside Libya is more than sufficient to discredit Qaddafi and his regime. The United States, in seeking to unsettle Qaddafi with military maneuvers, need not also act the part of a bellicose giant. American warships and planes need only be sighted by Libyan radar to have the effect of subtly turning up the heat inside the Libyan armed forces.

In October the British set an example of what the Europeans say is a more realistic and consistent policy than air raids in dealing with state terrorism—in this case, with Syria, a bigger and more politically powerful player than Libya in the terrorist game. The Thatcher government broke diplomatic relations with Syria after divulging what it said were telephone conversations proving the complicity of a Syrian ambassador in an attempt to blow up an Israeli airliner at the London airport. A British court convicted a Jordanian, recruited and trained by Syria, of putting a bomb in a bag belonging to his Irish girlfriend boarding the plane. The revelation and subsequent rupture in relations was internationally embarrassing to Syria, and has begun a process of what could be the diplomatic isolation of that country.

Toward Libya, what is called for is such a sense of measure. Qaddafi is his own worst enemy. He thrives on crisis, and in quiet times he grows bored. His increasing radicalization almost seems designed to keep his adrenalin flowing, but his radical vision is unworkable and doomed to failure. Qaddafi has set his regime on a course of self-destruction. The best American policy would be to turn off the rhetoric from Washington and let him go.

Milton Viorst

IRAQ AT WAR

Iran and Iraq resemble two exhausted boxers after a dozen rounds of high-stakes pugilism. The two have different fighting styles. Iran is more aggressive, Iraq wilier. Iran is more acutely motivated, Iraq better trained. Iran has no devoted handlers in its corner, whereas Iraq has an entourage of supporters. Neither combatant seems able to summon strength beyond that needed for one more good round, but each insists it will fight on until the other gives in. For the two of them, it is a grudge match. Both are apparently as stubborn as they claim.

Yet, devastating though it is in terms of lives and money, no one has much of a sense of when the fighting is likely to end, nor does anyone feel very confident about predicting the winner. After six years the prospect of endless war has created deep anxieties throughout the oil-rich Persian Gulf and sent intimations of calamity reverberating over a steadily widening area. Washington, with its vital Middle East interests, admits it is also worried. But sending confusing signals about arms supplies to the area, it appears to have no clear vision, much less a policy, for bringing the war to an end.

II

By conventional strategic assessment, Iran should win this war. With 42 million inhabitants, its population is three times the size of Iraq's. With a fervor born of a successful revolution, it has brought to the battlefield far more élan. But Iraq has defied the gloomy prophesies of outside experts and continued to fight with surprising obstinacy. To make up for its deficiencies in manpower, it has mobilized more effectively. Accurate figures in this war are hard to come by, but according to American estimates Iraq may have as many as 750,000 men permanently under arms, about 200,000 more than Iran. Fur-

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thermore, thanks to various friendly nations in the region and farther afield, Iraq has kept its men much better equipped.

Only a few years ago, Iran and Iraq were great oil powers, working to build modern industrial economies. Now both are virtually bankrupt. Iraq may be burdened by as much as \$50 billion in foreign debt, Iran by only slightly less. Iraq has difficulties paying foreign creditors and has cut back substantially on imports, not only of consumer products but of raw materials needed for its non-defense industries.

The difference between the economic circumstances facing the two countries, however, is that the Arab oil powers in the Persian Gulf will not let Iraq be defeated for lack of funds. They see Iran's revolutionary crusade as a menace to themselves as well as to the societies they govern. Convinced that Iraq's cause is their own, they have advanced \$30 billion or more in credits and will no doubt come forth with more as needed. In contrast, Iran, isolated by its doctrines not just from the West but from Moscow, must juggle its finances from day to day. To feed its people and its military machine, it is reduced to paying for almost all its imports in cash.

Militarily, what this means is that Iraq has the luxury of selecting from the best products of many weapons suppliers, most notably the Soviet Union and France. Iran, meanwhile, keeps its army going with second-rate weapons, most of them from China and North Korea, some from the Eastern bloc. In the past five years Iraq has built not only the largest but the best-equipped army in the Arab world. Although Western observers say that Iraq has not satisfactorily integrated its weaponry into battlefield operations, its effectiveness is growing. Most dramatically, Iraq has an edge in aircraft that may be as high as 20 to 1, though it has yet to capitalize on the battlefield superiority such a ratio would seem to promise.

Realistically, however, Iraq does not expect to win the war against Iran on the battlefield. Given the size and determination of its foe, it probably cannot. Insofar as it has a long-term view, Iraq's strategy is to maintain military pressure in the hope of exhausting Iran economically. It is no coincidence that when the Gulf powers opened their oil taps in late 1985, creating a glut that swept the floor from under world prices, Iran complained the loudest. Under pressure from other OPEC members, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait finally consented in August 1986 to a program of reduced production quotas, but only after forcing Teheran to exempt Iraq from any limits. At about the same

time the Iraqi air force began to show some daring, bombing Iranian oil installations throughout the Gulf. The most recent assessment indicates that Iranian oil shipments are down significantly. The bombing campaign was a clear acknowledgment by Iraq that only by conducting successful economic warfare is it likely to get out of the struggle intact.

Yet, despite its military and economic limitations, Iran's strategy has on the whole been to maintain the offensive, while Iraq has for the most part remained on the defensive. By concentrating its forces at selected points along the 730-mile frontier, Iran has shown that it can exploit local superiority in manpower to launch attacks that force the Iraqis into retreat and, occasionally, that breach Iraqi lines. But, lacking both mobility and firepower, Iran has been unable to build the momentum to capture cities or destroy armies. The cost of these operations has been an estimated 300,000 Iranian dead, more than double the Iraqi figure. Strategically, this is a level of loss Iran can take, thanks to its edge in population and morale, and still come back for more. But the strategy has not brought victory notably closer.

Iraq's lack of aggressiveness on the battlefield has puzzled Western experts, who have attributed it to military incompetence or, at the very least, to poor coordination between the civilian and military leadership. Indeed, even the Iraqis acknowledge that, when its forces invaded Iran in 1980, the Baghdad government failed to communicate clear objectives to its commanders in the field, a failure reflected in the tentativeness of the early advance. The Iran-Iraq border, after all, is one across which Arabs and Persians have feuded throughout much of recorded history. Iraq saw the war in some ways as the latest round in an established routine. Its forces encountered only scattered opposition at first, then retreated to the international border when Iran counterattacked. But even without a plan to vanquish the enemy, the Iraqi government resents any statement that its units suffer from poor leadership and low morale. It defends the army by asking rhetorically how, if its troops are poorly led and demoralized, Iraq has managed through more than five years to beat back all but one of Iran's frenetic attacks.

Iran's single successful offensive occurred in February 1986, when its forces surprised the defenders of the port city of Fao by forcing their way in small boats across the Shatt al-Arab, the waterway that divides the countries at the top of the Persian

Gulf. Iran's first major territorial capture, Fao was a psychological defeat for Iraq. But at the time it fell, Fao had little military significance. It had been abandoned as a port early in the war and was virtually unpopulated. More significant, Iraqis say, is that after giving up Fao, the Iraqi army regrouped and stopped the Iranians in their tracks, denying them the more important objective of Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, about 50 miles upriver. Since then Iraq has kept Fao under siege, bottling up some 30,000 Iranians. The cost to Iraq has been correspondingly greater, however. By staying in Fao, Iran has immobilized some 50,000 Iraqi besiegers, who cannot be deployed to defend against attacks elsewhere.

Western military experts have argued that Iraq, to redress national morale and restore the maneuverability of its forces, must retake Fao. Clearly, some Iraqi generals also want to be more aggressive, but the government has stood firm against taking the offensive. In a society that is secretive by nature, it is difficult to engage officials in on-the-record discussions of strategy. But privately, Iraqi leaders explain that Iraq, at a serious disadvantage in reserves, cannot wage a war that entails inordinate bloodletting. Indeed, the country's Achilles' heel lies in the attrition of its manpower. Iraqis point out that Iran's willingness to trade lives on a one-for-one basis is a bad bargain for them.

When I visited the Fao front in mid-1986, I found the generals more confident, the field-grade officers more vigilant, the soldiers more alert than I had anticipated. My irritation at not starting the tour until eleven o'clock in the morning was tempered by an explanation that the officers routinely remain awake throughout the night to guard against surprise attack. The men saluted smartly as our staff jeep passed through their positions. Sentries holding binoculars watched enemy positions across the Shatt al-Arab from within concrete bunkers or walls of sandbags. The bivouacs were clean and food appeared to be ample. It was clear from the artillery fire which punctuated our discussions that the Iranians holding the Fao salient were allowed little rest.

Asked whether Iraq had plans to take the offensive, the general in command was unambiguous. He said he would not send Iraqi infantry against Iran's fixed defensive positions, even if the invaders remained in Fao for years. Indeed, though the days that preceded my visit had been quiet at the front, the visible signs of Iraqi losses were plentiful. The army sends its

dead home in flag-draped coffins attached to the roofs of taxis, and I passed dozens on the road as my car moved southward from Baghdad. Iraqis acknowledge that Western experts call their strategy timid, but they insist that conserving lives makes good sense to them.

The strategy seems also designed to serve Iraq's political concept of the war. From the start, the government spoke of "measured" war aims. It knows very well that nothing it does will change the fact that Iran is the major power of the Gulf region. Inflicting a humiliation would only mean that, in a decade or so, Iran would come back for revenge. The weakness of Iraq's initial thrust seems to confirm that what it had in mind was, at most, a modest border war. The Iraqi government has never wavered from its claim that it is fighting not to conquer Iran but to defend its territory and its revolution.

Indeed, this is a war which cannot be understood as an ordinary clash of nations. Iraq, irritated at the Iranian meddling within its borders that began when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power, resolved to take a firm stand. It miscalculated by not grasping that its differences with the new regime could not be settled by a frugal exchange of blood on the battlefield followed by conventional negotiations. To Baghdad's surprise, Iran spurned the rules of limited war once the fight started, demanding Iraq's total and unequivocal surrender. Indeed, Iran insisted on turning the war into a showdown within the Islamic world between conflicting concepts of man, between one Weltanschauung and another, between incompatible revolutionary visions. After so many years of fighting, therefore, a negotiated settlement appears increasingly unlikely.

III

Much has been written about the Iranian revolution since Khomeini took power in 1979. An expression of Islamic fundamentalism, it promises its followers little during life, much after death. It is intolerant not only of faiths other than Islam but of forms of Islam less rigorous than its own. Placing the service of God at the center of its universe, it vigorously rejects the man-centered model that both the West and communism have imparted to the contemporary era. Hostile to what is new, it venerates the ways of the Islamic past, most conspicuously the secondary role assigned to women. It rejects Arab nationalism, particularly the concept of a single nation of Arabs, as

well as the local nationalisms of contemporary Arab states, as a diversion from the goal of Islamic supremacy. It is fanatically self-righteous, admitting the validity of no idea or practice that is not sanctioned either by the ayatollah or by the mullahs who surround him.

In contrast, the Baath revolution in Iraq is not familiar to many in the West. Unlike the Iranian revolution, it did not proceed from a dramatic popular uprising. The Baath's victory in 1968, five years after a failure to consolidate its first seizure of power, seemed barely distinguishable from the military coups that had attached to Arab politics the metaphor of the revolving door. Indeed, little seemed to separate Saddam Hussein, sparkplug of the Baath Party and later president, from the ruthless Iraqi generals who had ruled before him. At the time the Baath took control, few outside observers noted that it was a civilian party, with no tanks of its own. More important, unlike earlier military regimes it had a social vision.

The Baath revolution emerged from the thinking of a handful of intellectuals in Damascus and Beirut who in the late 1940s and early 1950s transmitted their doctrine to cells of activists around the Arab world. In Iraq, the Baath Party, organizing in secret, made key converts in the army, and through them seized power bloodlessly. The work of a tiny cadre, its revolution resembled the Bolshevik more than the popular Khomeini revolution. Saddam Hussein, a professional revolutionary, was its Lenin, grasping the machinery of the state by conspiracy, imposing the ideology of the party as the nation's constitution. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude from the absence of mobs in the street that the party's dogma was simply a cover for the crude acquisition of power. Though Baathism was never a mass movement, in ideological terms it represented no less than did Bolshevism revolution in a fundamental sense.

Baathism is Iraq's answer to a search in which all Arab society has been engaged since the fall of the Ottoman Empire early in the twentieth century. It is a search for political forms and intellectual direction that are responsive to the modern world but that do not offend religious and cultural traditions. Egypt's answer after Nasser has been authoritarian democracy, Jordan's an enlightened monarchy. Saudi Arabia's is tribal hegemony within a framework of religious austerity, Kuwait's a guided parliamentarism with a dose of personal freedom. Lebanon has found no answer at all. Syria, like Iraq, proclaims an

allegiance to Baathism, and the two countries, long-standing enemies, argue endlessly over which one practices the purer form. Whoever is right, both are committed to a radical secularization of Arab society. Iraq has proven itself the more serious about the transformation, if only because its commitment has been intensified during six years of war with Iran.

Baathism challenges orthodox Islam by promoting a doctrine that exalts the nation over the mosque, separating for all practical purposes the state from religion. Proclaiming an attachment to Islamic roots and a debt to Islamic tradition, it places no barriers in the way of worship, but neither does it grant a special role to the Islamic clergy or to the Shari'a, the Islamic law. Like Zionism, Baathism speaks of creating a "new" society, freed of the shackles of an oppressive past. It supports education and technology, the emancipation of women, economic development and material prosperity. It renders homage to the concept of Arab unity, but its real focus is on the political and social flowering of Iraq, the nation. The notion of *Islamic* unity, deeply rooted in Arab history, it considers a relic of the past.

Baathism thus departs from orthodox Islam, but does not abandon it, to address the problem of creating a nation out of a deeply divided people. Iraq, despite its brilliant role in Arab history, had ceased to exist under the Turks and, since independence in the 1940s, successive governments faced the dilemma of how to restore a sense of nationhood. Significantly, Baathism's chief ideologue, Michel Aflaq, was not a Muslim at all but a Christian Arab, raised in Syria and educated in Paris on pan-Arab doctrines. A venerated figure, he currently lives in Baghdad and serves, at least honorifically, as secretary-general of the Baath Party. Aflaq's formula for dealing with the Arab world's debilitating divisions was to create a powerful nationalism, built not upon religious conformity but on a genuine tolerance of cultural diversity.

It can be argued that the doctrine was made to order for heterogeneous Iraq. Though Muslims of the orthodox Sunni wing of Islam are politically dominant in the country, the majority of the population is Shia, from the ancient rival sect to which 90 percent of Iran also belongs. Located mostly in the south, the Shi'ites have historically been alienated from the Sunni Muslims of Baghdad. Equally divisive, a quarter of the population are Kurds, a separate ethnic and linguistic people from the Arabs, though Sunni in their religious practice. Con-

centrated in the north, where most of Iraq's oil and gas are located, the Kurds have been perpetually rebellious. What Baathism has offered the Kurds is a certain amount of political autonomy, just as it has offered the Shi'ites the practice of their religious rites without state interference. The price Iraqis pay to the Baath for this religious and cultural tolerance, however, is a rigorous and sometimes brutal suppression of political dissent.

To experience Baathism as a culture, it is necessary to see Baghdad. Look beyond the panels that everywhere display the likeness of Saddam Hussein, bemedaled in uniform or embracing his children, in bedouin headdress or in elegantly tailored Italian suits, atop a stallion or, least convincingly, on his knees in prayer. It is the women who are the index of Baathism. They make their presence felt in the daytime in shops and offices and, in the evening, many come out to stroll. Most wear Western clothes. They walk with men, sometimes hand in hand, along the avenues. They picnic with their families in the parks and dine with them in the fish restaurants on the banks of the Tigris. Some dance with male companions in the cabarets of the major hotels. Their presence gives the city, despite the scarcities and tensions of wartime, a more debonair quality than that of any other Arab capital.

In contrast, the provinces seem immune to Baath teaching. There, the women cover themselves from head to toe in black robes, and many still hide their faces with veils. Even the men wear traditional dress. The ways of Baghdad, the model of the "new" society, have not spread widely to the provincial cities, and even less to the impoverished countryside. If the hinterland is backward as a Westerner sees it, to Khomeini that is its strength. By the standards of Iran's revolution, Baathism has made of Baghdad not a model for the future but a den in which the virtues of Islam have given way to modernist corruption.

IV

Khomeini had a personal exposure to the Baath's "corruption" during 14 years of his life. In 1965, having been expelled from Iran as a troublemaker, he went to live in An Najaf in southern Iraq. An Najaf is one of the holy cities of Shia Islam, Khomeini's sect. With nearby Karbala, it is an object of pilgrimage for Shia Muslims, nearly as important as Mecca itself. During Khomeini's years there, large communities of Iranian Shi'ites lived in both cities, and he was a familiar figure in their

great mosques. He surrounded himself with political followers in An Najaf and, with little interference from the Baath regime, engaged in agitation against the shah's regime in Iran.

In 1975 the Baath attitude toward the shah, long hostile, took a positive turn when the two countries negotiated a treaty resolving a range of political and territorial disputes. Three years later, with revolutionary tremors rising in Iran, the shah asked Baghdad to put an end to Khomeini's political activities and Saddam Hussein agreed. First Iraq placed political limitations on Khomeini, then put him under house arrest and finally ordered him out of the country. With his entourage Khomeini headed by car to Kuwait, only to be turned back at the border. By the time he was taken in by France, any gratitude he may once have felt for Iraqi hospitality had given way to vindictiveness.

In his home outside Paris, shortly before his triumphant return to Iran, Khomeini disclosed to a journalist the names on his personal enemies list. First, he said, came the shah. Next, for the support it had given the shah, came the "American Satan." In third place was "Saddam Hussein and his infidel Baath Party." Though Zionism was Islam's ultimate foe, Khomeini said, he would take aim first at the targets that stood ahead of it.

Khomeini overthrew the shah in January 1979. In November, he humiliated the American Satan by seizing its embassy in Teheran and holding its personnel hostage, ultimately inflicting a fatal political wound on Jimmy Carter, its leader in the White House. After exacting his vengeance on the first two foes on his list, he was ready to turn his attention to the third.

By mid-1979, Khomeini had already rebuffed a series of friendly Iraqi overtures and begun his campaign. Teheran radio barraged Iraq with condemnations of his expulsion the year before. The government organized mass demonstrations demanding Saddam Hussein's death and the establishment in Iraq of an Islamic republic. In November 1979 Iran charged that Iraq was secretly aiding Zionism, a crime of which it had accused the shah, and Iranian officials threatened a march on Baghdad. Before the year was up, armed bands of Iranians had attacked Iraqi consulates and, reenacting the seizure of the American embassy, taken one of them over.

In early 1980 it became clear that Teheran was financing anti-Baath terrorists among Iraq's Shi'ites. The Baath retaliated by expelling dozens of suspect Iranians, some of whom

had spent their lives in Iraq. In great frustration, it put Iraq's leading Shia leader on trial for subversion and executed him. Iran's answer to the execution was to declare a three-day period of national mourning, during which it called on the Iraqi army to desert the Baath and bring down the regime.

Iraq does not deny that it struck the first blow in the war. In September 1980, Baghdad demanded that Iranian troops observe the terms of its 1975 treaty with the shah by withdrawing from a number of border areas. When Iran refused, claiming the new regime was not bound by the shah's word, Iraq abrogated the treaty. On September 22 Iraqi infantry columns crossed the frontier into Iran, while Iraqi bombers struck at Iranian military installations. The rapid Iraqi advance left little doubt as to which of the two sides had been preparing for the war. Nonetheless, the Iraqis claim with some plausibility that their move was a preemptive strike, aimed at denying advantage to a foe that had made clear its resolve to overthrow Iraq's government, whether by invasion or subversion.

Once the contest advanced beyond initial sparring, it became clear that Iraq was outmatched, at least in some ways. In a long war Iraq's inferiority in population was a significant handicap. The proximity of its major cities to the frontier made them easier targets than were Iran's. But more important than demography or geography was the mismatch in revolutionary ideologies. Baathism, unlike Khomeinism, offers the hope of improvements in the people's standard of living. To justify itself, it has to deliver material benefits that are measurable to its beneficiaries. The loss of comfort, riches or life is an erosion of its promise. Baathism, a revolution of this world, had no provision for a long, destructive war.

In contrast, Khomeini's revolution was otherworldly. Its realization is subjective. Abnegation is a reward, death a fulfillment. Since only in some universe beyond can its followers experience the bliss that it offers them, none will ever testify to the truth of its doctrine. While the Baath has to maintain decent living standards and conserve lives, Khomeini has only to persuade his people to believe. His persuasiveness has been manifest in the enthusiasm of his soldiers. It is a military asset that has surpassed in value any weapon that Iraq has been able to put on the battlefield. It has left Iran free to sacrifice both lives and property with abandon.

The different character of these two revolutions gives them different views of the war. For the Baath the war is a waste. It

can be justified only as a defense against an enemy with whom, for thousands of years, Arabs have regularly been in confrontation. On this basis Saddam Hussein rouses his people, invoking Qadisiya, a celebrated battle in A.D. 637 in which the Arabs drove the Persians out of Iraq. He uses the war to forge among Iraqi society's disparate groups a new sense of nationhood, and it is hard to imagine any peacetime policy that would have served as well. Still, even in accepting as inevitable that another round of fighting with the Persians will one day come along, revolutionary Iraq would like to get back to the practical work of nation-building.

That is not to say that Baath nationalism does not contain an expansionist germ. Not only does Baath ideology glorify Arab unity, but within every Iraqi resides the dream of restoring Baghdad's ancient leadership of an Arab empire. Still, in practice, the Baath regime has shown little disposition to extend its power beyond Iraq's borders. It lets its commitment to Arab unity simmer on a low flame, and it has substantially lowered Iraq's profile in the Arab struggle against Israel. Left alone, the Baath says, it is content to carve out a quiet corner in the region, tolerating the diversity of its neighbors. Though the revolution must defend itself, according to the Baath, it does not aspire to total victory.

Khomeini, however, needs the war badly. His revolution, which claims to be mandated by God, contains a universalist imperative which only victory can satisfy. Khomeini cannot contain his mission within the borders of one country. He sees frontiers, being man-made, as artificial barriers. His revolution must cleanse Iran's neighbors of false gods. He rouses his soldiers against Iraq with a call to liberate the sacred cities of An Najaf and Karbala from Baath corruption. To justify God's approval, his movement must spread beyond Iraq to the "heretic" states of the Gulf. He presses his revolution on the Islamic rebels in Afghanistan. His followers have become a dynamic fighting force in Lebanon. He sees his revolution as sweeping through Israel to the Mediterranean and beyond. He has called for a holy war, and should the time come when he is brought to a stop, it will be the sign that God recognizes his legitimacy no longer.

And so the struggle of revolutions goes on. Iraq, to win, needs only to avoid losing, and since 1981 it has grasped at every passing straw in the hope of ending the conflict. Iran, when it is willing to discuss terms at all, has set them much

higher. It demands reparations heavier than Iraq, or nearly any other nation, could pay. It insists on the freedom of Iranian Shi'ites to proselytize among Shi'ites in Iraq. Most audaciously, it stipulates that Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party leadership must go. Sometimes it even says they must be tried as war criminals. These terms add up not to a political settlement but a surrender of the Baath revolution to Khomeini's Islamic vision.

It is no surprise that these terms are unacceptable to the leadership of Iraq's regime. But in view of the regime's oppressive character one must necessarily ask whether the terms are unacceptable to the Iraqi people too. The war is a burden they have endured for more than six years. In the place of the prosperity that was promised them, they have mourned 100,000 sons. Yet, were there serious discontent, would there not also be—even under an oppressive regime—rebellion, strikes, flight from the trenches? Would not the seams of a much-quilted social fabric be pulling conspicuously apart? It is difficult to assess here how much the sense of Iraqi nationalism, Arab identity, support of the revolution or fear of Khomeinism contribute to the popular mood. But the evidence is compelling that the party elite is not isolated in finding Iran's terms unacceptable. It suggests that Iraqis, though they display little of the Iranians' noisy élan, are nonetheless committed to fighting on.

v

"I don't want to lecture your people on their interests, but certainly American strategists understand that stability in this region is important to the United States. Continuation of this war will lead to the region's disintegration."

The speaker was Tariq Aziz, Iraq's foreign minister and deputy prime minister, who talked with me in his office in Baghdad late one evening in mid-1986. Aziz belongs both to the Revolutionary Command Council, the country's highest governing body, and the Regional Command, the party's top echelon. A Christian, he is, like Saddam Hussein, a lifetime Baath revolutionary. In April 1980, not long after Khomeini came to power, he was the target of an assassination attempt by Shi'ites linked to Teheran. Aziz, articulate in English, is often the public spokesman for Iraqi government positions.

"I can tell you that you don't have to worry about us," Aziz said. "We can take care of ourselves. We've been fighting for

six years and all the predictions of our imminent collapse have proven untrue. The question is how long can *Iran*, with or without Khomeini, take it. Iran has jumped from revolution to war, without ever testing its character as a nation. There may be one day when it tries to push its people to the front and they won't go. Iran might disintegrate at any time, upsetting stability throughout the Gulf. The same question, from the other side, is how long can the Gulf take it. This is a very vulnerable region, important to the United States, and it is on the point of exhaustion. Leaving aside whether you care about Iraq, your own interests here require that you do something to stop this war."

Without necessarily sharing Aziz's sanguine view of Iraq's prospects, most American officials, both in Washington and the Gulf, have come to share his concern. Despite the current glut of oil on the market, there is the recognition that the West must have continued access to the region's oil fields. By current calculations they contain 60 percent of the world's reserves. Long after Texas and Alaska, Mexico and the North Sea have run dry, the Gulf will still be pumping oil. Decisive victory or decisive defeat of Iran in the war could cause chaos in the region. Either would create very serious problems for the United States.

After a dozen years of only icy contacts, Washington decided to step up its involvement with Iraq in 1979, when Iran's revolution began emitting ominous waves. Formal relations, broken off by Iraq over America's support of Israel in the Six-Day War, had never been restored. During this period Iraq and the Soviet Union had moved closer to each other, while the United States tied itself more intimately to the Iranian shah. Washington actually encouraged Iran's mischievous promotion of a Kurdish uprising against the Iraqi government. Washington's first serious overture to Baghdad came on the eve of the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Teheran by Iranian students, nine months after Khomeini came to power.

When the Iran-Iraq war broke out a year later, Washington announced that it would maintain a rigorous neutrality. Shortly afterward, however, regular meetings began taking place between high Iraqi and American officials. In 1982 the United States gave the first signs of a "tilt" by extending credits to Iraq—which recently reached a total of \$750 million—to buy American agricultural products. In 1983 Donald Rumsfeld, President Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East, called on

Saddam Hussein in Baghdad and, in the same year, Washington announced that it would seek to persuade its allies to stop all shipments of arms to Iran. In November 1984 the two governments formally resumed diplomatic relations.

The American government, in a statement of its basic policy on the Iran-Iraq war, dated May 1985, says as follows:

We seek an end to the war that will preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. We welcome constructive international diplomatic efforts for a negotiated conclusion. The US remains committed to freedom of access to the gulf, a matter of vital importance to the international community. The US does not permit US arms and munitions to be shipped to either belligerent and has discouraged all free-world arms shipments to Iran because, unlike Iraq, Iran is adamantly opposed to negotiations or a mediated end to the conflict.¹

This statement, which keeps the United States at arm's length from the war, is nonetheless regarded as strongly supportive of the Iraqi position.

Indeed, Washington showed no sign of serious concern about the war until the Iranian breakthrough at Fao last February. Last April, while the battle still raged, Vice President George Bush officially visited the Persian Gulf to show the American flag. He avoided Baghdad, but in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain, states with which the United States has military co-operation agreements, he reiterated an American pledge to keep the Gulf's sea-lanes open. Bush spoke of the "common security objectives" of the United States and the Gulf countries and he pledged support to them to combat aggression, though he was conspicuously vague about the nature of such support. Still, the visit was an assertion that the United States would consider an Iranian victory as contrary to American interests.

Beyond the Iranian factor, moreover, lay the Soviet question. Notwithstanding the Baath's rapprochement with Washington and its relentless persecution of local Communists, the Soviets, still Iraq's chief arms suppliers, remain the preeminent foreign power in Baghdad. Facing a slippage in their own oil production, Moscow has reversed several decades of indifference to Iraq's Gulf neighbors by undertaking a diplomatic offensive. In the past year they initiated formal relations with the United Arab Emirates and Oman, and they are about to open an embassy in Qatar. They have also established commercial con-

¹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Gist": *Iran-Iraq War*, May 1985.

tacts in Saudi Arabia, where they were once totally unwelcome. American diplomats in the Gulf agree that further chaos in the region can help only the Soviet Union. They insist that, though Iran is the immediate threat, the Soviet Union looms more ominously.

Ideally, American interests in the region would be served by a rough triangular balance among Iran, Iraq and the Gulf countries, led by Saudi Arabia. But the Gulf countries would rather buy their defense than fight for it (a joke circulating in the marketplace in Riyadh runs, "The royal family has decided to go to war against Iran, and has given the contract to South Korea"). Their huge wealth makes them a constant temptation to the other two. For the moment, Iraq has muted its historical claims in the region but Iran has not. Even while waging war on Iraq, Khomeini has sought to subvert at least two Gulf regimes, Kuwait and Bahrain, and no one doubts that if he wins the war he will target the entire area next. With negligible military power in the Gulf, the United States, notwithstanding Bush's brave vows, could do little to stop him.

"The understanding we reached with [Secretary of State George] Shultz to limit the flow of arms to Iran is important," Tariq Aziz said. "It affects Iran's ability to carry on the war. Iran doesn't produce arms and equipment. It can continue only if others provide the capability. Much of the equipment comes from China and North Korea, over which the United States has no control. But a flow of arms continues from the West, as well. It is one of our main problems."

Aziz insisted that Israel continued to make important arms deliveries to Iran. As evidence, he pointed to photographs of captured Israeli equipment routinely displayed in the Baghdad newspapers. Then, in November, a prominent Iranian political figure disclosed that former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane had visited Teheran secretly. A story began emerging that the White House, using Israel as a conduit, had indeed been trading arms in return for Iranian help in the release of American hostages in the Middle East. Led by the White House, U.S. officials nevertheless insisted that the embargo of arms to Iran remained in force. The reports of this episode left the Iraqis more puzzled than ever about American intentions.

Aziz also maintained that, despite American pressure, equipment is still getting through to Iran from Britain, West Germany and Japan. Much of it, classified as non-lethal, receives

no American attention, he said, but it is nonetheless important to the Iranian war effort. He particularly cited European trucks that bring troops and supplies to the front and the Japanese boats in which Iran's soldiers made their way through the marshes into Iraqi territory in 1985 and crossed the Shatt al-Arab into Fao last February. Washington officials, asked about Aziz's charges, acknowledged that the United States takes no position with its allies on non-lethal sales. Aziz argued that the damage to Iraq was too serious for a business-as-usual attitude, and urged that the President put his full authority behind an embargo. But he was pessimistic about the prospect that Washington would agree.

"Iraq cannot mobilize Western opinion," Aziz said, "because the war is not related to the East-West conflict. We are a Third World country without patrons. We are new in the American arena, furthermore, and we face a prejudice against Arabs which the Israelis have been playing on for years. I think we've convinced the United States now that Iraq wants peace. That's progress. But no one cares. Bush made some good statements during his visit here. But when the shah's regime disintegrated, the American fleet that was in the Gulf and Indian Ocean could do nothing to save it. And when the embassy in Teheran was taken the U.S. could do nothing. Talk is not enough to safeguard Western interests in this region."

Iraqis believe the United States, particularly if it were willing to work with the Soviet Union, could somehow put an end to the war. In part, this belief emerges from a mentality, common in former colonial countries, which holds that great powers can somehow do anything they choose. The Iraqis say that, together, Washington and Moscow can crush Iran's capacity to wage war. They do not believe Americans—or, perhaps, Russians either—who tell them that Iran operates in a sphere that is beyond their influence. They say the United States does not care about the Iran-Iraq war.

In fact, officials in the State Department and the Pentagon have reached the point where they care a great deal. Declining to be quoted, they acknowledge in interviews that domestic political conditions permit them to say little publicly about the war, and to do even less. Neither Congress nor the executive branch, they say, is willing to face the implications of a dramatic change in circumstances in the Gulf. The McFarlane episode, with its allegations of arms sales to Iran, suggests strongly, furthermore, that the White House has on its agenda items

that carry a higher priority than ending the Iran-Iraq war. Detestable as Americans find Khomeini, the public has not developed positive feelings for Iraq, which is still largely dismissed as an oppressive regime and an enemy of Israel. When asked how Washington would respond if Iranian forces crashed through Iraqi lines and headed for Baghdad, these officials shrug and reply that the United States takes the position that such an event is unlikely.

In both the State Department and the Pentagon, officials admit the United States has no contingency plans for thwarting a Khomeini victory. Conceding the seriousness of the threat, they say the problem has been discussed at middle levels of the bureaucracy but that the secretaries of state and defense have not been willing to place serious policy proposals before the President. Within the past year, Congress has thwarted pledges the President made—though he conspicuously failed to champion them—to sell arms to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. His defeats are evidence enough that the Arabs are an unpopular political cause. “I wouldn’t want to be the guy who had to go before a congressional committee and defend an American bail-out of Iraq,” one high official wryly remarked to me. Regretfully, officials in both the State and Defense Departments said Americans have not yet grasped what is at stake, confirming the belief conventionally held throughout the Gulf that Americans are indifferent to what happens in the Iran-Iraq war.

Joshua Muravchik

THE NICARAGUA DEBATE

After five grueling debates within the compass of five months in 1986, the U.S. Congress agreed to President Reagan's request for military aid for the rebels fighting Nicaragua's Sandinista government. Whatever this decision may herald for Nicaragua, for the United States it signals a further loosening of the constraints that have bound U.S. policy since the trauma of Vietnam. And by sanctioning, at least for the moment, the "Reagan Doctrine," it constitutes a step, albeit a small and reversible one, in America's continuing search for a global strategy to replace the one—containment—that was shattered in Vietnam.

To win this victory the President had to overcome misgivings about the conduct of the rebels and the CIA, skepticism about the rebels' prospects, anxiety about the Reagan Doctrine, and public opinion polls showing that most Americans opposed his policies. He won nonetheless by taking advantage of the considerable persuasive powers inherent in his office, and by making good use of the assistance proffered by a minority of Democrats, including some legislators and some activists, who split with their party's leadership. Above all he won because, when the debate was done, his opponents had failed to offer a compelling alternative policy for dealing with Nicaragua. Nor had they offered, on a global scale, an alternative to the Reagan Doctrine. Fear of "another Vietnam" was their most potent argument, but that fear, however justified and however widely shared, could not in itself generate a policy.

II

A new Congress will have to consider aid to the "contras," as the rebels are called, again in 1987. Despite the boasts of some rebel spokesmen, a year will not be nearly enough time, nor \$100 million enough money, to bring the Sandinistas down. And in 1987 the President's party will control neither house. Yet, barring some egregious act on the part of the rebels

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or some violation of trust on the part of U.S. officials, it is not likely that Congress will choose to reverse direction soon.

Despite the loss of a few seats, the President's cushion of support in the House may be somewhat deeper than indicated by the 12-vote margin by which rebel aid passed in 1986. A couple dozen moderate-to-conservative legislators, mostly Democrats, led by Representative Dave McCurdy (D-Okla.), sought to stake out a middle ground, which would have allowed nonmilitary aid to go forward while putting military aid off for a later vote if further attempts at negotiation proved fruitless. When the House Democratic leadership sensed that victory on the issue lay within the President's grasp, it threw its support behind McCurdy's compromise, over the objections of some liberals. The President's legislative triumph thus came on a vote that pitted his position against McCurdy's. But the McCurdy group harbors considerable sympathy for the rebels' cause (McCurdy was instrumental in negotiating the 1985 compromise providing \$27 million in "humanitarian" aid to the rebels) and might in the future provide additional votes for continuing aid.

The President's position enjoys no similar cushion in the Senate, which in Democratic hands may cause him more difficulty over Nicaragua than the House. Senator Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), a strong opponent of rebel aid, will become chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. But this will be offset by changes in the Select Committee on Intelligence, where two supporters of aid, Senators David Boren (D-Okla.) and William Cohen (R-Me.), will succeed two opponents, Senators David Durenberger (R-Minn.) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), as chairman and vice-chairman. Although the new Senate will have eight more Democrats, several of them have voiced support for rebel aid. Thus the Administration will have both the need and the opportunity to build upon the lessons in bipartisanship it learned in eking out its previous victories on the Nicaragua issue.

In seeking further aid, the President will be able to argue that reversing course would be a dangerous display of inconsistency. It took America years of pulling and hauling to decide to give the rebels military aid openly and in sufficient quantity to expand their forces significantly. To turn around a year later and cut them off would be a demonstration of fickleness that would worry our friends and tempt our foes in the region and perhaps beyond. Carried to an absurd extreme this argu-

ment could justify perseverance in any wrong course, but that is only to say that constancy cannot be the *sole* value guiding U.S. policy. Enough swing legislators, however, are bound to agree that it is one important value that Congress is likely to allow the President's policy to play out at least for a while.

III

The President's success climaxed a four-year struggle within the House, which had opposed military aid to the rebels almost from the program's inception. When the issue first came before that body in 1982, it adopted, by unanimous vote, the Boland Amendment, which barred aid to the rebels for any purpose other than interdiction of the flow of supplies from the Nicaraguan government to the communist guerrillas in El Salvador. This narrow scope was accepted by the Reagan Administration in order to forestall a complete ban on aid to the rebels, proposed by Representative (now Senator) Tom Harkin (D-Iowa). Perhaps, too, the Administration recognized more quickly than some of its opponents what an ambiguous thing interdiction could be under these circumstances.

The United States might give the Nicaraguan rebels arms for the purpose of defending El Salvador, but would they use them to fight for El Salvador rather than for Nicaragua? This question was just the beginning of the ambiguity. Nicaragua and El Salvador are not contiguous. Overland shipments from one country to the other must pass through Honduras. Conceivably the Nicaraguan rebels could aid the Honduran army in disrupting these routes. A more direct route for matériel, however, is not through Honduras at all, but across (or over) the Gulf of Fonseca. The Gulf of Fonseca borders Nicaragua to the west, while the Nicaraguan rebels operate only in the north, south and east of their country. How, exactly, could they interdict this route? The answer is that the rebels cannot directly block Sandinista aid to the Salvador guerrillas; what they can do is to provide generalized military pressure that might convince the Sandinistas to stop meddling in other countries. But how clear is the line that separates a war designed to bring such pressure from one designed to overthrow the Sandinistas outright?

The Administration was able to exploit these ambiguities in the rubric of interdiction, but whether this benefited its policy in the long run is debatable. Given America's reluctance, ever since Vietnam, to embroil itself in violence in the Third World,

even in defense of friendly governments, it is no easy task for the Administration to win support for the far more aggressive posture of raising an insurrection against an unfriendly government. Perhaps the program could only have been put across by gradually enlarging its stated objectives, rather than by confronting the public and Congress all at once with the idea of seeking to overthrow the Sandinistas. But by thus finessing the issue at the outset, the Administration sacrificed its ability to make a clear argument for the moral and strategic benefits of the policy it was pursuing and gave the impression that its policy was either uncertain or duplicitous.

By 1983 the House had had enough of such ambiguity and, led by Representative Edward Boland (D-Mass.), voted, by a 33-vote margin, to ban any aid to the Nicaraguan rebels. But the Senate that year approved continuation of the program, and in conference the two houses agreed on a compromise allocating \$24 million for the rebels, roughly half of what the Senate bill would have allowed. More important, the legislators' compromise measure barred the executive branch from spending any discretionary funds to continue the program after the \$24 million ran out unless it first secured congressional approval, something not ordinarily required for covert action programs.

When the President sought such approval in 1984, the House denied it, voting this time by a 64-vote margin against any support for the rebels. And this time it insisted on its position in conference with the Senate, thus shutting off the flow of aid. Although the Senate had again approved aid to the rebels in 1984, the President's strength on the issue had diminished in that body as well. Revelations that year about the CIA's role in mining Nicaragua's harbors and in publishing an instruction manual for the guerrillas that seemed to recommend practices against U.S. law and conscience had soured relations between the agency and the Senate Intelligence Committee, which felt that the agency had failed to keep it properly informed.

Given this outcome, and the fact that congressional momentum was clearly flowing against the Administration, a less ideologically engaged president might well have given up the fight at this point. But instead President Reagan encouraged private and foreign sources to help keep the rebel movement in operation. Buoyed by his own strong reelection victory and by the apparent gains of the rebels in the months following the

cessation of U.S. assistance, he renewed his request to Congress in 1985.

An initial House vote showed that opposition to his program was undiminished: a 68-vote majority rejected military aid for the rebels. In response, the President redesigned his proposal to make it more palatable. He kept the dollar figures low (\$14 million), limited the aid request temporarily to nonlethal equipment (thus the designation "humanitarian"), and linked it to a new attempt to stimulate negotiations between the Nicaraguan government and the rebels. These changes, especially the shift from military to nonlethal aid, made a big difference in the House, but not quite big enough. The package was defeated in late April 1985 by just two votes.

Almost at once, however, two events caused the House to have second thoughts. The most widely reported event was external—Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's much publicized visit to Moscow. This undercut a chief argument of the Administration's opponents—that U.S. aid to the rebels was itself the factor driving the Sandinistas into the arms of Moscow. Ortega's move suggested that Managua's ties to the U.S.S.R. were rooted in its own predilections, not in U.S. actions. And he seemed to be almost contemptuous of the Congress.

The second event was internal to the House, but it was no less important. The President's proposal had been defeated in favor of an amendment offered by Michael Barnes (D-Md.), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, and Intelligence Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.). The Barnes-Hamilton Amendment provided funds for Nicaraguan refugees, notably to resettle contra fighters and their families, and to underwrite the Contadora negotiations. Its authors presented it as a peaceful vehicle for achieving the same goals that the President sought through martial means. But no sooner was the President's proposal defeated than about 100 Democratic representatives reversed themselves and voted against Barnes-Hamilton on final passage, joining with Republicans to send it to overwhelming defeat.

For these Democrats, Barnes-Hamilton had been little more than a device with which to defeat the Administration's approach. *The Washington Post* explained that it had been "designed in part to provide cover for [Democratic] party members who not only oppose Reagan's program of arming and aiding the rebels but also do not like Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista

government and did not want to be blamed for aiding it." And *The New York Times* cited one typical vote-switcher as explaining that "many Democrats had voted for the earlier proposal because they wanted 'to vote for something' and protect themselves politically. But they voted against the final bill because they were afraid of what legislation would emerge from a conference with the Senate."

For a considerable number of middle-of-the-road legislators who had supported Barnes-Hamilton (including a dozen or so of the more liberal Republicans and a few score of the more conservative Democrats), this reversal was disconcerting. They were uneasy about blocking the President's program without having something to put in its place. Although polls repeatedly showed that large majorities of the American electorate opposed aid to the Nicaraguan rebels (just as they had opposed the increases in aid to the Salvadoran government that President Reagan had fought to wrest from Congress in earlier years), the polls also recorded widespread apprehension about the rise of communism in Central America.¹ The same electorate that invariably tells pollsters that it favors increases in government services and decreases in taxation now was telling them that it was anxious to stop communism in our hemisphere but reluctant to go to much trouble or accept many risks in order to do so. Moderate Democrats in Congress grew fearful that defeating the President's program—unpopular as it seemed—without offering any genuine alternative would leave them open to blame for whatever troubling developments might unfold in the region.

Moreover, the liberals' volte-face belied their protestations that they sought the same goals as the President but by different means. Barnes-Hamilton, as was revealed in the glare of its defeat, was only a cosmetic alternative. The Contadora process was stalled, after all, over substantive issues, not lack of funds, and resettling Nicaraguan rebels as refugees was a fine humanitarian gesture, but no answer to the problems President Reagan said the Sandinistas posed. Not all legislators agreed with his assessment, but those who did were impelled to consider afresh what realistic alternatives to his policies might exist. As

¹ An April 1986 CBS/*New York Times* poll was typical. A better than 2-to-1 majority opposed President Reagan's request for military aid to the rebels, but a 5-to-3 majority said they agreed that "it's important to the security of the United States to eliminate communism from Latin America."

a result, an alliance of conservative and middle-of-the-road representatives coalesced behind a compromise of their own that came closer to the President's position than to Barnes-Hamilton and that passed by margins of 36 votes and more on a series of votes. This measure provided \$27 million in nonlethal "humanitarian" aid to the rebels in FY 1986, but barred the CIA and Defense Department from any part in disbursing it. This set the stage for a renewed legislative battle in 1986 over the more controversial question of renewing direct military aid to the rebels.

IV

The five-stage battle over rebel aid in 1986 was characterized by numerous supporters and opponents alike as a "historic" debate. And, indeed, it may well prove to be the most important foreign policy debate that Congress has undertaken, save perhaps some on arms control and strategic nuclear weapons, since the battle over U.S. policy toward Indochina in the first half of the 1970s. No issue since then has posed such fundamental questions about the purposes and methods of U.S. foreign policy. What is at stake, as Representative James Shannon (D-Mass.) noted during the 1984 debate, "is not what we think about the Nicaraguans, but rather what we think about the United States and the role that we are going to play in the world."

In March 1986, the House defeated the President's request for \$100 million in mostly military aid by 12 votes. A week later the Senate approved his proposal by a vote of 53 to 47. The next month Administration supporters in the House failed in an effort to resurrect the Administration's proposal. But in June they prevailed, this time winning by 12 votes, as a handful of key Democrats changed their positions and a few stray Republicans returned to the party fold. Then in August the Senate, again by 53 to 47, adopted a measure corresponding to that approved by the House. In addition to providing \$70 million in military and \$30 million in nonlethal aid, these measures repealed the prohibition on CIA and Defense Department collaboration with the rebels.

To listen to or read these five debates over Nicaragua on the floor of the House and Senate was to observe the clash of two paradigms. On one side was the paradigm that dominated U.S. discussion of foreign policy throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s, which viewed the struggle with and contain-

ment of communism as the *sine qua non* of U.S. policy. This approach was best captured in President John F. Kennedy's oft-repeated declaration that the United States would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty." On the other side was the paradigm that dominated foreign policy debate from the late 1960s through the 1970s. It was most succinctly expressed in the phrase "no more Vietnams."

To be sure, there was much sound and fury over other issues. Supporters and opponents of the Administration traded atrocity stories, one side focusing on the cruelties of the Sandinistas, the other on those of the contras. There was no doubt some truth and some exaggeration on both sides, but how much of each was hard to tell given the remoteness of the areas where the rebels operate, the secrecy in which the activities of Nicaraguan state security forces are shrouded, and the partisan commitments of most of the sources of the charges and countercharges.

However intrinsically important these issues are in a humanitarian sense, it is doubtful they made any difference in the voting. There was probably not a single hawkish legislator who turned against the rebels because of their alleged abuses, and probably not a single dovish one who turned in their favor because of those alleged against the Sandinistas.

Much the same can be said about some of the other issues raised, such as the Administration's charges that the Sandinistas engaged in drug smuggling or its opponents' claims that the rebels had misspent earlier U.S. funds. Whatever the truth of such charges, they were debating points and changed few, if any, minds.

Both sides engaged in question-begging arguments as well. The Administration warned of a flood of refugees at our borders if communism swept over Central America, but if communism did sweep over the region, refugees might be the least of our problems. On the other side, it was often argued, for example as Senator Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.) put it, that "it will be far less expensive to eliminate those causes which brought communism into our hemisphere" than to aid the rebels. But poverty and injustice are not so quickly and easily eliminated, and what is to be done about Sandinista militarization and subversion in the meantime?

The opponents pointed out that a majority of the rebels' high command were former members of Somoza's National

Guard. The Administration replied that the three top political leaders of the rebel movement had been active against Somoza. The opponents countered that this paralleled the situation in El Salvador where an alliance of some democratic political leaders with the communist guerrillas was viewed by the Administration as a mere figleaf. But supporters of the Administration objected to this analogy, arguing that in contrast to the clear ideological commitments of the Salvadoran guerrillas, the former guardsmen among the Nicaraguan rebels had been soldiers not politicians.

A stronger argument advanced by opponents of the aid was that the Administration had often, over four years, changed its description of its goals in Nicaragua. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton complained: "The rationale has shifted from the need to interdict alleged arms shipments to El Salvador, to pressuring the Sandinistas to hold elections, to giving the contras a bargaining chip in dealing with the Sandinistas, to forcing the Sandinistas to restructure their government, to forcing the Sandinistas to negotiate with the contras." Though this account was somewhat embellished, Hamilton's essential point was true.

The primary argument, from the Administration's side, was that the Sandinistas were turning Nicaragua into a communist state closely tied to Cuba and the Soviet Union. If not stopped, the Sandinistas would subject the Nicaraguan people to all of the miseries of totalitarianism and turn Nicaragua into a base for fostering communist movements throughout the region and the hemisphere, as well as for the Soviet Union's own military forces. Nothing short of force was likely to stop them, and it would be better if that force were exerted by Nicaraguan fighters than by Americans. All of this was somewhat obscured by the Administration's repeated insistence that it hoped to compel the Sandinistas to change course, but few within the Administration or without it actually seemed to believe that the Sandinistas could be stopped except by their ouster.

The Administration's opponents effectively criticized this ambiguity, but this was still a secondary point. Their primary argument was that the President's policies would lead the nation into "another Vietnam." Again and again on the floor of the House and Senate the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was invoked, and dozens of legislators spoke of the parallels they saw between U.S. involvement in Indochina and the course the

President was steering on Central America. As Speaker of the House Thomas O'Neill (D-Mass.) succinctly put it: "The shadows of Vietnam haven't left us."

The argument came in different variants. The simplest was O'Neill's refrain that the President would not be "happy" until Americans were fighting in Nicaragua. A more sophisticated argument was put by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), among others: "The President's claim that U.S. combat troops will not become involved in Nicaragua is inconsistent with his description of what is at stake." The point was telling, but it did not necessarily lead to the conclusion Kennedy had in mind—that the threat was exaggerated. The President's estimate of the stakes was either right or wrong. It could be challenged on empirical or analytical grounds, but it could not logically be challenged on the grounds of its consequences. Indeed, if it were right, then Kennedy's argument meant that the President ought more actively to consider using American troops.

The most compelling variant of the "no more Vietnams" argument held that by backing the rebels the United States was investing its prestige in their battle and building a moral obligation to them. It was also exacerbating Nicaragua's relations with its neighbors. Even though the President might be quite sincere in his protestations that he had no intention to involve Americans in the fighting, circumstances could easily arise in which the United States might feel impelled to rescue the rebels, or rescue Honduras, or rescue American prestige.

Although the President and most of his men, notably excepting Secretary of State George Shultz, rejected this argument outright, their denials rang hollow. In fact, the argument was irrefutable, and the Administration had only one effective answer to it: failure to back the rebels now would make it more likely that the United States itself would have to confront the Sandinistas at some later point. This point was apparently convincing enough to neutralize some of the impact of the Vietnam analogy.

In reality, no one can foresee which course—aiding the rebels further or dissociating from them—is more likely to lead to direct U.S. engagement. There is no denying, though, the truth of the critics' charge that President Reagan's policy contains at least the possibility of such an outcome.

Should this possibility be allowed to paralyze U.S. policy? Two years ago, the same warnings were raised, just as vociferously and often by the same voices, about President Reagan's military aid program for El Salvador. Representative Thomas Downey (D-N.Y.) called the 1984 Broomfield Amendment that increased military aid to El Salvador "the modern Gulf of Tonkin resolution." And Senator Patrick Leahy declared that year: "American troops will be used in El Salvador. . . . It's inexorable." It seems clear now that they were wrong. And with the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear too that had military aid been denied El Salvador, as the majority of congressional liberals urged, the United States might well have been drawn into conflict, either to stave off a communist victory in El Salvador, or in response to other events in the region that such a victory might have precipitated. It should be added that the apparent success of U.S. policy in El Salvador owes something as well to congressional pressures that compelled the Administration to press harder for human rights reforms there.

The Nicaraguan situation, moreover, is even less like Vietnam than was El Salvador. In El Salvador, as in Vietnam, the United States was supporting a rather ineffective army against a growing insurgency. In Nicaragua, in contrast, we support the insurgents. And Nicaragua is unlike Vietnam in other important ways; for one thing it is much smaller. Americans tend to think of Vietnam as a small country. It is not. Its total population, north and south, is larger than that of France or England. Nicaragua, in contrast, is a genuinely small country, one-twentieth the size of Vietnam in population. Second, in relation to Nicaragua, the logistical situations of the United States and its adversaries are reversed. In Vietnam, the United States had to reach around the globe to supply its forces and its allies, while the Soviets and the Chinese had, in comparison, short and easy access. In Nicaragua, we have easy reach, while the Soviets have great distances to travel. More important, the battlefields of Indochina lay in the shadow of China's vast People's Liberation Army, which America was loath to confront. Therefore, U.S. planning was constrained by the imperative of avoiding actions that threatened to draw China into the war. One consequence was the decision to avoid carrying the ground war to the north. In contrast, Central America lies in the shadow of the United States, and this constrains what

the Sandinistas and their Soviet and Cuban allies can do, for example, in regard to rebel sanctuaries in Honduras.

In the case of Nicaragua, as with El Salvador, the “no more Vietnams” argument is strictly negative and offers little guidance for U.S. policy. The 1985 reversal on the Barnes-Hamilton Amendment was, in this sense, an epiphany. “Another Vietnam” is certainly something to be avoided, but the question is how to do it. The Administration has tried to turn the Vietnam argument around by saying that U.S. military involvement in Nicaragua will result not from giving the rebels aid but from failure to aid them. Administration opponents tacitly concede the plausibility of this when they argue, as many do, even including such outstanding doves as Senator Pell, that they can envision circumstances in which they would favor using American military force against the Sandinistas. Of course, Pell and those of a similar view believe that the President’s policies are far more likely to lead to direct military intervention, but their point serves to acknowledge that no sure formula exists for avoiding “another Vietnam” in Nicaragua. Thus this line of argument against the Administration’s policy loses much of its force unless it is coupled with the presentation of a compelling alternative policy.

VI

The most serious alternative has been articulated by Representative Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), among others. Solarz urges a policy that distinguishes between what he calls “security” issues—the size of Nicaragua’s armed forces, the presence of Soviet-bloc forces or bases, and subversion of Nicaragua’s neighbors—and what he calls “political” issues—democratization and civil liberties within Nicaragua. While insisting on his concern for the Nicaraguan people, he argues that Nicaragua’s domestic conditions are not realistically negotiable because the Sandinistas will not agree to relinquish or share power. But, he argues, the Sandinistas might well agree to satisfy the United States on the security issues in exchange for an end to U.S. aid to the rebels.

Such an agreement would, however, not be easy to enforce. Once the rebel movement is choked off, there will be no resurrecting it. Instead, as most who have argued for this kind of agreement acknowledge, it will only be enforceable by use of American military might. But to use U.S. military force for such purposes is to rely on a blunt instrument. Will we invade

Nicaragua if it violates the treaty? Will we send warships to bombard its coast? Even "surgical" air strikes, as the U.S. raid in Libya reminded us, inevitably also inflict civilian casualties. No administration will want to take such action without hard intelligence, and hard intelligence may be difficult to come by.

In addition, public disclosure of intelligence information to justify retaliatory measures (or its use in a private diplomatic protest to the offending party) risks the destruction of the source, as for example is reported to have happened when the Administration, in justifying its attack on Libya, revealed its interception of communications between Tripoli and Libyan embassies abroad. In short, the U.S. government would face recurring dilemmas over whether to risk using military force in response to violations that could not be proven, or to risk ignoring violations that, though unprovable, might well be real and damaging.

Perhaps some kind of verification system could be developed as part of a treaty, involving teams of on-the-ground observers, but the Contadora process has foundered in part over Managua's footdragging on all of the verification issues. And even if Managua were more forthcoming, the practical obstacles are enormous. Nicaragua's border with Honduras runs for 600 miles of rugged, densely foliated wilderness, and the quantity of personnel and matériel that would have to cross it to service guerrilla forces in Honduras or El Salvador is not that great.

These problems led the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America to reject the Solarz approach, on the grounds that the "political" and "security" issues could not be decoupled. It argued in its report:

Because of its secretive nature, the existence of a political order on the Cuban model in Nicaragua would pose major difficulties in negotiating, implementing, and verifying any Sandinista commitment to refrain from supporting insurgency and subversion in other countries. In this sense, the development of an open political system in Nicaragua, with a free press and an active opposition, would provide an important security guarantee for the other countries of the region and would be a key element in any negotiated settlement.²

In this judgment the commission was expressing its concur-

² *Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America*, Washington: G.P.O., January 1984, p. 114.

rence with the unanimous opinion of Nicaragua's Central American neighbors. These four countries have insisted in the Contadora negotiations that the issue of democratization not be separated from security issues, and that it be buttressed with guarantees no less firm than those on security issues. As the Costa Rican response to the most recent Contadora draft put it: "peace is not valid unless it is based on democracy."

Moreover, the kind of deal that Solarz proposes is precisely what then Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders traveled to Nicaragua to offer the Sandinistas in 1981, which they turned aside. Solarz argues that events since 1981, notably the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the rise of the contra movement, may have softened up the Sandinistas, making them more willing to compromise now. But if so, this is an argument for, and not against, sustaining the rebels. If military pressure by the United States and the rebels has made the Sandinistas ready to accept the compromise they once scorned, does it make any sense to withdraw this pressure at the outset of the long negotiating process that would inevitably be required to translate this deal into an enforceable treaty?

While the Administration argues that the kind of settlement Solarz envisions is unrealistic, he and many of his colleagues say the same about the kind of military solution the rebels seek. "Virtually everybody agrees that with or without American assistance, there is no way the contras [can] overthrow the Sandinistas," he says. But it is hard to see the grounds for such certainty. An insurgency of these proportions against an indigenous communist government is without precedent. The Sandinistas had merely a few thousand men under arms by the time they marched into Managua in July 1979, but they reached even that number only by virtue of snowballing recruitment during the preceding months as the tide of history seemed to be flowing their way. Humberto Ortega, the Sandinistas' chief military commander, revealed in a 1980 interview in the Cuban newspaper *Granma* that the Sandinistas threw 150 men into their penultimate national offensive in September 1978, just ten months before they seized power. That was almost surely the bulk of their available forces. Yet they had been in the field for 17 years! Today's rebels have been at it for five years and have one hundred times as many men. Who is to say what strength they might (or might not) have in ten months, or a few years?

Many of those who rose in Congress to warn of "another Vietnam" in Nicaragua also were alarmed about consecrating the global policy of which the President's Nicaragua program was a part. The Reagan Doctrine, they feared, contained the danger of dragging America into "Vietnams" many times over. Often they voiced objection in principle to U.S. support for the overthrow of a sitting government or of one with which the United States has diplomatic relations. But this is probably not the real issue. No congressional voices were raised in protest against the logistical support that U.S. agencies were reported to have given to the rebellious soldiers and officers who toppled Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, with whom we had diplomatic relations and more.

What seems more likely to have been on their minds is that any attempt to overthrow a communist government is sure to entail a long and bitter struggle and to engage the interests of our superpower adversary, while helping to topple the likes of Marcos could be done relatively quickly and painlessly. Once again, the motivation seems to be to avoid "more Vietnams." But this goal is no more adequate a guide for U.S. policy on a global scale than for policy toward Nicaragua.

What, after all, is meant by "no more Vietnams"? If it means no more wars, then it expresses a wish widely shared, but beyond the power of any policy to assure, for a nation may always be subjected to war by others. If it means no more losing wars, then, too, it is a wish widely shared that cannot be assured. Perhaps its meaning is best expressed in a phrase recently coined by *New York Times* columnist Tom Wicker: Nicaragua is like Vietnam, he wrote, because it is a "policy war." By this he apparently means a war not imposed on the United States by a direct attack upon our territory or that of allies to whom we have defense obligations, but fought for political objectives or to stave off some danger that seems less than clear and present. In other words, a war of the type Chamberlain and Daladier averted at Munich.

In the aftermath of World War II, Western publics concurred in the painful conclusion that the failure to take up arms against dangers that had seemed distant had led directly to the necessity to confront them on their own shores. For some this bitter lesson was all but canceled by the experience of Vietnam. Not that the policy of appeasement was resur-

rected. But a new theory was raised that held that the use of force had lost much of its efficacy in the contemporary world. Armed with this conviction—or perhaps disarmed by it—the Carter Administration attempted to pursue a foreign policy of which one chief principle was the avoidance of “policy wars.” But within four years that policy had been rocked by such severe setbacks that the President felt compelled to proclaim a new “doctrine” embracing sweeping U.S. commitments to the defense of the Persian Gulf and thus threatening to involve the nation in “policy wars” larger and more dangerous than any before.

But if the lessons of World War II ought not to be quickly discarded, what is to be learned from America’s harrowing experience in Vietnam? What Vietnam proved was that the policy of containment—the first expression of our mastery of the lessons of World War II—was flawed. Resisting communist expansion in a strictly defensive way and wherever it might threaten was ultimately beyond our means, or at least beyond our will.

We have yet to find a satisfactory policy to supplant containment. During the Kissinger years, the United States turned to *détente*, hoping to create a “vested interest in mutual restraint” and thereby restrain communist expansion with less call upon American force. It is a moot point whether *détente* would have worked out better had the public and Congress given fuller support to all of its components and the presidency not been paralyzed by Watergate. But from the outset the Soviets asserted their determination to continue supporting “liberation” struggles, that is, to continue to try to expand communism’s domain by force. Thus, at best, *détente* alone could not have been an adequate substitute for containment.

After Kissinger’s version President Carter tried his own more conciliatory version of *détente*, aiming, as he put it, to meet “the great challenge . . . to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that our good will is as great as our strength until, despite all the obstacles, our two nations can achieve new attitudes and new trust.” But he himself recognized after the invasion of Afghanistan that this approach severely misconstrued Soviet motivations.

With the failure of *détente*, in either the Kissinger or Carter variants, the United States repaired, in fact if not in doctrine, to what some call “selective containment”: resisting the advance of communism where we feel we can, where it seems

important, where we are obliged by treaty to do so. This approach has severe shortcomings. If we declare in advance the perimeter within which we are determined to resist communism, then we virtually invite mischief everywhere else, as may have been the case in Kórea in 1950. Leaving the issue vague, on the other hand, creates uncertainties not only in the minds of our adversaries but in those of our allies and ourselves as well. Either way, selective containment means that if the Soviets or their proxies press in the right places they will meet little resistance from us, and that the Third World will hold lots of such places.

These shortcomings may be inescapable, but there is one obvious way in which this policy can be strengthened. That is by what is now called the Reagan Doctrine, to wit, lending support to forces seeking to oust communist governments at the periphery of the Soviet empire. Indeed, the Reagan Doctrine is a natural if not inescapable concomitant to "selective containment." If global containment is impossible, as Vietnam taught us, because we cannot match our adversaries at every point of their choosing, we can compensate by choosing some points of engagement ourselves, points that seem favorable to us and where their assets can be put in question rather than ours. In the process, if a communist government is successfully ousted anywhere, we will reap the added benefit of undercutting communism's claim to represent the tide of history.

If we must discard containment's ambition to resist everywhere, then we must also discard its constraint of resisting only defensively. When the policy of containment was first formulated, some conservatives, such as James Burnham, protested against its purely defensive approach. But at that time the Soviet empire rested entirely in Eastern Europe, and to seek to "roll it back" meant to risk directly a new general war. Today, the Soviet empire stretches far from its borders and can be attacked at its fringes without similar peril.

Without the Reagan Doctrine, selective containment is a policy without promise. Thus as long as the Soviet Union continues to foster the rise of communist governments wherever on the globe it can, there really is no alternative to it. That was the essential truth that the Congress encountered in 1986 as it wrestled with our policy toward Nicaragua.

Violeta Barrios de Chamorro

THE DEATH OF LA PRENSA

On June 26, 1986, in a note just two lines long, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua notified me that our newspaper, *El Diario La Prensa*, was closed down indefinitely.

With this action, Nicaraguan authorities institutionalized the state's contempt for freedom of thought, speech, private property, religion and all norms of democratic government. *La Prensa* had already experienced four consecutive years of brutal censorship, in which 80 percent of the material submitted for publication was suppressed every day by order of the Sandinista military censors.

I tell of this, not as a long complaint of melancholy, but rather as testimony for all democracies to take notice.

II

The case of *La Prensa* is evidence of the worst sort of tyranny of our time, hidden by the workings of a Sandinista propaganda network that deceives many people of goodwill in the United States and throughout the world. The extensive and suffocating daily censorship of the press is sometimes excused by world public opinion as a logical consequence, given Nicaragua's state of war. These justifications are unfair to the Nicaraguan people, who are thereby denied their right to be informed.

The excesses of the censorship department at the Ministry of the Interior have not been clearly recognized. They are measures aimed not at national security, but at the systematic destruction of an independent newspaper such as ours, and of Nicaraguan freedoms.

At root there always has been a determination on the part of the Sandinista commanders to impose total dictatorship and prevent the most minimal expression of free thought. Just like General Anastasio Somoza, who despised anyone who contradicted him, the Sandinistas cannot tolerate a dissenting voice or the expression of a contrary political idea.

Violeta Barrios de Chamorro is co-owner and publisher of *La Prensa*. In 1979 she was a member of the Revolutionary Junta of the provisional Government of National Reconstruction, from which she resigned in 1980.

No one is indifferent to the tragedy in Central America or to Sandinista repression, but I am concerned that Nicaragua's case has been viewed outside our country through two prisms which ultimately distort the reasons behind our struggle for a free press.

Some assert that we oppose the Sandinista regime because we want to return to Somocism. Others say we oppose the Sandinistas because we support the declared policy of the President of the United States against the Sandinista regime. But the foreign policy of the Reagan Administration is obviously concerned with its own national security interests, and Nicaraguan opinion does not count for much in the decisions made in Washington.

No one can suppose that we of *La Prensa* are nostalgic for the Somoza period, when we struggled with our lives to defeat the Somoza dictatorship. My late husband and editor of *La Prensa*, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, was one who gave his life for this cause, in January 1978. Since the time of the Somoza dictatorship, when *La Prensa* opposed that government's policies, our only aspiration has been to achieve democracy in Nicaragua. Later, when *La Prensa* denounced the repression and abuses of the Sandinista government, its totalitarianism, its Marxist-Leninist impositions, we did so not from a desire to retreat into a past that nobody wishes to remember, but to realize the goals that had moved us to uproot Somocism from Nicaragua in the first place.

What the world has not yet realized is that we are living a new Somocism with the Sandinistas. The practical results of Sandinism have been a resurgence and growth of militarism, another confusion of state and party, corruption, press censorship, fraudulent elections, jailings and a trampling on human rights. Ironically, a revolution that began with the assassination of my husband, a free journalist, has brought with it the worst censorship that Nicaraguan journalism has ever endured. This is the colossal contradiction that should open the eyes of all men of goodwill. In the beginning we all gave our support to the Sandinista revolution because we believed that it was to be the first complete Hispano-American revolution, one which strove for justice but diminished no freedoms, achieved social democracy without the loss of political democracy. But instead they have betrayed a whole people who dreamed of being free.

First went the independent radio and television stations. Then the radio voice of the church, and now the press. By

closing down the last reserve of civic opposition in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas reveal they have decided on a military solution, although they preach the opposite. They have closed the doors to dialogue and opened the doors to war.

Measures like the closing of *La Prensa* should unmask to the world the fallacy of the Sandinista front's supposed desire for peace, a desire they attempt to present to groups that are negotiating in Nicaragua and are influential in shaping public opinion. We cannot believe any of their proposals to negotiate press freedoms. Freedom of the press is not negotiable; it is a right of all Nicaraguans and not the patrimony of their government.

III

This is our situation today. In Nicaragua there is no freedom except that exercised by the Sandinista front. We do not know what will happen tomorrow. But we hope that with the help of people in the United States and elsewhere, we will soon reach a regional solution to the Central American problem, a problem that has its roots in the deprivation of liberty in Nicaragua. The Western democracies need to be decisive and firm in coordinating their efforts to demand a civilized government in Nicaragua, based on the right to free elections and respect for the fundamental rights of man.

Freedom of the press is a basic criterion for determining if there is democracy in a country. My husband used to say, "Without freedom of press there is no liberty." And today, without freedom in Nicaragua, there can be no peace in Central America.

La Prensa supported the diplomatic efforts of the Contadora group of nations from their inception. We believed that its efforts would distance our country from two undesirable extremes: on the one hand, foreign intervention and, on the other, the entrenchment of a regime that is suppressing the nation's desire for justice and democracy. Unfortunately, after four years the Contadora group has failed to come forward with a proposal that offers acceptable and workable solutions to achieve internal democracy in Nicaragua.

Perhaps if these gentlemen of goodwill would meet one day in Nicaragua and see the military hospitals of one side or the other, filled with sixteen-year-olds torn apart by machine guns, missing arms and legs, blind, or with fate uncertain even after

extensive operations, they would then demand that an agreement be signed guaranteeing freedom for Nicaragua.

Behind this war—a civil war between Sandinista soldiers recruited against their will and Nicaraguan “contras” on the other side—there is a profound tragedy in which a whole people is impoverished by the loss of a great treasure: their freedom.

That is why we of the free press, loyal to our principles, believe that before all else the country must be returned to normalcy. We believe the appropriate first step must be to initiate the national and international dialogue we have desired for so long, for which my husband was struggling up to the moment he gave his life, for which we all have struggled with profound conviction for sixty years past.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

Review Essay

Michael V. Forrestal

THE WISE MEN: SIX FRIENDS AND THE WORLD THEY MADE. By Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, 788 pp. \$22.95.

In 1986 two great statesmen died, W. Averell Harriman and Robert A. Lovett. Their passing underlines the theme of this book about “six friends and the world they made.” Of the other four, Dean G. Acheson, Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen, John J. McCloy and George F. Kennan, only the latter two are still with us. This book, therefore, is about a specific era in U.S. history, the era of America’s emergence as a postwar superpower, of the cold war and the war in Vietnam. The substantive narrative ends in March 1968 with the last meeting of the six in Washington as Lyndon Johnson’s Wise Men—which the authors describe as the “last supper”—and the dismantling of the Establishment.

Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, young editors at *Time*, come from a generation—perhaps two—after their “Wise Men.” They have undertaken an awesome task. The book is a narrative history; but neither far enough in the past to have matured as history nor current enough to be yesterday’s news. The style wobbles from the journalistic interview to the documentary, from biography to diplomatic analysis.

One of the book’s major tenets is that these six men came from similar backgrounds, grew up in the same environment and shared common views of the world, thus forming a unique association in public affairs. Of course to some extent this is true, but one might question how significant it was in terms of their impact on history. Three of the six, Harriman, Lovett and Acheson, were indeed of the same age and lived closely related lives prior to World War II. The other three, McCloy, Kennan and Bohlen, were younger and did not know the older men or each other well until their public lives threw them together.

The importance of the book has to do with its timing and, within the limits imposed by literary technique and scope, its accuracy. The section on the decision in 1945 to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, for instance, tracks remarkably well the testimony of a contemporary witness to the decision, Lewis L. Strauss,¹ although Messrs. Isaacson and Evans do not appear to have consulted this admirable account.

It is the timing of the book’s appearance that makes it so important. For about half of the period it covers, the American public has been subjected to an outpouring from academia of revisionist, quasi-historical polemics on the cold war period. Fewer and fewer balanced accounts appeared, and one

¹ See Strauss’ *Men and Decision*, New York: Doubleday, 1962, pp. 184–200.

began to wonder whether future generations would be forever burdened with a highly politicized and distorted account of America's actions and reactions in the face of Soviet efforts to achieve a menacing hegemony in the postwar world. Revisionists seemed, to many who were involved in the period, to have decided that the motivations of American leadership were almost always impure and even sinister. This book revises the revisionist record and does a lot to bring it back into balance. It is by no means a whitewash. Except for the authors' somewhat romantic impression of the Establishment, it is from the point of view of one who lived most of the reported events a sober and straightforward account of what actually happened and why. It is a tonic, long overdue.

It is also biography. Harriman and Acheson are the main actors by reason of their positions and, in Harriman's case, his extraordinary length of public service. To readers who knew them and the other four heroes, the book adds some anecdotal insights.² To those who did not, however, it may raise some difficult questions about men in U.S. public life. With the exception of George Kennan, these men were not intellectuals, nor, with the exception of Harriman, did they ever hold elective office. Yet their integrity, their clear-minded view of the foreign problems they were facing and their intelligent restraint in reacting to them have not been discernible in the last twenty years of American leadership. Isaacson and Evans give full marks for this, but in order to balance the equation, they seem to feel it necessary from time to time to point out that Harriman and Lovett (the others were never in a position to be so accused) did not leave their partnerships in Brown Brothers Harriman and therefore must have profited somehow from a conflict of interest. As the authors point out, this is an issue that was never raised during the careers of the two men. Indeed, in his 1954 campaign for the governorship of New York, Harriman was accused by his Republican opponent, Irving Ives, of having been careless in business and responsible for several corporate failures as an investment banker. In fact, Harriman, as a limited partner, paid little attention to the affairs of Brown Brothers during the last 30-odd years of his public life. Today, however, even such a limited association while in public service would be impossible. Appearances seem to count more than substance.

Where and how is the government to find and attract men and women of experience and judgment to fill its top policymaking positions? It has always been something of an earnings sacrifice to accept a governmental appointment; today it is also likely to be a capital sacrifice. When added to the other costs and the loss of privacy, the impediments become quite serious. Perhaps this is why policy positions in foreign affairs are filled more and more with people from academic life and the military services. Recent history suggests the results are not always good. One wonders whether professionals from the Foreign Service can take up the slack. Two of the Wise Men, Kennan and Bohlen, were just such people. One might question whether the Foreign Service today, in light of the past career experiences of its senior officers, can attract such ability. The fact, which emerges only

² One of the best of these appears early in the book. Harriman is reported, at age 13, to have written his father a letter describing Groton's Endicott Peabody, "You know he would be an awful bully if he wasn't such a terrible Christian."

obscurely from the book, is that despite their very great talents, neither Kennan nor Bohlen played or could have played leadership roles in policy formation during their service. As often as not, their very sound views were ignored or at the least not accepted until long after they were expressed.

The book leaves one with a slightly depressed feeling. An era has ended, its heroes are gone and the future is unclear. If one takes a Tolstovian view of history, one could conclude that it was the great events of the times which thrust these six men to the front pages of history, and that actually they were the result, not the cause, of the events. But this is an un-American view. We believe in the role of the individual and we still struggle to find the best to manage our great affairs. In this context the book does a great service. It restores balance to our recent history, and some sheen to its heroes. It may generate a much-needed movement to correct revisionist history. It should be read.

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW. By Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, with Francis P. Butler. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1986, 347 pp. \$27.50.

An extensive legal study that examines the constitutional power to initiate acts of war, in the light of executive and legislative actions and judicial decisions in hundreds of instances since the founding of the republic. Taking note of the tendency of presidents, particularly in the latter half of the twentieth century, to assert and exercise war-initiating power on their own, the authors come down firmly on the side of the power of Congress alone to authorize acts of war, which the War Powers Resolution of 1973 restates and confirms. To the argument that the perils of the nuclear age justify the president's having authority to act, they reply that those perils only reinforce the requirement for deliberation and congressional approval (though without denying the president's power to respond immediately to armed attack). The book is for lawyers, but the issues are for everybody.

NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER: THE ARTISANSHIP AND ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY. Edited by Alan K. Henrikson. Wilmington (Del.): Scholarly Resources, 1986, 265 pp. \$30.00.

The underlying idea of the Fletcher School's Negotiating World Order Project is the need for synthesis of the approach of the "international architect," the theorist of world order, with that of the "diplomatic artisan," the professional negotiator, in the building of a more stable and peaceful world. This book grew out of a series of lectures by eminent authorities (more are artisans than architects), including Brian Urquhart, Tommy Koh, Gerard Smith and Max Kampelman. Not bound by a rigid agenda, they go off in the various directions set by their experience and preferences, but the book is well organized and drawn together by the editor in an excellent concluding chapter. There is no transcendent message, but what emerges is a realistic picture of where the world stands and the length of the road ahead.

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DOMINANT POWERS AND SUBORDINATE STATES: THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Jan F. Triska. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1986, 504 pp. \$57.50 (paper, \$16.95).

Comparison between these two spheres of influence (a term almost impossible to define precisely) turns up some parallels, which stem from the elementary facts of power, geography and cold war competition, as well as some obvious fundamental differences. This particular inquiry, a massive effort by a collective of scholars, subjects all the relevant factors to intensive scrutiny. It is an exercise that cannot fail to intrigue political scientists. Policy implications are less apparent, but it is of interest that the book lends support to the proposition that efforts by both superpowers to maintain their traditional systems of domination or influence are becoming counter-productive.

REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE THIRD WORLD: CASE STUDIES FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Mohamed Ayoob. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 284 pp. \$35.00.

Editor and authors set out to bring greater order and rationality into thinking about problems of security and insecurity in the Third World. What they succeed in doing, intentionally or not, is proving the existence of a compound of internal, regional and global factors that defy rational thinking and assure permanent insecurity. The book is of special value in that virtually all the contributors give the reader the benefit of a relatively sober and realistic Third World perspective without overindulging in polemics against the superpowers.

THE DIPLOMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Edited by David D. Newsom. Washington: University Press of America/Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1986, 252 pp. \$24.75 (paper, \$10.75).

This book makes a special contribution to the burgeoning literature on human rights in that most of its authors are or have been practicing American diplomats charged with the task of implementing, in their contact with foreign governments and societies, the human rights policies determined in Washington. Their experiences—in Eastern Europe, Iran, Korea, Brazil, South Africa and elsewhere—illustrate the dilemmas a diplomat faces when Washington does not have its priorities straight, and even when it does.

FORTY YEARS: A THIRD WORLD SOLDIER AT THE UN. By Carlos P. Romulo. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1986, 220 pp. \$29.95.

General Romulo of the Philippines was a fixture at the United Nations, something of an institution himself, from the start in 1945 until his retirement in 1983. His memoirs, with no pretense of being systematic, follow the ups and downs of the organization's history, garnished with impressions, anecdotes and conversations with delegates and the world's statesmen. Always a friend of America, he was no automatic supporter of U.S. policies and did not hesitate to give his U.S. colleagues timely warnings and advice, especially about Washington's course in Asia and its downgrading of the U.N. His recommendations for revising the U.N. Charter (including removal of the veto) and improving the work of the organization are seriously meant; they also have little chance of succeeding.

JUDGING THE WORLD COURT. By Thomas M. Franck. New York: Priority Press Publications, 1986, 112 pp. \$8.50 (paper). A Twentieth Century Fund Paper.

REVIVING THE WORLD COURT. By Richard Falk. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1986, 197 pp. \$25.00.

Recent actions by the U.S. government, including refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the World Court in the Nicaraguan case and espousal of a Reagan Doctrine to support "freedom fighters" in a worldwide struggle against communism, have raised anew the question of the place of international law and the World Court in American foreign policy. Professor Franck is understanding of the Reagan Administration's position against accepting international adjudication of matters of national security involving possible use of force, but he makes a persuasive case for the United States to use the court and accept its jurisdiction in other matters. Professor Falk is not at all content with the court and the international legal system as they now exist. He would like to see them become more in tune with the pluralism of today's world (e.g., as reflected in the U.N. General Assembly); he even chides the Soviet bloc judges for not being more Marxist, and the Third World judges for being too much under the influence of traditional Western concepts of international law. Falk's recommendations may go rather far afield, but one may find them, and Franck's as well, a needed antidote to the opinions flowing from the legal adviser's office in the State Department.

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

STAR WARS IN A NUCLEAR WORLD. By Lord Zuckerman. London: William Kimber, 1986, 226 pp. £12.50.

L'INITIATIVE DE DEFENSE STRATEGIQUE ET LA SECURITE DE L'EUROPE. Edited by Pierre Lellouche. Paris: French Institute for International Relations, 1986, 210 pp.

Informed European analysis of the global strategic consequences of the Strategic Defense Initiative has been relatively slow in developing. The reasons are several: uncertainty as to how seriously to take President Reagan's "vision" of a transition from offense to defense; the lure of participating in the technological research; the reluctance to confront politically the United States now on a system that will take decades to move from research to deployment; and the uncertain impact on arms control. Lord Zuckerman, a former principal British scientific adviser, is an exception as he has maintained a running commentary in various publications. These generally critical views of SDI, always written in an erudite and elegant manner, are brought together in this volume. Included also are some chapters on the relationship among scientific advisers, bureaucrats and politicians—a subject that has long been a personal concern to the author and on which he contributes much wisdom honed by practical experience.

The volume from the French Institute of International Relations is a first-rate analysis of all the key issues. The authors are of differing nationalities and perspectives, and the tone is analytical rather than polemical. It

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would be difficult to improve upon this balanced and authoritative work, and its publication in France is to be applauded.

THE DEFENSE GAME. By Richard A. Stubbing with Richard A. Mendel. New York: Bessie/Harper & Row, 1986, 445 pp. \$21.50.

Drawing upon his 20 years' experience in defense budgeting, Mr. Stubbing presents a commonsensical, well-written critique of the process. This is not about high-priced coffee pots but the year-round budget grind. Seeing the process as not quite out of control, he provides in the closing chapter a very good list of possible improvements in such areas as weapons acquisition and defense planning/budgeting. The best sections, however, consist of vignettes of five recent secretaries of defense: Melvin Laird gets the top grade because of his political savvy.

THE REAGAN DEFENSE PROGRAM: AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT. Edited by Stephen J. Cimbala. Wilmington (Del.): Scholarly Resources, 1986, 215 pp. \$35.00 (paper, \$11.95).

Has the large increase in defense budgets of the past five years been well spent? The authors are of differing views but they seem to agree on the failure to set adequate priorities. Secretary Weinberger, according to Vincent Davis, has chosen to be an external fund-raiser and promoter rather than an internal Pentagon manager. How revolutionary the change has been compared to the post-Afghanistan Carter defense buildup is also questioned. On many key matters the jury is still out, but this volume can help shape an educated judgment.

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND DEFENSE MANPOWER. By Martin Binkin. Washington: Brookings, 1986. 144 pp. \$28.95 (paper, \$10.95).

An important but not widely recognized question is well addressed in this short study. The planned new military technologies, especially the conventional weapons for the 1990s, are much more complex and sophisticated than today's. Will enough skilled technicians and specialists to man these systems be available from a diminishing supply of recruits able to absorb the necessary training? Binkin does not believe that substituting civilians in some defense tasks will solve the problem. He would recommend fielding less complex and more reliable systems so as to make the military needs fit the available manpower.

SECURING EUROPE'S FUTURE. Edited by Stephen J. Flanagan and Fen Osler Hampson. Dover (Mass.): Auburn House, 1986, 334 pp. \$32.50.

This is as good an overview of the political and military dimensions of current European security issues as can be found. It is written by the "successor generation" of European and American scholars, assembled here by Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs. They fully understand the lasting importance of the "old" issues, such as NATO and East-West relations, and are very knowledgeable about their "new" dimensions.

DEFENDING EUROPE IN THE 1990s: THE NEW DIVIDE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY. By Joseph C. Rallo. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 136 pp. \$29.95.

The author, a professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy, makes the case for a stronger political-military-economic entity in Western Europe. He is

a bit too optimistic. But in the process he examines the technological policies of Europe, noting the possibilities for dual commercial and military application, and he has some interesting comments about such interrelationships. Unlike most analyses, moreover, economics and security are integrated even though not at a deep level.

THE SENATE AND U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE. By Phil Williams. New York: St. Martin's, 1985, 315 pp.

The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe is a recurrent issue, and although minor now, who can say that it may not loom larger in the years ahead? The work of a Britisher, this book focuses on the Mansfield resolutions of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It is a work of meticulous scholarship and sound judgment, providing an excellent study of an often highly charged issue.

THE SOVIET VIEW OF DISARMAMENT. By P. H. Vigor. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 189 pp. \$25.00.

THE SOVIET UNION, THE WEST, AND THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. By Robbin F. Laird. New York: New York University Press, 1986, 236 pp. \$35.00.

These two books deal with Soviet policy toward arms control and disarmament but in quite different ways. The first is more of a Sovietologist's work and tends to place Moscow's policies in the context of Marxist-Leninist theory, while arguing that beyond this theory the U.S.S.R. pursues its national interests. But what country does not? The author makes a detailed presentation of Soviet proposals, but it is not clear how much he advances our insight. The second volume places more emphasis on the East-West interaction and has interesting chapters on the impact of the British and French nuclear forces on Soviet arms control policy. In this way Laird properly reminds us that the game is not only a Soviet-American one, and that, indeed, Moscow must increasingly pursue an "anti-coalition" policy designed to create fissures within the Western alliance.

THE LONG DARKNESS: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR WINTER. Edited by Lester Grinspoon. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, 213 pp. \$25.00 (paper, \$7.95).

Some of the nation's best thinkers—Henry Steele Commager, Erik Erikson, Robert J. Lifton and Stephen Jay Gould among others—put their minds to the moral and psychological aspects of nuclear winter (as depicted in grim detail by Carl Sagan). Clearly the nuclear winter theory, to whatever extent it is valid, has induced a significant debate about man's wisdom in relying upon nuclear weapons and about the entire concept of deterrence. A common horror, however, is easier to evoke than are acceptable alternatives. Such a book can serve an important purpose in crystalizing attention, but its practical lessons for public policy and the current arms control dialogue are uncertain.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

CASINO CAPITALISM. By Susan Strange. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 207 pp. \$24.95.

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When money is out of control, exchange rates and interest rates fluctuate widely and wildly and "sheer luck begins to take over and to determine more and more of what happens to people." The strength of this book by a London School of Economics professor of international relations is the vigorous demonstration of this thesis. As much of the blame for these developments is assigned to decisions and non-decisions in American policy, a deeper analysis of the forces shaping that policy would have been welcome. To set matters right, Strange argues, "the United States has to recognize its own true long-term national interest in exercising a wise hegemony over the world market economy." A possible bargain with Europe is spelled out, but little is said about Japan.

THE MONEY MANDARINS: THE MAKING OF A SUPRANATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. By Howard M. Wachtel. New York: Pantheon, 1986, 254 pp. \$18.95.

Professor Wachtel of American University writes clearly and well about the breakdown of the system of semirigid exchange rates and the emergence of immense, largely uncontrolled money markets. He links both developments to almost every evil that has beset the American and international economies for the past decade on the grounds that "private supranationalism . . . has overwhelmed public institutions." To put things back in order he proposes shrinking the Eurocurrency markets through reserve requirements, creating a public agency to take over international debts, instituting tax laws that penalize wasteful takeovers, and continuing to pursue the ever elusive international coordination of national economic policies. One may quarrel with the program while agreeing that some major rethinking of the political economy of public and private issues is in order.

OTHER TIMES, OTHER PLACES: MACROECONOMIC LESSONS FROM U.S. AND EUROPEAN HISTORY. By Charles L. Schultze. Washington: Brookings, 1986, 88 pp. \$15.95 (paper, \$7.95).

Hard digging and careful calculation mark these three Okun Lectures' inquiry into some of the elements of "inertial inflation," the supposed stickiness of real wages in Europe, and the reasons the American economy has fluctuated less since World War II than it did before 1914. Mr. Schultze's long experience in matters of macroeconomic policy lends particular interest to his comment on the importance of "relationships about which we currently know far too little," including "the determinants of real exchange rates." The conclusions of this valuable work are important for policy, but the demonstrations are for economists.

LEADERSHIP AT THE FED. By Donald F. Kettl. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, 218 pp. \$22.50.

"For the Fed to survive, it must travel a politically acceptable course through irreconcilable demands." How that course has been found in spite of tension with every president, occasional surges of congressional pressure, shifting economic priorities and changing views as to what the Federal Reserve Board's responsibilities really are is the main subject of this good and interesting book. Professor Kettl, a political scientist, stresses the leadership role of the chairman and has enlightening, fairly detailed accounts of the different styles and experience of Marriner Eccles, William McChesney Martin, Arthur Burns and Paul Volcker. He rather neglects

the international dimension of the Fed's work and does not tell us if it helped or hindered the effort to maintain the board's "independence."

SECOND TO NONE: AMERICAN COMPANIES IN JAPAN. By Robert C. Christopher. New York: Crown, 1986, 256 pp. \$16.95.

Reviewers cringe when yet another book on Japanese-American relations appears, especially one about business. But this book is an exception. Focusing on the success stories of American companies in Japan, it is full of interesting firsthand material (although the same people appear rather often). Some of its best sections discuss the personal—and personnel—relations of American managers with their Japanese colleagues. On broader issues we hear only one side of the story, but the criticisms of the prevalent American disposition to blame everything on the Japanese are well put.

WHEN MARKETS QUAKE: THE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE OF RESTRUCTURING INDUSTRY. By Joseph L. Bower. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1986, 256 pp. \$19.95.

Overcapacity has troubled the highly international petrochemical industry for some time. Giant companies can sustain low prices and losses for a long time without leaving the field; governments resist contraction; only prolonged crisis brings action. Professor Bower of the Harvard Business School gives a remarkable and lively account of how European, American and Japanese companies have tried to cope without eliminating the central problem. He worries that private firms may have no future against government enterprises that are not as well managed, but he recognizes that unless government industrial policy supports it there is no prospect that what he thinks is the required degree of cooperation among private firms can succeed.

LIBERAL PROTECTIONISM: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ORGANIZED TEXTILE TRADE. By Vinod K. Aggarwal. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 302 pp. \$9.95 (paper).

Although it is presented as a study of "regime transformation," this book has particular value as an intelligent and intelligible history of international arrangements for dealing with trade in textiles and clothing. From documents (some of them restricted), interviews and other analyses, Mr. Aggarwal has put together a first-rate analysis of events from the late 1950s to the 1981 renewal of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement. In the early years one could make an argument for the view that "an international regime regulating intervention in the textile trade" was restraining "full-blown protectionism." By 1977, however, things had deteriorated to the point that the industrial countries were largely freed from any limitations on their authority to set the terms of access to their markets and to discriminate among suppliers in the process. Mr. Aggarwal lays most of the blame for this on the European Community. His book is not the whole story, but it is a good and significant part of it.

INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: NEW ROLES FOR PRIVATE CAPITAL? By Theodore H. Moran and others. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books (for the Overseas Development Council), 1986, 194 pp. \$19.95 (paper, \$12.95).

This excellent and exceptionally timely book raises some cautions about the current mood of "almost unqualified support" for private direct in-

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vestment as the major solvent of basic international economic problems. Bringing to bear the latest (and usually quite sophisticated) empirical analysis, the authors look at many issues, including the conditions in which foreign investment helps or hurts a host country, the importance of competition, the relation of direct investment to debt, incentives to invest, the "export of jobs," and the role of the World Bank in these processes. The conclusion, according to Professor Moran of Georgetown, is that the "dynamic role" of private direct investment in the growth of developing countries is real, but it "is smaller, takes longer to build up, and carries more dangers than conventional wisdom currently suggests."

IN WHOSE INTEREST? INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Benjamin J. Cohen. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986, 347 pp. \$19.95. A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

When private international lending gets big enough, it becomes thoroughly intertwined with the public interest as reflected in foreign policy and concern for the international economic system. How this happens, how the resulting problems have been dealt with in the past, and how they might be handled better in the future are the subjects of this first-rate book, which has emerged from the studies program of the Council on Foreign Relations. There are case studies of Arab investment, the Iranian crisis, pressure on Poland and Latin American debt. The book concludes with short- and long-run policy prescriptions for the United States and other countries.

WORLD FOOD POLICIES: TOWARD AGRICULTURAL INTERDEPENDENCE. Edited by William P. Browne and Don F. Hadwiger. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1986, 220 pp. \$26.50.

This good collection of papers gets its focus from the observation that "interdependence is achieved within a highly fragmented protectionist policy framework." The resulting difficulties in prescribing constructive courses for all governments come out quite clearly and are not really resolved. International food aid is more highly thought of by these authors than by most other people in recent times.

RED MULTINATIONALS OR RED HERRINGS?: THE ACTIVITIES OF ENTERPRISES FROM SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THE WEST. Edited by Geoffrey Hamilton. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 194 pp. \$27.50.

In spite of the rather flashy title, this is a scholarly book, indeed, a largely factual one. Several authors examine the organization and operation of companies owned by the Soviet and East European governments in Germany, Austria, Sweden, Britain and Ireland (with a brief look at the developing countries). The data, though several years old, are useful and go somewhat beyond the basic work that has been carried on for some time at Carleton University in Ottawa. Not surprisingly, few of these enterprises show signs of developing as Western multinationals have done.

FRENCH INDUSTRIAL POLICY. Edited by William J. Adams and Christian Stoffaës. Washington: Brookings, 1986, 228 pp. \$22.95 (paper, \$8.95).

Many authors, mostly French, write fairly succinctly about successes and failures in French industrial policy (with a few excursions into the United

States). The papers were for a 1984 conference, but Stoffaës, a leading authority, adds a later chapter on the first phases of the Mitterrand regime.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

EISENHOWER: AT WAR, 1943–1945. By David Eisenhower. New York: Random House, 1986, 977 pp. \$29.95.

IKE: HIS LIFE AND TIMES. By Piers Brendon. New York: Harper & Row, 1986, 417 pp. \$21.95.

David Eisenhower's study of his grandfather as commander of Allied forces in Europe in World War II is on the scale of Martin Gilbert's biography of Churchill. The book has been justly acclaimed for its solid research, clear writing and fair portrait of the general. Although it contains less novelty than the dust jacket suggests, the book is an excellent narrative of the problems of high command, and demonstrates the truth of the adage that there is no clear line separating military and political considerations. Piers Brendon, a British writer, takes on all of Dwight Eisenhower's life. The prose is lively, and the intent is to deflate the current exalted reputation Eisenhower enjoys among historians, without returning to the 1950s liberal caricature of the tongue-tied anti-intellectual more interested in golf than the presidency.

WHITE HOUSE OPERATIONS: THE JOHNSON PRESIDENCY. By Emmette S. Redford and Richard T. McCulley. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986, 247 pp. \$30.00.

This is one volume in a huge ongoing history of the Johnson Administration. The prose is turgid but the subject is fascinating both historically and as a text on the problems of creating a "superpresidency" that is simultaneously lean enough to work and large enough to provide the president with guidance on the myriad crosscutting issues of national leadership. The authors draw on interviews as well as published and unpublished records of the Johnson White House.

FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS, 1933–1937. By Kenneth S. Davis. New York: Random House, 1986, 756 pp. \$29.95.

This is the third volume in a magisterial biography built on deep research, filled with psychological and political insight, and beautifully written. Granted questions of foreign policy were secondary during the first four years of the New Deal, Roosevelt's attention to them, as Mr. Davis demonstrates, was superficial and insufficiently serious.

THE IRON CURTAIN: CHURCHILL, AMERICA, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR. By Fraser J. Harbutt. New York: Oxford, 1986, 370 pp. \$24.95.

"CO-OPERATION WITH LIKE-MINDED PEOPLES": BRITISH INFLUENCES ON AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY, 1945–1949. By Richard A. Best, Jr. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986, 226 pp.

In the present age it is easy to forget (or never to have known) how important British views and policies were for the United States in the early postwar years. These well-researched books, using British and American

unpublished sources, help remedy that failure of memory. Mr. Harbutt deplores the fact that the U.S. government during 1946 came to define its security interests in terms very similar to the message Churchill was preaching. As left-wing critics used to say at the time: "Churchill was willing to fight the Soviets to the last drop of American blood." But coincidence of perceptions does not prove cause and effect; had Churchill died immediately after Yalta in 1945, it seems likely that U.S. responses to the Soviet Union would have been no different. In contrast, Mr. Best celebrates Anglo-American cooperation and what he considers the altogether positive way the British trained American leaders in the substance and organizational requirements of cold war strategy. His book should get a prize from the English-Speaking Union.

DIVIDED COUNSEL: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RESPONSE TO COMMUNIST VICTORY IN CHINA. By Edwin W. Martin. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986, 265 pp. \$27.00.

BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1957-68. By J.P.G. Freeman. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 317 pp. \$35.00.

More on British-American relations in historical perspective. Mr. Martin's excellent study of differences over China policy is temperate and illuminating. He denies that American emulation of the British policy of recognizing the People's Republic of China would have made a great difference, but he does suggest that opportunities were lost for smoothing the sharp edges of U.S.-Chinese hostility. Mr. Freeman focuses on the negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1962 and the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, demonstrating the substantial British influence on both. He ends with a note of regret that a comprehensive test ban treaty, which the British favored, was not concluded.

DECISIONS AT YALTA: AN APPRAISAL OF SUMMIT DIPLOMACY. By Russell D. Buhite. Wilmington (Del.): Scholarly Resources, 1986, 156 pp. \$25.00 (paper, \$8.95).

This brief study, appearing fortuitously amid the debate over Reykjavik, deplores the Soviet-American summit conference as an institution and the assumption that much good can come of seeking détente. The author, a diplomatic historian, contends that the American national interest was in no way served and in many ways injured by Roosevelt's participation in and decisions at Yalta. This is vintage historical neoconservatism—less strident than the criticism from the right in the 1940s, but tending toward similar conclusions.

THE WAR'S LONG SHADOW: THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH. By Bradley F. Smith. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, 319 pp. \$18.95.

A sensible extended essay on the revolutionary and disorienting impact of World War II on the politics and societies of America, Russia, Britain and China. Mr. Smith deplores the tendency of ideologues to treat the war as if it were significant primarily as the breeding ground for the cold war.

MY LIFE BETWEEN JAPAN AND AMERICA. By Edwin O. Reischauer. New York: Bessie/Harper, 1986, 367 pg. \$22.50.

A full autobiography recalling the author's childhood as a "B.I.J."—born (1910) in Japan (of missionary parents)—through his pioneering scholarship as a historian of Japan at Harvard, and his eventful tour in the 1960s as U.S. ambassador in Tokyo. The treatment is factual, chronological, without rancor. The chapters on the Tokyo years, which saw Mr. Reischauer survive an assassin's knife and keep Japanese-American relations on a steady course in spite of the Vietnam War, are an important contribution to diplomatic history.

HOW NATO WEAKENS THE WEST. By Melvyn Krauss. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, 262 pp. \$17.95.

Assuming the existence of a zero-sum game between the United States and the Soviet Union, the author of this contentious tract condemns the European members of NATO not only for taking a free ride in defense but also for strengthening the Soviet Union through a misguided effort to find security through détente and trade. He believes that if the United States withdraws from direct participation in European defense, the European nations will be forced to take care of themselves, thus strengthening the West overall.

PROPHECY AND POLITICS: MILITANT EVANGELISTS ON THE ROAD TO NUCLEAR WAR. By Grace Halsell. Westport (Conn.): Lawrence Hill, 1986, 200 pp. \$14.95.

The alarming title of this reportage is slightly misleading. The subject is the role of the ancient (Old Testament) and modern state of Israel in the theological cosmography and eschatology of Jerry Falwell and other American evangelists. The author believes that nuclear war is a possible consequence of the kind of thinking she describes.

THE AYATOLLAH IN THE CATHEDRAL: REFLECTIONS OF A HOSTAGE. By Moorhead Kennedy. New York: Hill and Wang, 1986, 241 pp. \$17.95.

An intensely personal memoir-essay about the author's career as a diplomat specializing in the Middle East, his experience as one of the hostages in Teheran, subsequent resignation from the Foreign Service, and a spectacular disagreement with antinuclear activists leading to another resignation—this time as the head of a church-related peace institute. His twofold message is an appeal to Americans to understand the perspectives of others, especially the people of the Middle East, and a denunciation of dogmatism by the American equivalents of the ayatollah.

"THE TARGET IS DESTROYED": WHAT REALLY HAPPENED TO FLIGHT 007 AND WHAT AMERICA KNEW ABOUT IT. By Seymour M. Hersh. New York: Random House, 1986, 282 pp. \$17.95.

This is a temperate, credible reconstruction of what really happened to Flight 007 and what America knew about it. On the basis of investigative reporting of a high order, Mr. Hersh concludes that KAL 007 was not on a secret intelligence mission but strayed because of gross human errors by the flight crew; that the U.S. Air Force knew almost immediately that the Soviets believed that they had attacked an American military intruder, not

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a civilian airliner; and that American leaders, most notably Secretary of State Shultz, misrepresented the situation because it served political purposes to portray the Soviets as deliberate murderers of civilians.

THE CIA AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. By Scott D. Breckinridge. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 364 pp.

A useful but anodyne description of the public legislative and administrative history of the Central Intelligence Agency, mentioning almost no names, maintaining perfect discretion. The author served with the CIA for 26 years, six as deputy inspector general.

THE FBI-KGB WAR. By Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman. New York: Random House, 1986, 320 pp. \$18.95.

Mr. Lamphere served in the FBI from 1941 to 1955, becoming a specialist in counterespionage. Here are his recollections of the days of Klaus Fuchs and the Rosenbergs, and problems with the British. Very readable.

BUREAUCRACY AND STATESMANSHIP: HENRY KISSINGER AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Robert J. Strong. Washington: University Press of America, 1986, 124 pp. \$19.75 (paper, \$8.75).

This essay, originally a doctoral dissertation under the direction of Kenneth Thompson (in whose series of studies on "the credibility of institutions, policies and leadership" it appears), gives Mr. Kissinger a mixed grade: praise for his appreciation of a leader's need to escape the constraints of bureaucracy, criticism for relying too much on "mere maxims."

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

AGAINST ALL HOPE: PRISON MEMOIRS. By Armando Valladares. New York: Knopf, 1986, 380 pp. \$18.95.

FIDEL: A BIOGRAPHY OF FIDEL CASTRO. By Peter G. Bourne. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986, 368 pp. \$18.95.

FIDEL: A CRITICAL PORTRAIT. By Tad Szulc. New York: William Morrow, 1986, 504 pp. \$19.95.

CUBA: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE. Edited by Jaime Suchlicki and others. Miami: North-South Center for the Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1986, 190 pp.

Four new volumes heavy with insights augment the seemingly endless literature on post-Batista Cuba. The Valladares volume, a horrifying recital of 11 years lost in the hunger, filth and putrefaction of a Castro prison, is the most personal and vivid, a landmark in the annals of tyranny. The Bourne account, written with the "general support" of the Cuban government and with access to its archives, is fair minded and balanced, although its emphasis is on the earlier and more favorable Castro years. The author, a psychiatrist with extensive experience in public and foreign affairs, stresses the effects of illegitimacy and the father's macho qualities on Castro's childhood and his (still continuing) sense of the world as conflict. He makes clear the intense personalism of the regime, and believes that a different

U.S. policy in 1960 would have made little difference since "the die was cast historically and psychologically before Fidel came to power." The book by Tad Szulc, written with the collaboration of Castro, has verve and a sense of immediacy, although it is heavily tilted toward the years before 1962. An interesting conclusion: it may take a generation for Cuba to get back to the cultural freedom of the time of José Martí. "Cultural policies have dealt a lethal blow to creativity in his country; even in 1986 the island was a wasteland of ideas. . . ." The University of Miami study contributes a short but effective group of essays on contemporary Cuban circumstances.

ARGENTINA: ILLUSIONS AND REALITIES. By Gary W. Wynia. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986, 207 pp. \$32.50 (paper, \$14.95).

A very fine account of Argentina during the last 40 years, with some historical background in addition. The author walks the wavering line between pessimism and optimism that is particularly hard to identify in that interesting and baffling country, and presents effectively the patterns of social and personality traits that found volatile expression in Peronism and in the regimes that succeeded it.

RELIGION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Daniel H. Levine. Chapel Hill (N.C.): University of North Carolina Press, 1986, 266 pp. \$24.95 (paper, \$9.95).

The broad theme of these essays appears in the final chapter on "Conflict and Renewal," which interprets the relations between religion and politics in democracy and the process of democratization, and expresses it in terms of an ongoing struggle to define and control "the popular," meaning popular culture, popular religion, popular organization, etc. The countries considered are El Salvador, Nicaragua, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Bolivia.

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1980s. Edited by Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986, 648 pp.

Fifteen essays and seven comments, by U.S., Latin American and English contributors, analyze current relations between Latin America and the United States, emphasizing broad themes rather than nation-oriented accounts. Four categories of issues are thus presented: those dealing with economics, political and social matters, and security problems. There is also a long preface on change, complexity and contending perceptions, as well as statistical appendices.

CONFRONTING REVOLUTION: SECURITY THROUGH DIPLOMACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. By Morris J. Blachman, William M. Leogrande and Kenneth Sharpe. New York: Pantheon, 1986, 438 pp. \$12.95 (paper).

The authors see inequality and authoritarianism as the primary sources of long-range turmoil in Central America, and they believe that the United States should abandon its "hegemonic strategic vision" in favor of a "principled realism" that would favor U.S. security as well as peace, democracy and broadly shared development.

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HONDURAS CONFRONTS ITS FUTURE. Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg and Philip L. Shepherd. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1986, 268 pp. \$30.00.

Eighteen essays provide an overall analysis of this relatively little-known country: its problems with democracy, human rights and social issues, economic development, agriculture, and foreign policy. The concluding chapter reviews scenarios for the future. There are interesting comments on procedural democracy versus substantive democracy.

PERU AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. By Thomas Scheetz. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986, 257 pp.

The IMF's monetary approach to a Peruvian balance of payments comes under heavy fire here, the author assailing it as neither good theory nor good policy and accusing it of aiming not at stabilization but at a surplus in external accounts. There is extensive statistical material.

MEXICO: CHAOS ON OUR DOORSTEP. By Sol Sanders. Lanham (Md.): Madison Books, 1986, 222 pp. \$18.95.

Employing muscular prose, a journalist has produced here a dark vision of the Mexican future. He views the current dilemmas as a third national crisis, after the break with Spain and the 1910 revolution, and predicts not a tidy revolution from the left but a gradual breakdown as the PRI erodes, "a devolution into chaos."

LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS Y TRUJILLO: COLECCION DE DOCUMENTOS DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE ESTADO, DE LA FUERZAS ARMADAS NORTEAMERICANAS Y DE LOS ARCHIVOS DEL PALACIO NACIONAL DOMINICANO. AÑO 1930. Edited by Bernardo Vega. Santo Domingo: Fundacion Cultural Dominicana, 1986, 2 vols. \$30.00.

Continuing the excellent series that began with compilations of diplomatic, archival and photographic documentation covering U.S. relations with the Dominican Republic in 1945-47, the editor now presents two volumes devoted to the U.S. role in that Caribbean country in 1930 and in the years immediately preceding, while Trujillo was rising to power. The same high standards are maintained here, including extensive analytical commentary by the editor. Well done, and highly useful.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

MAKING SENSE OF EUROPE. By Christopher Tugendhat. London: Viking, 1986, 239 pp. £9.95.

Which is precisely what Mr. Tugendhat does, drawing on his national experience as a British M.P. and on his recent eight years as a member of the European Commission, four of which he spent as a vice president of the commission. His Europe is the Community: how it does and does not work. It is a detached and yet inside view, in which he recalls specific frustrations and advances, the inevitable three steps forward and two back. A brilliantly informative book that includes both an analysis of what exists and a set of practical guidelines for further progress: the creation, for example, of a true internal market (that could compete with the U.S. and

Japan) and the strengthening of the European component of defense, which would still and for various reasons need an American presence. He envisions in the future a still expanding European Community that would always remain a beneficent complement to and not a substitute for the individual states. A marvelously readable account of one of the great postwar achievements—for all its deficiencies.

THE THIRD REICH AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION. By Francis R. Nicosia. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986, 319 pp. \$35.00.

A careful study, based on extensive archival sources in Germany, Israel and elsewhere, of German policies toward Palestine. In the early years the Nazi regime encouraged Jewish emigration by favorable financial concessions arranged between Zionists and German government authorities. Nicosia emphasizes that until 1941 the Nazis wished to promote Jewish emigration, including the plan to settle large numbers in Madagascar, thus implying that many more Jews could have been saved at a time when the holocaust was hardly imaginable. The book also suggests that the Nazis were anxious not to violate British interests in the Middle East or to support Arab wishes for independence. A book that perhaps slights the various shifts, dualities and criminalities of the Nazi regime.

SPAIN AFTER FRANCO: THE MAKING OF A COMPETITIVE PARTY SYSTEM. By Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 516 pp. \$42.00.

THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN. By Paul Preston. London and New York: Methuen, 1986, 274 pp. \$32.00.

Spain's peaceful transition from Franco's authoritarianism to democratic polity is a fascinating success story, and the book by Gunther *et al.*, full of important details, based on an analysis of electoral statistics and supplemented by interviews and questionnaires, focuses on the role of the emergent political parties. It argues in tedious and sometimes banal, if highly quantified, form what does not seem very surprising: the Spanish elites cooperated in establishing a democratic framework and were determined to avoid the extremism that had marked the years before the civil war. A narrow book for specialists on a subject of the broadest interest. Preston, a British historian who lived in Spain for three years toward the end of the Franco regime, also analyzes the peaceful transition in much greater breadth if perhaps less depth. His book is instant history, crisp, clear and persuasive. He emphasizes that difficulties abounded in Franco's final years, including a growing discrepancy between a rapidly modernizing economy and "a refractory polity," with an erstwhile supporter (the church) moving away from the regime. The transition was beset by enormous dangers: the recalcitrance of the ultras with their "bunker mentality" and the violence of Basque terrorism. Much credit goes to Juan Carlos, who intuited and gave direction to the political will of moderate Spaniards. A reconstruction of dramatic events, perhaps too narrowly focused on individual actors and events, but eminently readable. The more scholarly book is also the duller: a necessary professional deformity?

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THE CHARACTER FACTORY: BADEN-POWELL'S BOY SCOUTS AND THE IMPERATIVES OF EMPIRE. By Michael Rosenthal. New York: Pantheon, 1986, 335 pp. \$22.95.

Ending the "immunity from critical scrutiny" that the Boy Scout movement and its founder had previously enjoyed, Michael Rosenthal provides a brilliant account of the presuppositions of the movement, an analysis of its conscious and unconscious aims, its much-touted virile values and prejudices. Baden-Powell had fashioned himself a hero of the Boer War, the war that for many Britons intensified their fears of imperial decline and internal degeneracy. Rosenthal is less concerned with the innocent trappings of a uniformed youth movement than with its historic meaning, its class and imperial aspects. Scouting was to teach the lower-class children the austere and patriotic virtues that their betters acquired in British public schools. A scholarly work, felicitously written and broadly conceived, that tells us much about a particular strain in British and European culture—and does so with wit, irony and just a trace of excessive, merry revisionism.

SINK THE RAINBOW!: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE GREENPEACE AFFAIR. By John Dyson. London: Gollancz, 1986, 192 pp. (North Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, distributors, \$19.95).

A popular account by a New Zealand writer, assisted by a Paris reporter for the *International Herald Tribune*. French agents conspired to sink the *Rainbow Warrior* in order to prevent the Greenpeace boat from observing and reporting on scheduled nuclear tests in the Pacific. A dramatic tale, told without identifying sources, of what came to be called France's Underwatergate. A sympathetic picture of Greenpeace with its continuous efforts to stop nuclear testing and protect the threatened environment. A good mystery story, with the villains the inept agents of the French secret service.

LE CHOIX DE MARIANNE: LES RELATIONS FRANCO-AMERICAINES, 1944–1948. By Annie Lacroix-Ris. Paris: Messidor, 1985, 222 pp.

A tendentious analysis of Franco-American relations from Liberation to the Marshall Plan, with the theme that the United States forced France into submission and also consistently favored German over French interests. A crude picture of American "imperialism," of European countries being reduced to states approximating banana republics. Allegedly based on new archival sources, the book does not identify them; the reader is referred to the author's *these d'état* for the sources. Abundant secondary literature is used selectively. A caricature of revisionism, but enough to suggest that a serious new look at political-economic relations in that period might be useful.

THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE. By Robert Jay Lifton. New York: Basic Books, 1986, 561 pp. \$19.95.

A major work on the role of doctors in the death camps, largely based on interviews with Nazi doctors who participated in mass killing or ghastly experiments and with surviving victims. A well-known psychiatrist and writer examines the psychic process—he calls it doubling—by which "banal men" performed "demonic acts." He acknowledges the few resisters and emphasizes the conduct of "decent Nazis," who were "idealistic" and who

through occasional acts of normality thought themselves pure as against those doctors without any redeeming moments. Lifton believes "that most of what Nazi doctors did would be within the potential capability—at least under certain conditions—of most doctors and most people." A hedged statement that in part may account for the motivation of this study of horror—but even in Nazi Germany it was only a small group who committed these atrocities.

MARSEILLE-NEW YORK, 1940–1945: A SURREALIST LIAISON. By Bernard Noël, edited by André Dimanche. Montclair (N.J.): Abner Schram, 1986, 142 pp. \$50.00.

A retelling of the now almost mythical story of the poets, painters and writers (many of them Jewish) who escaped from Paris to Marseille after the fall of France in 1940, and from there were smuggled out through the efforts of Varian Fry and the Emergency Rescue Committee. Thus it was that André Breton and his entourage arrived in New York in 1941 and launched Surrealism in America. This is a wonderful documentation of that story, with a text in both French and English, and superb illustrations. L.D.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

THE KREMLIN AND THE WEST: A REALISTIC APPROACH. By Wolfgang Leonhard. New York: Norton, 1986, 213 pp. \$17.95.

Much of this work is elementary exposition of the Soviet system, but Leonhard also selects his data to reinforce his principal message. Too many in the West, he contends, are either hardline anti-communists or naïve believers in *détente*. He argues for a more realistic approach, less concerned with military power and arms control, more concerned with forces at work within the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet bloc. He believes the system, under the inevitable pressure of internal problems, to be capable of reform that will affect foreign as well as domestic policy. His proposals for a "new Western approach" to help the process along, however, do not seem very new.

THE DILEMMA OF REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Timothy J. Colton. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986, 274 pp. \$9.95 (paper).

A revised and expanded version of Colton's earlier work, noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1984, bringing the story through the first years of Gorbachev's leadership. Clear, precise and judicious, it is an excellent introduction to the U.S.S.R. of today. As before, the author sees a real possibility of what he calls "moderate reform," and also of a less dangerous U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship, if both sides are willing to seize it.

THE LAST EMPIRE: NATIONALITY AND THE SOVIET FUTURE. Edited by Robert Conquest. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1986, 406 pp. \$27.95.

This composite work is more than the usual collection of papers done for a conference and then thrown together for publication. Its value lies, first, in its comprehensiveness, as it attacks the subject from many angles; second, in the quality and repute of the authors, whose contributions are

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up to their usual high standards (the roster includes Hugh Seton-Watson, Leonard Schapiro, Milovan Djilas, Frederick Barghoorn, Alexandre Ben-nigsen, Donald Treadgold, Robert Conquest, and some talented younger scholars). In general the treatment of Russian nationalism seems more profound, if also more speculative, than that of the non-Russian nationalities. All agree that the nationalities problem has been widely misunderstood and underestimated in the West, especially the degree to which it is changing the character of the Soviet polity. But the "last empire" is not about to dissolve.

ALONE TOGETHER. By Elena Bonner. New York: Knopf, 1986, 269 pp. \$17.95.

Memoirs of the wife of Andrei Sakharov, telling of their harrowing years of enforced exile in Gorki under the watchful eye and cruel persecution of the KGB. Her book, written in the candid style of a diary, clarifies for the world many things previously obscured by secrecy or deception, and is also revealing of the character of Sakharov himself and the spirit of this fiery and indomitable woman. The main story is about their travails in the U.S.S.R., but the scene shifts occasionally to America during Bonner's recent visit for medical treatment, giving her the opportunity to present some impressions of this country.

THE ANTI-SOVIET SOVIET UNION. By Vladimir Voinovich. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986, 325 pp. \$19.95.

A distinguished Russian novelist, now in emigration, writes a sprightly book about life in the U.S.S.R.: the big bosses, the party hacks, the watchdogs of art and literature, and especially the ordinary people. Full of anecdotes and remembered experiences, it is laced with humor often sharp, occasionally flat, but the light touch does not disguise the bite of the author's message.

LETTERS FROM PRISON AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Adam Michnik. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 354 pp. \$25.00.

Adam Michnik has been in and out of prison, mostly in, since the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. As a founder of KOR in 1976 and counselor to Solidarity from 1980 he has been at the center of antiestablishment politics for a decade. These letters and essays, which have been circulating underground, contain sober reflections on Polish history, analysis of recent events and judgments on people and institutions (especially the current regime), and statements of faith and conviction on questions of morality and human rights. They reveal his dedication to ideals of freedom and to political activism in the service of the Polish people. Michnik's writing comes through as sincere, inspired and, for his Polish readers especially, inspirational.

SHIELDING THE FLAME: AN INTIMATE CONVERSATION WITH DR. MAREK EDELMAN, THE LAST SURVIVING LEADER OF THE WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING. By Hanna Krall. New York: Henry Holt, 1986, 124 pp. \$13.95.

Recollections and reflections of a Jewish physician on the fate of Warsaw's Jews in World War II and on his own role, brilliantly reported by a Polish Jewish journalist. The conversation is personal, philosophical, at times

almost surrealistic, revealing of the horrors of the time, the agonizing choices in the looming presence of almost certain death, and the complex relations of Jew, Pole and German. The original work was published in Poland in 1977 and widely read.

HUNGARY AND THE SOVIET BLOC. By Charles Gati. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1986, 237 pp. \$40.00 (paper, \$14.95).

In some respects Professor Gati's volume sets a new standard in the study of Soviet policy and Eastern Europe. He has explored many little known sources in order to get behind the facade of Soviet and Hungarian official positions, and of those on the Western side as well. A notable contribution is his exposition of the interplay between internal competition and uncertainty in the Kremlin and changes in the leadership and policies of the East European parties and states, in this case the Hungarian, from the end of World War II to the present. The book, however, goes well beyond Hungary to treat developments throughout Eastern Europe and to consider both Soviet and American policy toward that area. The author makes much of his differences with the usual interpretations of Western analysis, slaying a number of straw dragons as he goes; in any case, it is a stimulating book that breaks new ground and merits a wide reading.

OPPOSITION IN THE GDR UNDER HONECKER, 1971-85. By Roger Woods. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 257 pp. \$29.95.

Two givens in the history of East Germany have been the distaste of the people for the regime and the regime's intolerance of opposition. How to measure that distaste and the limits of official tolerance, however, are not easy questions to answer. Roger Woods, with the aid of documentation that takes up most of his book, makes the effort by examining three kinds of dissent: open criticism by intellectuals (the familiar cases of Bahro, Havemann, Heym and Biermann); rejection of the system by those who choose, or wish to choose, emigration; and the activities of the unauthorized peace movement. This "opposition" has not shaken the regime but may, the author argues, have influenced it. Again, it is difficult to prove much, but the G.D.R. under Honecker has certainly undergone change, and the issues raised here cannot be ignored by the regime, by Bonn, or by Moscow and Washington.

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

ARAB AND JEW: WOUNDED SPIRITS IN A PROMISED LAND. By David K. Shipler. New York: Times Books, 1986, 596 pp. \$22.50.

An American journalist reports his observations, conversations and reflections after a five-year tour as correspondent in Jerusalem. He leaves high politics and diplomacy aside in seeking to penetrate and understand the thinking, emotions and actions of the two peoples now living side by side in historic Palestine: perceptions and misperceptions on each side; the burdens of history; the clash of competing nationalism and religions; the thickening miasma of contempt, fear and unreasoning hatred; terrorism and violence as the accepted norm. It is a book of anecdotes and episodes, many dramatically and eloquently told, with a total impact that suggests

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that the chances for peace and reconciliation, on the part of leadership or of peoples, are close to zero.

HEROES AND HUSTLERS, HARD HATS AND HOLY MEN: INSIDE THE NEW ISRAEL. By Ze'ev Chafets. New York: Morrow, 1986, 249 pp. \$17.95.

An informal, breezy assessment of contemporary Israel by an American Jew who migrated there in the late 1960s, got into politics, served the Begin government as press officer, and has never ceased observing the leaders and people of his adopted country with a keen eye and an independent mind. "A nation that doesn't know what it wants to be when it grows up" is his description, but he finds much that is positive even if the unresolved problems remain and the early Zionist ideal is a shattered dream.

IN SEARCH OF ARAB UNITY, 1930-1945. By Yehoshua Porath. London: Frank Cass, 1986, 376 pp. (Totowa, N.J.: Biblio, distributor, \$32.50; paper, \$14.95).

Professor Porath concedes the existence of a wide gap in his source material due to his inability to consult Arab archives, but he partially compensates by extensive use of Arab publications and by burrowing deeply into Zionist and British documents. His book is largely a history of British policy in the Middle East, and of British efforts to make sure of a dominant future position there in the critical years before and after World War II. The exemplary research, which brings out a number of new and interesting points, shows how many different views and voices there were in the British government on Middle East policy, how closely the future of Palestine was tied to the plans (British, Arab, Jewish) for greater Arab unity, and how lukewarm or negative London was toward all such plans, even those that led to the formation of the Arab League in 1945.

AFRICAN-ARAB RELATIONS. By Hilmi S. Yousuf. Brattleboro (Vt.): Amana Books, 1986, 212 pp. \$12.50 (paper, \$9.95).

On a subject that defies organization and summary treatment, the author of this study, after a brief historical overview of Islam in Africa, sensibly confines himself to two main aspects, which he covers competently and without polemics. The first is African policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, told largely from the record of published rhetoric at the U.N., the OAU and the Nonaligned Movement's conferences. The second is Arab aid to Africa, where he does a useful job in bringing together data from the many Arab funds and banks in the business of dispensing aid.

THE ARAB RADICALS. By Adeed Dawisha. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986, 171 pp. \$8.95 (paper).

This subject surely needs clarification and Adeed Dawisha provides some, particularly in giving a rational definition of Arab radicalism; the term remains elusive, as a radical state or movement may, in changing conditions, turn moderate, and vice versa. The analysis shows how the currents of secular nationalism, militant Islam, social protest and personal or ethnic rivalry can combine or divide—and sometimes produce terrorists. The author is content to explain; perhaps wisely, he refrains from prophecy and from specific advice to Western nations on how to cope with the Arab radicals. There is no incontrovertible truth about many of these matters except in the minds of those who think they possess it.

SEMITES AND ANTI-SEMITES. By Bernard Lewis. New York: Norton, 1986, 283 pp. \$18.95.

A distinguished historian sheds light on the experience of the Jews in the West and in the Islamic world and explores the causes and nature of the phenomenon of anti-Semitism. He does not dwell at length on the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine, although he recognizes that the Arabs' outrage, humiliation and sense of injustice is the cause, rather than the result, of the rise of virulent anti-Semitism among them. It is not just political opposition to Zionism and Israel, however, but a campaign of hatred and defamation—evident even in Egypt—of Jews as Jews, as the personification of evil. This is not the historical and relatively mild Islamic discrimination against Jews, but the poisonous anti-Semitism of the West that culminated in the Nazis and the holocaust. Lewis sees it as still a campaign from above, from the Arab leadership rather than the society. *A calm and reasoned, but not neutral, discussion of a subject that rarely evokes calm and reason.*

ARABIA IMPERILED: THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB GULF STATES. By Mazher A. Hameed. London: Croom Helm/Washington: Middle East Assessments Group, 1986, 188 pp. \$14.95 (paper).

This is, first, a useful handbook giving essential data on the Gulf states and their military establishments; second, it is an appraisal of their security problems and those of the West in that region. The approach assumes a greater congruence of interests among the Gulf states and between them and the West than may in fact exist; and it expects too much from those states in the way of military capability and deterrence. All in all, however, the author shows real understanding of both the political and the military aspects, and he is right in stressing the central importance of Saudi Arabia.

PARADOX OF POWER: THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA, 1973–1984. By Maya Chadda. Santa Barbara (Calif.): ABC-Clio, 1986, 272 pp. \$35.00.

"Southwest Asia" includes everything from the eastern fringes of the Arab world to the western limits of the Indian subcontinent. Roughly, it is Zbigniew Brzezinski's "arc of crisis." To furnish a chronicle and critique of U.S. policy over so broad a region is a formidable task, but it is done here with laudable detachment and passably well. The author draws together the basic facts on the aims of American policy, how it did or did not respond to conditions in the region, and where it succeeded or failed. It is on the interpretation, generally well founded but often unheeding of nuance and always unhesitating in its judgments, that questions may be raised. It is doubtful, for example, if Henry Kissinger would recognize the policies here attributed to him.

IRAQ BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS. By Reeva S. Simon. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, 233 pp. \$30.00.

The main theme of this study is the dominance in Iraqi politics of former Ottoman army officers with German training and a nationalist ideology of the German type. The author makes much, indeed too much, of the German connection, although she is right in stressing the role of the military. The

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book is not a history of Iraq between the wars and does not displace the earlier works of Majid Khadduri, Hanna Baratu and others.

QADDAFI: HIS IDEOLOGY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Mohamed El-Khawas. Brattleboro (Vt.): Amana Books, 1986, 222 pp. \$18.95 (paper, \$9.95).

The author takes a vow of objectivity and succeeds fairly well in keeping it, although with this subject the task is close to impossible. He presents Qaddafi's ideas and policies—Green Book and all—in a straight-faced manner, and then periodically points out where they have not worked or have aroused opposition. On the international aspects, including the running confrontation with the United States, he gives more than one side of each issue, relying mainly on current press reports. Unfortunately, he does not get far beneath the surface in Washington or Libya; perhaps wisely, he does not assay the role of amateur psychiatrist to explain Qaddafi.

THE STATE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN TUNISIA AND LIBYA, 1830–1980. By Lisa Anderson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, 325 pp. \$35.00.

The character of politics in Tunisia and in Libya is not determined solely or even primarily by the fact that the one has been ruled by a European-oriented moderate and the other by a “madman.” The relation between state and society is a key element in Third World development, with the state often the engine of social change; as Lisa Anderson's solid monograph shows, one of the reasons for Libya's problems after independence was the void left by the Italian colonial administration, which destroyed the earlier institutional structure. One would have liked to see a more extensive description and critique of Qaddafi's governmental, or anti-governmental, system in theory and practice than the author provides.

ALGERIA: THE REVOLUTION INSTITUTIONALIZED. By John P. Entelis. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 239 pp. \$30.00.

A “profile” of Algeria that provides at least a brief look at all aspects: history, geography, population, economy, society, culture, internal politics and foreign policy. It is, however, more than simple description; the author displays a keen critical sense especially in analyzing the economy (including the conspicuous failure in agriculture) and the political system; less so, in his treatment of Algeria's militant international role.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

BEHIND THE FORBIDDEN DOOR: TRAVELS IN UNKNOWN CHINA. By Tiziano Terzani. New York: Henry Holt, 1986, 270 pp. \$17.95.

This volume is a somber corrective to much of the current reporting about China. Written by an Italian journalist fluent in Chinese who lived in Beijing for four years before being expelled, it describes the increasing power of the police, the ingrained habits of secrecy, the elaborate surveillance system for controlling the population, and the forced isolation of all Westerners living in China. Terzani's children, writing about their experi-

ences in a Chinese school, complain that at the end of three years "we did not have a single Chinese friend." Teachers kept their "foreign influence" as far away from the Chinese students as they could. Not a single conversation could go much beyond greetings. This and other essays in the book provide eye-opening details about many aspects of contemporary Chinese life that are usually hidden from tourists and other outsiders.

COLD WINDS, WARM WINDS: INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN CHINA TODAY. By Judith Shapiro and Liang Heng. Middletown (Conn.): Wesleyan University Press, 1986, 212 pp. \$17.95.

While Terzani stresses the negative side of contemporary Chinese life, Shapiro and Liang provide a richly detailed account of the new artistic and intellectual freedoms. They show both the degree of intellectual liberation that has occurred since Mao's death and the continuing constraints. They emphasize the unevenness of the development of the new freedoms and the threat to them from party hardliners. They conclude that "increased Sino-Western contact could be crucial to the continuation of the reforms after Deng's death. Many reformers firmly believe that certain aspects of Western values and culture hold the key to the release of China from the feudalistic politics of personality. The more dealings China has with the West and the more stable its economic policies, the greater will be the number of Chinese . . . unwilling to return to an emphasis on ideological orthodoxy and class struggle."

THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION, 1800–1985. By John King Fairbank. New York: Harper & Row, 1986, 396 pp. \$20.95.

The dean of American sinologists has written what is probably destined to be a small classic—a history of China over the last 185 years in one volume. It will be an ideal introduction to China for the general reader. The book is brimming with insight and illumination that can come only from a long historical perspective. On the future of Deng Xiaoping's reform effort, Fairbank believes that the P.R.C.'s entrance into international life cannot in general be reversed, but he is still wary of a xenophobic, anti-materialistic reaction to the current "open door" policy.

THE SOVIET FAR EAST MILITARY BUILDUP: NUCLEAR DILEMMAS AND ASIAN SECURITY. Edited by Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka. Dover (Mass.): Auburn House, 1986, 280 pp. \$29.95 (paper, \$16.95).

This is a pioneering effort to look at the expansion of Soviet ground, naval and air forces in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly the nuclearization of the Soviet military presence, and to evaluate its significance for the countries of East Asia that are allied to, or friendly with, the United States. As the editors point out, an important element in Soviet strategy in Europe has been to raise fears among America's allies about the decoupling of the U.S. strategic deterrent from the defense of Europe, and to stimulate public anxiety about the possibility of nuclear conflict as a means of undermining the political foundations of NATO. Moscow is pursuing a similar strategy in Asia, where its unabated nuclear buildup has been paralleled by a series of political initiatives designed to arouse fears about nuclear conflict. Although these efforts have been less successful in Asia than in Europe, antinuclear sentiment persists throughout the region, as is evident in New

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Zealand, Australia, by the August 1985 effort by the South Pacific Forum states to create a nuclear-free zone, and by the recent efforts among some groups in the Philippines to turn that country into a nuclear-free zone. The volume is an important contribution to one of the critical questions of American foreign policy: how to maintain a security coalition in the nuclear age.

ASIAN-PACIFIC SECURITY: EMERGING CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES. Edited by Young Whan Khil and Lawrence E. Grinter. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1986, 274 pp. \$25.00.

This is a well edited and useful collection of essays on the security environment in East Asia, including a particularly cogent summary of China's strategic thinking by Robert Sutter. According to Sutter, whereas China once saw the Soviet Union as an immediate threat to its security, it now sees it as more of a long-term threat. Beijing believes that the focus of Soviet attention is in Europe but that the strength of NATO requires Moscow to work in other regions, notably the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Africa and East Asia, in order to outflank Western defenses. China is seen as a relatively low priority to Soviet strategists, but Chinese leaders clearly appreciate the dire consequences if the U.S.S.R. were able to consolidate its position elsewhere and then focus on China. China's strategy, therefore, aims basically to obstruct Soviet expansion in general and to raise the possibility of a multi-front conflict if the U.S.S.R. tries to attack China. Cooperation with the United States is especially important.

THE ORIGINS OF WAR IN SOUTH ASIA: INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICTS SINCE 1947. By Sumit Ganguly. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1986, 182 pp.

This is a richly researched and solid analysis of the three Indo-Pakistani wars since 1947. It offers some interesting reasons why there may not be a fourth. Within Kashmir, the scene of two of the three wars, only a vocal minority now seeks independence from India while the majority party, the Kashmir National Congress, merely seeks better conditions within the Indian national framework. Thus the force of Pakistani irredentism has diminished. Also the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and India's unquestioned military strength make it difficult for any Pakistani regime to contemplate an attack on India. Finally, the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by both sides may in fact lead to increased prudence by the two South Asian rivals.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

BEGGAR YOUR NEIGHBOURS: APARTHEID POWER IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. By Joseph Hanlon. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986, 352 pp. \$35.00.

The low-level conflict between South Africa and its neighbors, rising and falling from time to time and place to place, will probably escalate notch by notch as the republic's internal struggles intensify. This volume provides an invaluable background for understanding the regional conflict, assembling reams of data on the history and current state of political and

economic relations between South Africa and the neighboring black-ruled states.

THE APARTHEID CRISIS: HOW WE CAN DO JUSTICE IN A LAND OF VIOLENCE. By Oliver F. Williams. New York: Harper & Row, 1986, 124 pp. \$7.95 (paper).

A Roman Catholic theologian aims this argument about the moral value of sanctions against South Africa toward a general audience, setting the scene with a simple history of the country and map of present-day politics. Arguing for responsible involvement on the part of U.S. business (which he calls "stewardship"), he tries hard to give a balanced view of disinvestment (which he characterizes in terms of "clean hands" and "prophetic" approaches).

APARTHEID IN CRISIS. Edited by Mark A. Uhlig. New York: Vintage Books, 1986, 334 pp. \$5.95 (paper).

This useful collection brings together speeches and writings of representative South Africans including ANC leader Nelson Mandela, Bishop Tutu, President P. W. Botha, novelists Nadine Gordimer and Mothobi Mutloatse, and right-wing leader Andries Treurnicht, whose voices together evoke the complicated dissonances of South Africa today. Framed by analyses of black and white politics, black unions, the country's economy and its foreign relations, the book provides a readable introduction to South Africa for a lay audience.

ETHIOPIA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. By David A. Korn. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986, 199 pp.

This illuminating study is to some extent a personal account of U.S. relations with Ethiopia as experienced by the author, who, as chargé d'affaires, was head of the American embassy in Addis Ababa from 1982 to 1985. Korn also recounts the saga of the somewhat ambivalent efforts by the United States to maintain some influence with an increasingly "unfriendly" regime from 1974 on, and assesses the ties between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. While not trying to demystify a fairly inscrutable period of Ethiopian history, the book does provide a convincing sketch of strongman Mengistu and a detailed evaluation of the regime's problematic role in the international famine relief operations.

THE CRISIS IN ZAIRE: MYTHS AND REALITIES. Edited by Nzongola-Ntalaja. Trenton (N.J.): Africa World Press, 1986, 327 pp. \$32.00 (paper, \$11.95).

In this excellent study, Zaïrean and American scholars look at African development issues from one—admittedly extreme—case. Scrutinizing the origins of Zaïre's economic debacle, the role of international actors and the evolution of the economy as peasants try to retreat from state control, they only occasionally grapple with prescription. Though the book's overall approach is iconoclastic regarding the current advocacy of "privatization," the authors have nothing to say about state reform and a good deal of emphasis falls on improving the economic chances of the peasant.

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IMPOSING AID: EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES. By B. E. Harrell-Bond. New York: Oxford, 1986, 440 pp. \$12.95 (paper).

Drawing on months of fieldwork among Ugandan refugees in the Sudan, the author provides an eye-level account of refugee life and the workings of emergency relief programs. Her conclusions are provocative and valuable: refugees should contribute to the local economy and should be integrated into it; refugees themselves and the local community should plan development projects; and aid should aim at building the local infrastructure for the benefit of both refugees and the original local inhabitants.

AFRICAN REFUGEES: REFLECTIONS ON THE AFRICAN REFUGEE PROBLEM. By Gaim Kibreab. Trenton (N.J.): Africa World Press, 1985, 129 pp. \$25.00 (paper, \$7.95).

The focus here is on the dimensions of the problem—vast in relation to the African states' present-day ability to provide for extra mouths—and possibilities for absorption of refugees through "integrated zonal development" schemes. The author, an Eritrean living in Sweden, goes to some lengths to debunk myths about tribalism and "African hospitality."

THE FUTURE OF AFRICA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. Edited by Ralph I. Onwuka and Olajide Aluko. New York: St. Martin's, 1986, 326 pp. \$29.95.

A number of Nigerians and a few Americans take a contemporary look at what has become a largely historical artifact. While not happy with the North's rejection of a new order, they are generally very realistic about the reasons as well as about future prospects; and many call overwhelmingly for internal reform and South-South cooperation as the most feasible route to development for African countries.

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